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ABSTRACT 
 
Previous, mainly quantitative, research has indicated that information security threats 
and incidents are having a significant impact on the conduct of electronic business - 
and office automation in general - both nationally and internationally.  However, as 
revealed by this study‟s extensive review of the relevant literature, our understanding 
of the information security situation in Australian organisations has been quite 
limited.  There has been very little detailed research into security threats and 
incidents and, equally importantly, the strategies the Australian IT industry is using 
to deal with them. 
 
In addressing that deficiency, this study used a qualitative, case-based research 
methodology involving a variety of Australian organisations. The case based 
approach, using in-depth interviews, facilitated a thorough examination of the 
information security risks (threats and incidents) and enabled assessment and 
analysis of management actions (countermeasures) to mitigate the identified risks. 
 
 
The major findings with regard to this study's research issues are: 
 
 The case-study organisations are generally highly reliant on IT for the 
conduct of their business and therefore would be heavily impacted if it was 
unavailable 
 They face a variety of information security threats with viruses being the 
most prevalent threat. The hacking threat was not as evident as reported in the 
literature 
 There are some differences between the Australian information security 
experience and that reported in the literature for international organisations in 
particular many of the very large business overseas operate on a much larger 
scale than those in Australia 
 The organisations do not believe that they are specific targets for security 
attacks; rather they believe that are 'targets of opportunity' 
 A wide range of countermeasures are employed; generally, the larger the 
organisation the greater the diversity and complexity of countermeasures. 
However, the majority do not have a clear link between risks and 
countermeasures 
 The majority of the organisations do not have a specific security budget. 
 
Whilst Australian organisations were generally well prepared and versed on security 
issues, the findings indicate the need for the application of best practice across the 
industry as a whole.  A degree of cynicism regarding the nature of the hacking threat 
was evident – with many participants believing that the threat is overstated. Indeed 
this study uncovered little direct evidence of the organisations involved being 
subjected to actual hacker attacks. 
 
The framework developed for this study and its findings are readily adaptable for use 
by industry. By following the process specified in the framework, organisations will 
be better able to identify both likely and unlikely threats and incidents and deploy 
appropriate countermeasures. 
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter introduces the dissertation topic and the specific project described and 
analysed in a later chapter. This chapter begins with an overview of the relevant 
parent disciplines for an investigation into IT security in the Australian business 
environment. This study attempts to identify the IT security threats, the actual 
number and type of incidents and the counter measures that organisations are 
employing to protect their systems. For the purpose of this thesis: 
 
- Information security is basically about the examination of threats and 
risks to information and the application of technical sciences and 
procedures to counter those threats (Hancock 2000; Dhillon 2007).  
 
- Risk management is essentially a process designed to study and identify 
risks, investigate risk reduction methods and the implementation of the 
risk reduction methods and the subsequent management of the residual 
risk (Caelli, Longley, and Shain 1989; Conrow and Shishido 1997; 
Hassler 2001).  
 
 
These terms are more fully discussed in chapter 2. 
1.1 Background and Significance of the Study 
 
The electronic economy and the Internet economy in Australia is booming with 
Australian organisations estimating that Internet business tools generated $28 billion 
in 2000 to 2001 (Brown 2001). In the five years to 2006-07 Internet Service 
Providers (ISP) in Australia have achieved growth of over 152.6% (Baker 2007). 
With large amounts of money at stake chief executives and IT managers alike must 
be aware of the actual risk to their organisations in order to deploy the appropriate 
counter measures. Australian companies do suffer financial losses from computer 
crime and security related incidents (Thompson 1998; Lichtenstein 1998).  
Therefore, the Australian business community would benefit from a comprehensive 
study into information security in the Australian business environment. 
 
Section 3.0 will demonstrate that there is a gap in the literature in regards to nature of 
threats to IT resources in Australia. One previous study used a case based 
methodology to conduct an in-depth review of the information security problems of 
one particular organisation (Lichtenstein 1998). This research confirms that there are 
security threats worthy of further investigation.  As the Lichtenstein study involved a 
single organisation a more comprehensive study may provide additional information. 
 
Much of today‟s economy relies on the use of IT. Until recently only a few managers 
were fully aware of how their day-to-day operations and basic business 
administration was dependant on the availability and integrity of computing and 
network resources (Caelli et al 1989; Withers 2002). Organisations and society in 
general are increasingly more dependent on the use of technology and organisations 
are becoming even more reliant on computer technology and the interconnection of 
computing resources (Furnell and Warren 1999; McNurlin and Sprague 1998; Ward 
and Griffiths 1998).  
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The success or failure of an organisation now rests with its ability to maintain and 
leverage their IT resources. Hence the importance of ensuring that computing and 
network resources remain available and that the integrity of organisational data is 
assured (Caelli et al 1989; Fisher 1984; Westwood 1997). 
 
1.1.1 Significance of Information Security 
 
The information economy is now a significant part of our way of life with more 
organisations turning to e-commerce and the Internet to either create or extend their 
business (Brown 2001; Hassler 2001). It is therefore somewhat ironic that the 
technology being used to develop business can also be used to conduct cyber crime 
against businesses (Caelli, Gaskell, Longley 2005). Businesses are suffering 
verifiable financial losses from cyber crime. In 1998 for example one study indicated 
losses to business were in the order US $266 million dollars (Harrison 1999). 
 
There is evidence that instances of cyber crime are increasing. The US Federal 
Bureau of Investigations (FBI) and the Computer Security Institute (CSI) have 
teamed together over the last 12 years to conduct a number of surveys on information 
security. Their findings show that the number of reported attacks is increasing and 
the amount of money being lost to cyber criminals is growing at an equally alarming 
rate (Power 2000). In the year 2000 survey 90% of respondents had suffered from an 
attack or misuse of their systems (Power 2000). This figure was up from 78% in 
1999. Overtime however, the year 2000 peak had reduced to 46% in 2007 
(Richardson 2007). 
 
1.2  Research Problem 
 
The business research problem for the proposed study is stated in general terms 
(Zikmund 1997) and focuses on the general area of the problem (McPhail 2000). The 
proposed research problem for the study is as follows: 
The phenomenon of information security incidents, and concerns over data 
security are having a significant impact on the conduct of electronic business 
and office automation in general. Little is known of the impact, costs, or what 
strategies the Australian IT industry is using to deal with information security 
incidents. 
1.3 Justification for research 
 
The research as proposed is justified on the basis that it is unique in the depth that it 
intends to cover information security in the Australian context. There is a gap in the 
current literature in regards to both detail and availability of qualitative data and 
quantitative data in Australia. The majority of past research deals with quantitative 
data for example Briney (1998) and Harrison (1999). Qualitative studies in Australia 
about cyber crime and information security are limited in the number of cases that 
they contain, for example Lichtenstein (1998) details a single case. The 1997 
Information Security Survey (Thompson 1998) is the most detailed study found that 
was conducted in the Australian environment, however, it focused on law 
enforcement issues and makes few inferences. 
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The findings of this research will be highly relevant to many Australian organisations 
that rely heavily on interconnected computer systems and the Internet. Qualitative 
data on how threats are being realized, why certain companies are being targeted, and 
what companies are doing to protect themselves would be highly valuable 
information. Industry value alone provides sufficient justification for the pursuit of 
the proposed research question (Varadarjan 1996). Analytical generalizations made 
from the research finding will enable industry to make more informed IT security 
decisions. 
 
1.3.1 Contribution of the research (contribution to theory/contribution 
to practice) 
 
The expected outcome of this research is to increase Australian industry‟s 
understanding of the nature of information security issues that they face. Importantly 
it will better enable Australian business to identify information security risks. Armed 
with a more complete picture of the relevant risks IT managers will be able to make 
more informed decisions about how they attempt to manage the risks to their 
organisations. 
1.4 Methodology 
 
The research was aimed at in-depth and detailed investigation of the how and why of 
information security in Australia. Based on the framework provided by Yin (1994) 
for choosing an appropriate research strategy, case study was chosen as the most 
appropriate method. Data collection was done in two ways: a pilot study and in-depth 
interviews. Each data collection method is briefly described below. 
 
In-depth Interviews. A case study matrix was developed in order to get a reasonable 
cross section of large/small to medium enterprise and both public and private 
organisations. Two informants from each organisation were chosen from the IT 
management area. Where possible, a general IT manager was chosen as one 
informant and an IT security specialist was chosen as the other in order to gain a 
different perspective on information security. A 45-minute interview was scheduled 
for each participant. An interview guide was developed to provide a basic structure 
to the interviews. In some cases the interviews could not be conducted face to face 
and had to be conducted via a combination of telephone and electronic 
correspondence. 
 
Pilot study. As much of the previous research had been conducted using quantitative 
research techniques that had proved less than scientific due to poor response rates a 
small pilot study was conducted to test the validity of quantitative and qualitative 
techniques. The pilot study consisted of a single case interview and the distribution 
of a survey instrument to a number of well-frequented information security 
newsgroups on the Internet. The pilot was also used to validate assumptions and 
gather feedback on the focus and usefulness of the research. 
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1.5 Structure of dissertation 
 
This MIT dissertation is structured as follows: 
 
Chapter 2 - Literature Review. This chapter provides a review of the literature 
surrounding information security and presents a research framework by which 
information security in the Australian business context can be investigated. Specific 
research questions are also presented which will be addressed in the data collection 
stage. 
 
Chapter 3 - Methodology. This chapter identifies, describes and justifies the 
methodology used to explore the research problem and answers the research 
questions. Data collection procedures and the interview guide are also presented. 
 
Chapter 4 - Data Analysis. This chapter reports on the finding from the in-depth 
interviews in the context of Australian business. 
 
Chapter 5 - Conclusions and Implications. This chapter answers the research 
questions and provides conclusions about the research problem. The implications for 
theory and practice are also presented. Finally, the limitations of the study, and 
implications for future research are discussed. 
 
1.6 Delimitations of scope and key assumptions 
 
Information security can potentially impact on all organisations that use computing 
or information resources. Due to potentially global nature of the interconnected 
information systems this research has focused only on information security in the 
Australian context. It focus is on the collection of qualitative data gathered from IT 
managers about how information security impacts on their business. 
 
A key assumption that has been made is that organisations will be reluctant to 
participate in the study due to the potentially sensitive nature of the information 
being dealt with. In some cases the informants are being asked to identify system 
vulnerabilities or are inferring information about potential systemic problems with 
their organisations. The data collected will be primarily relevant to the time frame in 
which it was collected 2002 – 2003. 
 
1.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter laid the foundation for the dissertation. It provided a background on 
information security and the significance of information security to business. The 
study was justified as a significant contribution to both theory and practice of 
information security in Australia. The method by which the research was conducted 
was presented. Following which the delimitations of scope and key assumptions 
were presented. Finally, an overview of the dissertation chapter was given. 
 
The next chapter is a review of literature regarding information security in Australia. 
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CHAPTER 2 - LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter provides an overview of the published literature and research on 
information security. It also provides a research framework for studying information 
security in Australia. Specific research questions are also presented which will be 
addressed in the next stage of the study. The chapter provides an introduction to IT 
academics who are interested in information security issues whilst also being of 
relevance to information security practitioners as it provides a unique and objective 
approach to the subject matter. The chapter starts with an introduction to the 
disciplines that are applicable to the study; risk management and information 
security. Throughout the discussion of the literature references are made to the 
international context and findings and the equivalent research results in the 
Australian context. Then a research framework that could be used to investigate 
information security in Australia is presented. Finally, the research questions that 
cover the issues of the research question are presented. 
 
2.1 Risk Management 
 
Risk management and analysis are commonly used terms and methodologies 
employed in business. Risk management is an element of management science, 
which has provided the basis of underwriting decisions in the insurance industry 
(Caelli et al 2005). For the purpose of this research we are primarily interested in the 
application of risk management methodologies as they relate to information systems 
and information security. Risk management methodologies may use qualitative, 
quantitative or combination of both methodologies in order to estimate the level and 
nature of risk (Halliday, Badenhorst, von Solms 1996) 
 
2.1.1 Simple Risk Management Model 
 
A simple risk management model is depicted in Figure 2-1 below.   Risk analysis is 
the key component of the risk management methodology. Risk analysis evaluates the 
relationship between the seriousness of a threat, the frequency of occurrence 
(probability), and the cost of implementing a suitable protection mechanism (Hassler 
2001). 
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Figure 2-1: Simple Risk Management Model 
Assets
Threats
Vulnerabilities
Risks Countermeasures
Analysis Management
 
Source: Caelli et al  1996 
 
The risk analysis process involves the analysis and study of: 
 
 The assets to be protected 
 The threats in the assets environment 
 The vulnerabilities to these threats 
 The types of impact to be reduced  
 The safeguards used to mitigate the risk 
 
Source: Caelli, Longley, and Shain 1994 
 
2.1.2 Security vs Functionality 
 
Security procedures are costly and often involve some form of compromise for a 
company‟s profits, user convenience, and turn around times. (Risk free information 
security or any other business activity is never attainable.) Acceptable levels of risk 
must be postulated (Caelli et al 2005). Essentially, a decision must be made in regard 
to the amount of security to employ in relation to an acceptable level of system 
functionality. Risk analysis aims to ensure that the decisions made are based on 
accurate information. Figure 2-2 (below) illustrates that as functionality in a system 
increases the amount of security that is generally capable of being applied drops. 
This is the essence of how risk management applies to information security. 
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Figure 2-2: Security v Functionality Trade Off 
Se
cu
rit
y
Functionality
Y
-A
x
is
Security v Functionality
 
Source: Developed for this research 
 
2.1.3 Qualitative Risk Analysis 
 
Qualitative risk analysis, according to Peltier cited by Power (2000, p.281) “is a 
technique that can be used to determine the level of protection required for 
applications, systems, facilities, and other enterprise assets. It is a systematic 
examination of assets, threats, and vulnerabilities.” The qualitative methodology 
attempts to prioritise the various risk elements in subjective terms. Qualitative 
methodologies usually relate to variables that are intangible, descriptive, or 
subjective in nature. Qualitative matrixes are expressed in terms of a ranking from 
high to low or using numbers to rank threats, vulnerabilities or assets. 
 
The twelve steps in qualitative risk analysis identified by Power (2000) are: 
 
1. Develop a plan 
2. Develop an application priority 
3. Identify and evaluate assets 
4. Identify threats 
5. Evaluate threats 
6. Estimate potential losses 
7. Calculate risk factors 
8. Analyse vulnerabilities 
9. Identify safeguards 
10. Perform cost/benefit analysis of safeguards 
11. Rank safeguards in priority order 
12. Write risk-analysis report 
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2.1.4 Quantitative Risk Analysis 
 
Quantitative risk analysis uses mathematical formula to determine in tangible form 
the monetary costs and potential losses involved in a risk. A popular quantitative 
technique is Annualised Loss Exposure (ALE) (Bandyopadhyay, Mykytyn. P, 
Mykytyn. K 2000; Caelli et al 2005). This technique attempts to assess risk based on 
the Risk = Probability of occurrence x one time loss produced by the occurrence of a 
threat (Caelli et al 2005; Fisher 1984). Quantitative techniques allow businesses to 
compare the value of their information assets to the amount of money they can or 
should spend protecting those systems. 
 
 
2.2 Information Security 
 
It is somewhat ironic that one of the first uses of the computer was to break codes 
and ciphers used to protect information during World War II. The allied effort was 
greatly assisted by the use of the first computer to break the German Enigma code, 
which subsequently helped stop the German U-Boat Wolf-Packs from savaging 
allied shipping. Now the security of all information, particularly that stored and 
transmitted using computers or other electronic devices is subject to potential 
compromise (Caelli et al 1996). 
 
Security is a broad concept, which has its own language, which focuses on the 
processes of attacks on information, and in preventing, detecting and recovering from 
attacks (Caelli et al 1996). Information security is defined as procedures and actions 
designed to prevent the unauthorised disclosure, transfer, modification, or 
destruction, whether accidental or intentional, of information in a network. 
Information includes data, voice, video, images, and fax (Ghosh and Schumacher 
1997). 
 
2.2.1 Information security components 
Information security consists of three main system components: 
 Confidentiality 
 Integrity 
 Availability 
 
Source: Caelli et al 1996 
 
Another two components that are sometimes added to the main three are non-
repudiation and authentication (Hassler 2001;Escamilla 1998). Figure 2-3 below 
depicts the relationship between information security requirements and business 
enabling information. 
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Figure 2-3: Information Security Concepts 
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Source: Developed for this research 
 
2.2.1.1 Confidentiality 
 
Confidentiality refers to the protection of data so that it cannot be disclosed in an 
unauthorised fashion, also referred to as privacy or secrecy (Escamilla 1998; Hassler 
2001; Caelli 1996). Most IT users recognise the need to ensure that the information 
that they transmit to a recipient should arrive without being read by a third party. 
Encryption is the most widely used technique or process used to provide 
confidentiality to data and systems. Whilst it is one of the most widely employed 
mechanisms, encryption alone will not protect all systems from being destroyed or 
modified, therefore it is usually combined with other protection tools. 
 
2.2.1.2 Integrity 
 
The data integrity component of information security aims at ensuring that data is not 
modified or altered by unauthorised system users (Hassler 2001; Escamilla 1998). It 
is possible that damages could be sustained if users of systems make business 
decisions based on faulty information. A systems‟ integrity relates to the assurance of 
accuracy, completeness, and performance according to defined specifications 
(Khadraoui and Herrman 2007). 
 
Integrity is normally provided on a computing system through a number of 
approaches. Encryption can assist in providing data integrity by ensuring that data 
packets are not intercepted, modified and then re-transmitted to an unsuspecting 
recipient. Access control, which involves ensuring that only authorised users can 
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gain access to data is another mechanism that be used to provide or to ensure data 
integrity (Escamilla 1998; Khadraoui et al 2007; Hassler 2001). By restricting access 
to a particular system it makes it potentially harder for an outsider to access and then 
modify the data. 
2.2.1.3 Availability 
 
The availability goal in information security is to protect network services and data 
from unauthorised attempts to withhold information or computer resources 
(Escamilla 1998). Lack of access to information can be a critical concern. If patients‟ 
medical records become unavailable due to a network security problem the 
consequences could be fatal. 
 
Statements about the availability of network and data services cannot be made with 
the same level of confidence as can be given for confidentiality and integrity 
(Escamilla 1998). A hardware failure resulting in a network traffic congestion 
problem could deny users access to resources. Either of which could be a result of 
equipment failure, poor network planning or some other reason and therefore not the 
result of security incident per se. A number of controls may, however be 
implemented to increase availability. Network design, access control, and prioritising 
services and users can all promote enhanced resource availability. 
 
2.2.1.4 Authentication 
 
Authentication ensures that a users‟ identity or data origin are genuine and that they 
have access rights and privileges to computer resources (Hassler 2001). 
Authentication systems determine what IT resources any given user has the right to 
use on a system. Most network operating systems have some form of built-in 
authentication system that associates a particular user with a list of resources that the 
user is allowed to access. Encryption techniques can also be employed in more 
sophisticated authentication systems. 
 
2.2.1.5 Non-repudiation 
 
Non-repudiation is the process of proving that a message or data could not have 
come from anyone other than a stated author (Escamilla 1998). Non-repudiation is a 
valuable concept in military systems. For example, before ordering an attack on an 
enemy, generals would want to be certain that the message they received was from 
the appropriate and authorised source (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1997). This concept is 
also important to business. Any organisation that wants to guarantee that the other 
party in a conversation, message, or other data transfer is the person or organisation 
that they claim to be may be interested in non-repudiation services. The common 
technique used for non-repudiation in public key cryptography. 
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2.3 The information security in Australia immediate discipline 
 
In the Information Security in Australia immediate discipline, five research issues 
will be addressed. 
 
 
2.3.1 Threats to information security in Australian business 
 
As this study is based on information security in Australia it is important to 
determine what information security threats are faced by Australian industry. 
International literature and research findings will be used to provide a preliminary 
list of threats. This will allow for the comparison between threats in the Australian 
environment and those identified overseas. 
 
As mentioned in previous sections of this thesis data in the Australian context is 
limited in comparison to studies that have been conducted overseas. A basic list of 
information security threats that Australian business face are as follows: 
 
 Disgruntled employees 
 Independent hackers or information brokers 
 Australian owned corporate competitor 
 Foreign corporate competitor 
 Customers 
 Suppliers 
 Foreign government intelligence activity 
 Criminals 
 Authorised users 
 
Source: Thompson 1997 
 
In one international study, in which, 114 Australian businesses participated, 53% of 
all the participating businesses stated that they were more concerned about external 
threats,  53% by hackers, unauthorised users 49% are rated as a greater threat than 
current employees/authorised users 31% (Dinnie 1999). Whilst there were Australian 
participants in the survey no breakdown of the threats perceived in each country has 
been given. This study could not therefore shine any light on the situation in 
Australia. It would be desirable to establish whether, the threats in Australia are 
indeed similar to those experienced internationally. 
 
The increasing threat of viruses should be added to Thompson‟s list. Viruses are a 
known threat to Australian businesses Lichtenstein (1998). The problem of 
definitions of what a threat is; is an issue that could cause difficulty in either 
compiling a list of threats or attempting to make comparisons between international 
studies. The definitions for threats, types of incidents and vulnerabilities are often 
used interchangeably (Caelli et al 1996). For the purpose of this research a threat is 
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defined as „...the active agent in a potentially loss causing event‟ (Caelli et al 1996 
p.84).  
 
Each of the major threats will be discussed in the sections below. 
 
2.3.1.1 Viruses 
 
The threat of computer viruses has become headline news over the last few years. A 
few years ago many people were unaware of the potential threat that viruses posed to 
computer systems and that data that resides on those systems (Richardson 2007; 
Baker, Hylender, and Valentine 2008). Computer viruses are now commonplace. 
They pose real and credible threats to virtually all computer-based networks. Not 
only are the threats of computers viruses‟ real the number of incidence and the 
numbers of viruses in circulation are on the increase (Caelli et al 1996; Khadraoui et 
al 2007; Kearvell-White 1996; Bissett and Shipton 1999; Hanson 2000). 
 
The virus was defined by Cohen as a program that can infect other programs by 
modifying themselves to include a (possibly evolved) copy of itself (Caelli et al 
1996). The National Computer Security Centre has recently defined the term virus as 
a „self propagating „Trojan Horse‟, composed of a mission component, a trigger 
component, and a self propagating component. A more complete definition of the 
term virus is given by Pipkin (2000), who defines a virus as a program that infects 
another program by replicating itself into the host program. A virus has three phases: 
 
1. The infection phase where the host is infected from previously 
existing virus. 
2. The activation phase, where this new copy is triggered to find a new 
host to infect. 
3. The replication phase, where the virus finds a suitable host and copies 
itself to the host. 
 
Most researchers in the area of information security investigate viruses as threats to 
computer systems to some extent. A number of international surveys have indicated 
that viruses are the common type of information security incident that an 
organisation is likely to face (Richardson 2007; Baker et al 2008; Rapalus 2000; 
Dinnie 1999; Bisset et al 1996). The research does show that there is some difference 
in the quantitative figure for the rate of incidents. According to one study, conducted 
by Ernst and Young, the global rate of business exposed to viruses was 52 %, with 
49 % of Australian organisations indicating that they had suffered from virus attacks 
(Dinnie 1999). This survey also reported that the incident of viruses in the United 
States was 63%. The Computer Security Institute and US Federal Bureau of 
Investigation figures for the same year are vastly different. The CSI/FBI research 
indicates that in the same year 90% of respondents had been subject to virus attacks 
(Power 2000). 
 
The CSI/FBI survey only considers United States respondents but the wide variation 
between the Ernst and Young research and the CSI/FBI results highlight one of the 
significant issues relating to research in the information security field. According to 
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the Ernst and Young research they included the comments of 4 254 IT managers in 
29 countries. The report does not indicate response rates. The CSI/FBI report, which 
is considered an authoritative source of statistics in the field, had a 14% response 
rate.  A 1996 study conducted by KPMG in the UK had a response rate of 9.6% 
(Kearvell-White 1996), while an industry wide survey conducted by Information 
Security Journal in 1998 had 9.9% response rate. Given the extremely low response 
rates it is difficult to know the true rate of virus incidents or any other type of 
information security incident. 
 
The number of new viruses in circulation increases by between 150 – 200 per month 
(Kearvell-White 1996). Many of the „new‟ viruses however, are simple 
modifications of an existing virus (Bissett et al 1996). For example a virus that 
displayed a certain message on the screen could be slightly changed to alter the 
spelling of a single word on the screen. The altered message would result in the virus 
being classified as a different virus. 
 
Current research does not tell us the whole story of the threat and impact that viruses 
are having on businesses, particularly as those threats affect Australian organisations. 
As the current information involves mainly quantitative data it can only be implied in 
a limited context. Surveys conducted by KPMG, Ernst and Young, and the CSI/FBI 
attempt to quantify the number of virus related security incidents that are occurring 
and in some case they also attempt to quantify the financial losses that result from 
such incidents (Power 2000; Briney 1998; Dinnie 1999; Kearvell-White 1996). There 
is a gap in the current literature as little is known about the kinds of how, why, and 
when viruses incidents are occurring. More needs to be known about the nature of 
the virus threat to Australian organisations so a proper defence strategy can be 
formulated. 
 
Quantitative surveys conducted in Australia under the auspices of the Australian 
Computer Emergency Response Team (AusCERT) indicate that viruses were the 
most common form of electronic attack reported by their respondents with 45% of 
respondents experiencing this type of infection (AusCERT 2006). 
 
2.3.1.2 The internal threat - Disgruntled employees 
 
It has already been identified that there are a wide variety of potential threats to 
computing systems and networks. One of the more frequent or likely threats that an 
organisation‟s systems face originate internally (Powers 2000; Denning 1999; 
Thompson 1997; Dinnie 1999). The internal threat has been described in a variety of 
ways by different researchers and authors on the subject. Essentially, the internal 
threat is made up disgruntled former and current employees whom take it upon 
themselves to seek revenge or de-fraud their employer and of authorised users who 
access information without proper authorisation (Denning, Caelli et al 1996; Briney 
1998). 
 
The threat of the insider „turned bad‟ has attracted a significant amount of coverage 
in the media. One such example of a trusted employee who turned into a major 
information security threat can be seen in the well-known Tim Lloyd/Omega case. In 
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this case an employer became upset at the lack of respect that he was being showed 
by his organisation. After leaving the organisation a computer application that he had 
built and later modified was made to crash their file servers. The consequential 
damage cost Omega 10 million dollars and 80 staff were retrenched (Gaudin 2000). 
This case demonstrates that a significant amount of trust is given to employees 
especially those with network administration roles (Gaudin 2000; Ceraolo 1998, 
Powers 2000; Schumacher et al 1997). Insiders are more likely to have intimate 
knowledge of how systems internal to organisation operate and what data is most 
valuable to an organisation. When this knowledge is combined with access to a 
system a dis-affected employee or even a thrill seeking employer could cause a 
considerable security threat. 
 
The American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS) survey, conducted in 1998 
confirmed what information security experts have been saying for years: The single 
greatest threat to corporate intellectual property is trusted insiders – current and 
former employees, temps, onsite contractors, and consultants (Denning, 1999). Other 
surveys support the notion that insiders are a major threat to corporate security 
(Thompson 1998; Dinnie 1999; Rapalus 2000), however, there is some debate as to 
the exact level of threat, and whether is the most likely or simply among the more 
likely threats to information security and corporate information in general (Power 
2000; Ernst and Young 1995 Survey 1995; NUA Internet Survey 2001). Current 
research also indicates that the number of incidents of insider originated security 
breaches are increasing, however, the percentage rise in external incidents is 
increasing a faster rate. The CSI/FBI research indicates that over the last five years 
the disgruntled or dishonest employees involved in security related incidents has 
topped the level of threats (Powers 2000; Rapalus 2000). In general terms the threat 
from insiders has remained constant in comparison to increased rate for external 
sources of security incidents. 
 
The 1995 Ernst and Young Survey indicated that 88% of respondent organisations 
stated that internal threats were greater than external threats (Ernst and Young 1996). 
The CSI/FBI report show that in 1997 40% of respondents reported incidents relating 
to employee access abuse; in the year 2000 this figure rose to 71% (Powers 2000; 
Rapalus 2000). One the prominent reasons cited for the insider threat is because of 
the very nature of organisational networks, they are by definition designed to give 
people access to information. Security related incidents occur when a system is 
designed in such a manner that it is possible to gain access to information for which 
they have no right to see. Unauthorised access to information is perhaps the largest 
component of insider related security incidents (Powers 2000; Denning 1999; Briney 
1998; Ceraolo 1998; Guadin 2000). An additional type of insider abuse of systems 
has also surfaced over the last few years, namely, employees abusing their access to 
Internet during work time (Powers 2000; Lichtenstein 1998). Organisations are keen 
to ensure that valuable work time is not lost while employees misuse the Internet 
(Briney 1998; Denning 1999; Kearvell-White 1996). 
 
The perception of the internal threat being greater than the external threat has 
reduced in the years from 2000 – 2008. In fact many organisations now consider the 
external threat to be greater than the internal threat. This may be because of 
increasing maturity of organisations in the analysis of risks or due to implementation 
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of countermeasures that have adequately dealt with the earlier identified insider 
threat (Richardson 2007; Baker et al 2008, AUSCERT 2006). 
 
Research into information security threats in the Australian context, whilst limited in 
scope and size in comparison to the international studies indicates that Australian 
organisations also believe that the internal threat is more likely in comparison to 
external threats (Thompson 1998; Liechtenstein 1998).  
 
This study attempts to differentiate between „threats‟ and „incidents‟. A threat for 
example may never eventuate – whilst an incident is something that has actually 
occurred. This distinction is made due to the importance of perceptions on how 
information security is managed (hence the importance of a qualitative approach). 
For example the example of „insider‟ threat mentioned above. In comparison to the 
findings mentioned recent Australian surveys demonstrate that the majority of 
incidents (83% externally compared to 29% internally launched incidents) 
(AusCERT 2006). 
 
2.3.1.3 Hackers and Hacking 
 
The term hacker is generally used to describe those people who attempt to penetrate 
a system externally (Powers 2000). Within the hacking community however, a 
hacker is defined as a person who attempts to break into a system in order to learn 
and explore whilst a person who breaks into a system with the intent to steal or 
destroy is referred to as a cracker (Powers 2000; Furnell, Downland, and Sanders 
1999; Westwood 1997; Khadraoui et al 2007). Regardless of their intent hackers and 
crackers attempt to illegally gain access to an organisation‟s computing networks and 
therefore pose a significant threat to the information that resides on those systems 
(Caelli et al 1996). 
 
The popular stereotypical hacker is a young intelligent person attempting prove their 
skills and to perhaps make a statement about a particular point of view. Whilst a 
certain percentage of hackers may fit this profile other researchers are quick to point 
out that there are far more serious hackers who are professional in every sense of the 
word; they can be sponsored by large corporations or foreign governments with 
intent to gather otherwise unavailable information (Powers 2000; Denning 1999; 
Westwood 1997; Khadraoui et al 2007; Furnell and Downland et al 1999; Furnell et 
al 1999; Hinde 1998; Schwartua 1994). 
 
The term „White Hat‟ and „Black Hat are also used to describe hackers and crackers 
respectively (Bishchoff 2001). Again, the white hat is driven by curiosity whilst the 
black hat is driven by power or for the chance at stealing or making a profit 
(Bishchoff 2001). It is comparing the fundamental differences where the paradigm of 
defending against hackers seems flawed. It is widely believed that the white hat 
hackers thrive on the challenging of breaking into highly secured systems whilst the 
black hats will generally target those with little or no security; the analogy often used 
is “if my house is locked then the thief will move next door” (Bishchoff 2001; 
Gouldson 2001; Caelli et al 1996; Power 2000). This theory does not account for 
those professional hackers who may be determined to break into a particular site for 
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specific reasons such as obtaining information that no other organisation has (Powers 
2000; Denning 1999; Schwartua 1994). 
 
Hacking and hackers also generate a lot of interest from the media, which has the 
effect of significantly raising its profile in comparison to other computer related 
security incidents (Powers 2000). The incidents of hacking are certainly on the 
increase (Powers 2000; Rapalus 2000; Kearvell-White 1998; Richardson 2007). 
There appear to be two major reasons for the increase in the number of hacker related 
security incidents; firstly as computer networks continue to expand there is an 
increase in the number of systems that can be potentially attacked, and secondly 
because of the resources available on the Internet it is becoming a simple process to 
obtain and use hacking tools (Schwartua 2000; Venter and Eloff 1998; Powers 
2000a; Powers 2000b; van Doorn 1999). 
 
Anecdotes abound of organisations that have been victims of hacker attacks, 
however, there is a general lack of willingness on the part of organisations to share 
information about attacks that they have encountered (Gouldson 2001; Powers 2000). 
The relatively poor response rate to surveys in the field can also been seen as an 
indication of the sensitivity of the subject (Powers 2000). Researchers on the topic 
are left with reviewing the cases and incidents that have been reported and 
investigated, many more hacking incidents are believed to go unreported or even 
undetected (Powers 2000; Rapalus 2001, Gouldson 2001; Caelli et al 1996). Where 
instances of hacking have been reported the figures show an alarming rise in 
instances. The Computer Emergency Response Center (CERT), at Carnegie Mellon 
University have been tracking reported hacking incidents for the last 13 years. In 
1988 six incidents were reported, by 1995 there were 2412 incidents in that year and 
in year 2000 21 756 incidents were reported to the CERT (Bishchoff 2001). The 
CSI/FBI results indicate that in the year 2000 25 % of respondents suffered from a 
system penetration from outside their networks and 27 % suffered a denial of service 
attack (Powers 2000). In an another international survey the global average for 
organisations that had suffered from hacker attacks was 21 % (Dinnie 1999). Given 
the seemly large amount of reports that the CERT Center is receiving it would appear 
that many organisations are either not responding the surveys or not admitting or do 
not know that they have suffered from a hacker attack (Powers 2001; Bishchoff 
2001). 
 
There are a variety of reasons that an organisation may have for not reporting that 
they have suffered from a hacker attack. In the 1999 CSI/FBI report 84 % of 
respondents failed to report hacker attacks and other security incidents because they 
feared negative publicity. 79 % of respondents felt that they could not report the 
incidents in case their competitors seized upon the opportunity to take advantage of 
the situation. 36 % were not aware of the fact that they could report the incident to 
law enforcement agencies for them to investigate and resolve (Powers 2000). There 
is also a belief that reporting incidents to law enforcement agencies can be a double-
edged sword. Whilst, law enforcement agencies have encouraged organisations to 
report incidents of cyber crime, information handed over to them by victim 
organisations under confidentiality agreements may subsequently be obtained by the 
media and other organisations under freedom of information arrangement (Gouldson 
2001). Successful prosecution of hacking crimes has also proved to be difficult given 
the depth required in investigating the crimes and the limited resources available; the 
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successful conviction rate is very low (Gouldson 2001; Bequai 1998). This trend 
appears to be continuing as the 2007 CSI/FBI 2007 study indicated a „peak‟ of 
reporting to law enforcement of incidents to 29% (Richardson 2007). 
 
Fear of negative publicity is a genuine concern, especially for small e-commerce 
based companies that rely on networks such as the Internet for much of their income. 
In one recent case a small home based company that sold photos of animals online, 
had its customer credit card number database stolen after hackers discovered a flaw 
with the online payment software that the company used. Unknown to the company 
hackers were stealing credit card numbers and using them as they wished. In one 
instance a customer‟s credit card was charged 30 000 dollars. When the organisation 
attempted to right the situation they found it was very difficult to gain assistance 
from credit companies, law enforcement, or from software vendors (Fenn 2001). 
This case indicates why hacking can be extremely damaging to an organisation in 
terms of poor publicity and the difficulties that are often encountered when 
attempting to investigate instances of cyber crimes (Escamilla 1998; Bejtlich 2004; 
Khadraoui et al 2007).  
 
A variety of techniques are used by hackers in their attempt to break into computing 
systems and networks. Some of these techniques are relatively straightforward and 
involve the use of purpose built hacking programs. These hacking programs are 
freely available on the Internet and require very little skill for their use (Hancock 
2000; Gouldson 2001; Hind, 1998; Schwartua 1998; Powers 2000). Because of the 
relative ease of use of these applications and their ability to literally put powerful 
tools into the hands of children users of these applications and techniques are often 
referred to as „Script Kiddies‟ (Bischoff 2001). Perhaps one of the more powerful 
techniques used is that of social engineering (Bischoff 2001; Khadraoui et al 2007; 
Escamilla 1998; Ceraolo 1998). This process involves the search for information that 
can be later used to uncover more sensitive information. For example, by 
determining who worked in an organisation‟s IT department a hacker may attempt to 
impersonate individuals, supervisors or infer to others that they have the authority of 
a well-known person in the organisation. Kevin Mitnick, a.k.a. the “Condor”, is 
perhaps the most famous of hackers who served five years in prison for allegedly 
possessing unauthorised access codes. Mitnick would call an IT department and use 
his personal communications skills to convince his target that they should change the 
password of another person in the organisation; Mitnick‟s hacking spree allegedly 
cost his targets over 200 million dollars (Powers 2000; Bischoff 2001). 
 
Hacking is an issue in Australia (Warren and Hutchinson 2003). The Australian IT 
environment, like in any country connected to a variety of global communications 
and information systems networks is at threat to hacker attacks. In a single week a 
Polish hacker using the name L4m4 attacked and defaced 47 web sites (The 
Australian 06 Jul 01). The hacker defaced the web sites with messages relating to the 
poor security of the sites and the targets ranged from legal firms, online bookstores, 
and television channels‟ web sites. These kinds of attacks show that Australian 
organisations are vulnerable. They also demonstrate a common hacker technique of 
scanning systems for vulnerabilities and then attacking opportunity targets as they 
arise (Denning 2001 pers. comm., 31 Dec). In the 1997 Computer Crime and 
Security Survey 23% of respondents indicated that they had suffered from external 
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hacker attacks, additionally 21% of the respondents indicated that hackers/criminals 
were a significant threat to their organisation (Thompson 1998).   
 
The international experience is that hacker and security incidents in general are on 
the rise (Powers 2000; Rapalus 2000; Briney 1998), the same is also true in 
Australia. In 1999 AusCERT logged 9000 security breaches, in the year 2000 that 
figure had leaped to 22 000 incidents (Gliddon 2001). Hackervism, which is where 
hackers attack websites to make a political point have been rampant in the US since 
the Spy Plane incident (Johanson and Park 2001). Whilst Australia was sparred from 
many of the incidents involved in this informal cyber war between pro-US and pro-
Chinese hackers Australian sites still suffer from approximately 40 attacks per day 
(Johanson et al 2001). Some other differences have been seen in the Australian 
context of hacking as compared to that of the international experience. In one survey, 
which compared security incidents where actual losses could be recorded, the global 
rate of hacker attacks that had resulted in losses in terms of all incidents was 21%, 
the US rate was 30% and the Australian rate of hacker attacks that resulted in losses 
was 13%, less than half of that of the US (Dinnie 1999). In order to determine the 
impact of hackers on the use of IT in Australia it is important to determine the 
perceived level of threat and how this compares to the actual rate of incidents and the 
subsequent management decision made because of the threat of hacker attacks.  
 
2.3.1.4 Espionage and other threats 
 
In previous sections it has been established that businesses and governments are 
becoming increasingly reliant on information systems and the data stored on those 
systems. The collation of this data has been used as a powerful tool by organisations 
to better support their business objectives. This aggregation of information has also 
increased the potential reward for less than ethical organisations or foreign 
governments to undertake computer based attacks or intelligence gathering exercises 
or information warfare (Hutchinson and Warren 2001a; Warren 2008a; Warren 
2008b;Denning 1999; Schwartau 1997). 
 
The term information warfare or I-War is defined as a range of deliberate offensive 
activities that range from destroying IT equipment (hardware) to subtle perception 
management, and from industrial espionage to marketing (Hutchinson and Warren 
2001b; Westwood 1997; Hinde 1998; Denning 1999; Schwartau 1997). 
 
Whilst there is little doubt that I-War occurs between nation states, businesses and 
organisations there is little hard evidence in the published literature that can be used 
as comparison. Nations are unlikely to admit (at least officially or in detail) that they 
use information systems to intercept computer traffic, hack into computers of foreign 
nations. Having said that, organisations such the National Security Agency (NSA) 
and the Australian equivalent the Defence Signal Directorate (DSD) are known to 
collect signal intelligence (SIGINT) from all sources of communications – 
information systems included. From an internal perspective, these organisations 
combine with their British and Canadian counterparts to form a system known as 
ECHELON. This alliance attempts to constructively share information regardless of 
where in the world it is derived. As digital technologies combine, 
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telecommunications and information systems have become seamless (Westwood 
1997). 
 
Nation states may use information systems as potential weapons and so too may 
terrorists and criminals. These organisations may use technology to either gain 
access to sensitive information or deny the rightful owner access to their own system 
and data (Furnell and Warren 1999b). Cyber warfare and terrorism has been used in 
support of broader and more traditional military and terrorism campaigns. 
 
The threat of cyber-terrorism and is relevant to Australian organisations. Any 
computing system connected to other computer systems offers potential points of 
ingress which could be used by entities intent on causing mischief or harm. There is 
little hard evidence as to the exact nature of this threat. It is deemed as a possible risk 
but there has yet to be an exhaustive study that has been able to quantify the risk in 
more exact terms. 
 
2.3.2 Australian businesses are targets 
 
Australian businesses are at risk from information security related incidents 
(Thompson 1997; Lichtenstein 1998; Dinnie 1999; Dearne 2002Aa Dearne 2002b; 
AusCERT 2006). In Thompson‟s study he found that 37% of respondents had 
suffered from an information security related incident. This compares to 50% in the 
same year in the U.S. (Power 2000). The difference between these two figures could 
be due to a number of factors. Assuming that both figures are accurate reflections of 
their respective populations it could be possible to speculate that there are a number 
of differentiators that could be influencing the results. 
 
Australian business has not adopted e-commerce as readily as their U.S. counterparts 
(Dinnie 1999). According to Dinnie, the touted reasons for this difference is that 
Australian businesses are concerned about security issues and are also unsure if they 
or the technology are ready for the transition to online business. 
 
Later studies conducted by a variety of organisations clearly indicate that Australian 
businesses are the targets of information security attacks and incidents. In 2002 
KPMG conducted its first global information security review. This study is useful as 
it attempts to make comparisons between the level of incidents in the Asia/Pacific 
region in comparison to the level of incidents experienced in the Americas or 
Europe. This study also differs from its peers as it uses telephone interviews as the 
data collection technique instead of mail out surveys. The telephone interview 
technique allowed the researchers to obtain a broader range of information and to 
better interpret responses. The study found that organisations in the Asia/Pacific 
region suffered from more instances of attacks than organisations in either Europe or 
the Americas. Also, Asia/Pacific organisations were less likely to be protected by 
adequate polices and procedures in comparison to their American and European 
counterparts (KPMG 2002). 
 
The 2006 AusCERT survey, which represents a joint production between AusCERT 
and all of Australia‟s law enforcement agencies reports exclusively on security 
incidents in the Australian context. It is however, specifically designed to follow the 
same format as the American CSI/FBI survey so as to allow direct comparison 
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between the results. This research represents the latest industry accepted data on the 
topic of security incidents in Australia, however, like its American counterpart it 
suffers from a poor response rate. The Australian survey had a response rate of 17%. 
The report does, however, acknowledge the fact that the data is not scientifically 
meaningful, but asserts the point that the data is the best currently available. The 
results of the survey and the way that the report is presented must also be viewed in 
the context that commercial entities who sell security services and products often 
sponsor this kind of research. 
 
 
Importantly, AusCERT now has a number of completed surveys that allow for year 
by year comparisons of trends. The AusCERT research indicates that the volume of 
computer crime and security incidents in Australia is declining. 67% of respondents 
had suffered a computer security incident in 2002, twice the level of 1999, and 
higher than that recorded in the USA (AusCERT 2002). More recent results reflect 
the downwards trend (22% 2006, 35% 2005, and 49% 2004) (AusCERT 2006). The 
report also found that from 2002 that in Australia, the growing threat of external 
attack had surpassed the threat of internal attack. This finding represents a significant 
shift from previous international studies as well as those findings of similar such 
studies previously conducted in Australia. 
 
The study will allow for the closer examination of potential differentiators to 
determine if and why there are difference between the Australian information 
security environment in comparison to the experiences of other nations. 
 
There is a growing amount of evidence that Australian businesses are the subject of 
computer security incidents, particularly as more organisations pursue e-commerce 
opportunities. In March of 2002 one Australian e-commerce organisation that traded 
goods online was attacked on at least two occasions. In the first occasion operating 
system files were deleted which resulted in the trading site being offline for five 
days. The losses from this attack were estimated to be over $20 000 per day. The 
other attack involved accessing the organisation‟s router and deleting important 
configuration information that resulted in the company losing its Internet connection. 
With the aid of computer forensic experts, law enforcement was able to track the 
attacks to a broadband connection that was being used by an ex-employee of the 
organisation (AusCERT 2002). 
 
2.3.3 Countermeasures 
For the purpose of this research countermeasures are defined as those procedures or 
steps that are taken as part of providing a security solution. After identifying threats 
to a system and any inherent vulnerabilities in that system countermeasures are 
employed to deal with the risk (Caelli et al 1996). The aim of information security 
countermeasures is to provide: 
 
 Impact avoidance 
 Impact transfer 
 Impact reduction 
 Reduce likelihood 
 Reduce threat 
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These aims may be achieved by using a number of mechanisms and procedures. One 
way of achieving impact transfer for example, may be seeking insurance against a 
major catastrophe. Security technologies such as firewalls that are used to filter 
access to a system can be used to attempt to achieve impact avoidance, to reduce the 
threat and to reduce the likelihood. 
 
Security procedures and practices that are documented and enforced are believed to 
be the most effective manner to protect an organisation‟s systems (Power 2000; 
Caelli et al 1996; Khadraoui et al 2007). Little is known about the specifics of how 
Australian businesses are protecting themselves from information security threats. In 
1997 60% of Australian businesses did not have an information security policy 
(Thompson 1997). This is 10% worse than recorded in the U.S. (Power 2000). The 
study conducted by Ernst and Young, in 1999 found that 68% (of the 114 Australian 
companies surveyed) had security policies (Dinnie 1999). Some of the security 
technologies and/or methods used in Australian businesses are: 
 
 Anti-virus protection 
 Intrusion Detection 
 Firewalls 
 Encryption 
 Security Policies and Standards 
 Incident Response 
 
A more detailed analysis of the technologies, methods and issues involved in the 
protection of computing systems from security related security incidents follow in 
the sections below. 
 
 
2.3.3.1 Anti - Virus protection 
 
As discussed previously, viruses are a major threat to the security of information 
systems (Powers 2000; Briney 1999). When discussing the spread and detection, and 
the general protection against viruses it is important to distinguish between the action 
of a specific and that of some future theoretical virus (Caelli et al 1996). It is always 
possible to detect a known virus because it has specific properties and actions, thus 
these properties create a unique signature for the virus that can be detected 
(Khadraoui et al 2007; Caelli et al 1996; Pfleeger 1989). This known signature is 
what is used when mechanisms are constructed to defend against certain viruses, this 
could subsequently lead to a virus designer to produce a program that infects other 
programs but does not produce a unique signature that can be detected by virus 
scanning software (Pfleeger 1989). It is also important to stress that it is not possible 
to point to an attribute that must always be present in an arbitrary virus and must 
always be absent from an arbitrary piece of legitimate code (Pleeger 1989; 
Khadraoui et al 2007; Caelli et al 1996). Therefore there is no known test or series of 
tests that can unambiguously identify a virus and it has been suggested that it is 
theoretically impossible to develop such a test (Cohen 1994). 
 
Master of Information Technology   
 
 
22 
The advent of viruses produced a spate of anti-viral software packages, some of 
which provided inadequate defence mechanisms for the average PC user (Caelli et al 
1996). The PC is the most likely platform to succumb to a virus attack (Power 2000; 
Khadraoui et al 2007). The Unix operating system does provide some inbuilt features 
such as file check facilities that allow for the checking of file size, a checksum of the 
contents, when it was last modified to potentially determine if the file has been 
„attacked‟ by a virus (Caelli et al 1996). 
 
The most fundamental lesson of anti-viral measures is that the most vulnerable 
systems are those that fail to observe sensible data security measures (Caelli et al 
1996; Khadraoui et al 2007), which are characterised by: 
 
a. inadequate backup procedures, 
b. inadequate user training, 
c. inadequate control of the introduction of software, 
d. lack of control of file transfers, and 
e. poor or absent security policies. 
 
Anti-viral products generally fall into three categories as listed by Caelli et al (1996, 
p. 609): 
 
a. Class 1 – Infection prevention. Designed to stop the virus replication 
process and prevent initial infection. 
b. Class 2 – Infection detection. Designed to pick up virus attacks soon 
after they happen, mark the specific component(s) infected and allow 
remedial action to be taken. 
c. Class 3 – Infection identification. Designed for showing up specific 
types of strain of viruses; it will identify viruses in systems and may 
remove them, but only works on known viruses. 
 
Whilst anti-virus software can be an extremely effective tool to combat the very real 
threat of virus incidents, anti-virus software cannot detect all viruses, particularly if 
they have yet to be identified (Cohen 1984; Caelli et al 1996; Pikin 2000; Power 
2000; Pfleeger 1989). Virus screening or scanning software must also be kept up to 
date to ensure that the software can detect and eliminate new viruses as they emerge 
(Thomson 2009; Lowe 2002). A total virus approach must include the capability to 
act on a large scale, thereby eliminating the risk of spread in an entire organisation 
(Dojkovski, Lichtenstein and Warren 2007). Sound security policies, good backup 
and recovery procedures, access control on file transfer systems used in conjunction 
with up to date virus screening software are the best countermeasures to the virus 
threat (Westwood 1997; Dojkovski et al 2007; Power 2000; Nelson 1999). 
 
Virus controls are part of the British Standard (BS7799), which specifies 10 key 
controls in computer security, virus control is identified as one of the key controls in 
the standard.  In one UK study, 88% of respondents indicated that they had 
implemented virus controls. Of the respondents who indicated that they followed 
BS7799, 95% of those organisations indicated that they had implemented virus 
controls. In the same study 90% of respondents who had a security policy indicated 
that their policy mentioned virus controls and countermeasures (Kearvell-White 
1996). The 1995 Ernst and Young Survey cites that 62% of organisation in US used 
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virus controls and 45% of UK organisations used virus controls. The use of anti-virus 
controls has obviously grown with the increase in incidents, a later industry survey 
conducted in the US states that 91% of respondents had active anti-viral software and 
that anti-virus software was rated the number one security product (Briney 1999). 
 
The Australian rate of use of ant-viral products is unclear. Several studies mention 
the threat and importance of virus countermeasures but do not quantify the extent of 
Australian businesses reliance of anti-viral products (Dinnie 1999; Thompson 1998). 
The case study into the security procedures of an Australian travel company 
conducted by Lichtenstein, highlights that not only are there recorded incidents of the 
virus threat in Australia, but Australian companies are using anti-virus measures, 
including scanning software, procedures and policies in an attempt to counter that 
threat (Lichtenstein 1998).  
According to the AusCERT  study reported use of anti-viral countermeasures was 
98% in 2003, 100% in 2004, 99% in 2005, and 98% in 2006 (AusCERT 2006). More 
information is needed on the extent and the nature of anti-viral countermeasures in 
the Australian context. 
2.3.3.2 Intrusion detection 
 
The term intrusion detection has a somewhat broad definition as it is used to describe 
audit trial processing, firewall filtering and logging, router based access list usage, 
telephony toll fraud detection, operating system probes and monitors, camera 
surveillance at gates and fences, and even physical surveillance by law enforcers 
(Bejtlich 2004). For the purpose of this thesis intrusion detection is defined as the 
process of identifying and responding to malicious activity targeted at computing and 
networking resources (Bejtlich 2004; Khadraoui et al 2007; Escamilla 1998).  The 
term intrusion basically means any misuse, intrusion, or misfeasance that is 
unwanted (Escamilla 1998). The basic concept of an intrusion detection system is 
depicted in the figure 2-4 below: 
 
Figure 2-4: Simple Intrusion Detection Concept Model 
 
Target System
Intrusion Detection 
System
Intrusion Detection System Infrastructure
Monitor
R
e
p
o
rt
R
e
s
p
o
n
d
 
Source: Developed for this research 
 
Master of Information Technology   
 
 
24 
The way in which derived information about an intrusion is processed, stored, 
protected, shared, and used as the basis of a risk mitigation strategy is the most 
challenging aspect of practical intrusion detection (Bejtlich 2004). Intrusion 
detection is still a relatively new field and processes, technologies and use strategies 
are still being developed. A number of methods are used to conduct intrusion 
detection (Bejtlich 2004; Escamilla 1998; Khadraoui et al 2007; Power 2000). These 
methods include: 
a. Audit trail processing. This is the most commonly used technique in 
intrusion detection. It uses existing audit logs for analysis and 
searching. 
b. On the fly processing. This is a form of network intrusion detection, 
which involves the monitoring of traffic so that real-time or near real-
time analysis can be done. Specific strings are often searched for such 
as „/etc/passwd‟ or „/etc/shadow‟. This technique is used to 
compliment audit trail processing. 
c. Profile normal behaviour. This method attempts to identify the 
signatures of known attacks and suspicious input strings to attempt to 
identify specific types of intrusions. 
d. Pattern matching. This is a special sub-set of profiling, and attempts to 
identify the patterns of normal network operation so that when 
abnormal conditions are encountered that alarms can be raised that 
may warrant further investigation. 
 
Intrusion detection systems comprise of a series of common components including 
sensors, audit and archive mechanisms, knowledge bases that store signatures and 
patterns of know attacks or system operating specifications, a processing engine with 
associated algorithms and incorporated alarms, a systems management facility and 
supporting graphical user interface (Escamilla 1998; Khadraoui et al 2007). Whilst it 
is possible to list a series of common components of an intrusion detection system it 
is generally accepted that there is no „cure all‟ intrusion detection product that can be 
purchased to provide complete security (Khadraoui et al 2007; Bejtlich 2004; 
Escamilla 1998). Rather, a proactive and interactive approach is required to ensure a 
series of complementary technologies and policies are implemented in order to have 
a successful intrusion detection methodology (Dojkovski et al 2007; Power 2000). 
 
Due to the need for an integrated and comprehensive intrusion detection system host 
based and network based intrusion detection systems have been developed (Power 
2000; Khadraoui et al 2007). Host based systems essentially rely on audit trail 
processing. The key advantage of host-based systems is the high quality information 
that can be derived from them. The disadvantages of host based systems is that they 
are quite often platform or operating system specific and that they can lead to 
performance degradation on the host due extra processing work required for logging 
of events (Power 2000; Khadraoui et al 2007). In network based intrusion detection 
systems network traffic is copied and inspected by the system. Because of this 
approach normal traffic flow is not affected, therefore there is zero performance 
impact on the system as a whole (Power 2000; Khadraoui et al 2007). The 
disadvantages of network-based systems are that they can lose packets in a network 
that has been flooded and there is a need to ensure that the system can handle the 
amount network traffic on a particular network (Bejtlich 2004; Escamilla 1998). 
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Due to the various potential advantages and disadvantages of network-based and 
host-based intrusion detection systems the best option is often to use an integrated 
approach to the implementation of an appropriate system (Powers 2000; Bejtlich 
2004; Escamilla 1998; Dojkovski et al 2007). Most of the latest intrusion detection 
systems are classified as second-generation systems and are hybrid network and host-
based systems (Eschehbeck 2000). The hybrid approach has become critical in the 
attempt to provide real-time detection capabilities to ensure that mission critical 
systems are protected and monitored against cases of cyber attack (Eshehbeck 2000; 
Power 2000; Bejtlich 2004). 
 
There is very little evidence to quantify or qualify the use of intrusion detection 
systems. The various information security surveys that have been conducted seldom 
mention intrusion detection systems in specific terms. The CSI/FBI surveys indicate 
that in 1998, 35% of respondents used some form of intrusion detection systems. 
Subsequent surveys in 1999 and 2000 indicated that this figure had risen to 42% and 
50% respectively (Power 2000). One international survey detailed that 40% of 
Australian respondents used some form of security product (including intrusion 
detection systems) compared to 48% in the US and 49% globally (Dinnie 1999). The 
2006 AusCERT survey indicates that after a peak in 2005 at 59% the use of intrusion 
detection systems dropped to 44% in 2006 (AusCERT 2006).  
 
The usage rate and perceived effectiveness of the intrusion detection systems within 
Australia is an important fact worthy of investigation.  
 
2.3.3.3 Firewalls 
 
The word “Firewall” when used in the context of information security can mean 
many different things to different people. To some, a firewall would be an entire 
system that acts as a gateway between your system and the outside world. To others 
a firewall may mean little more than a single device designed to stop unwanted data 
entering a network. For the purpose of this study a suitable definition for a firewall is 
a system (or device) that is used to control access to or from a protected network. It 
implements a network access policy by forcing data to pass through the firewall 
where it can be analysed, audited, and processed (Power 2000; Khadraoui et al 2007; 
Escamilla 1998). This processing could result in the information being discarded in 
the case of unauthorised external data or an error message being sent to an originator 
in the case of an unauthorised internal communications attempt. Most firewalls have 
auditing features that are monitored by system administrators. When unauthorised 
access attempts occur the systems administrators are able to examine the incident and 
take appropriate action (Bejtlich 2004; Khadraoui et al 2007; Escamilla 1998). 
 
A graphical representation of a simple firewall is shown below. In this example the 
firewall is a system that consists of two devices a gateway and packet filter. Each of 
these devices will be explained in the following pages. 
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Figure 2-5: A typical depiction of a firewall  
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Source: Developed for this research 
 
There are three general features that should be provided by a firewall if it is to 
provide adequate security for an information system (Escamilla, 1998). These 
purposes or features are: 
a. Restricted external access, 
b. Controlled internal use, and 
c. Audit and accountability. 
 
The initiation of information flow from an external source should be severely 
restricted. In an e-commerce environment it essential that external information be 
allowed to flow between networks. Firewalls enable the safe transmission between 
two different computing environments, say from a customer‟s computer to a 
supplier‟s computer. Firewalls allow a system to authenticate external users to ensure 
that the only authorised users can access the secured domain (Caelli et al 1996; 
Eshehbeck 2000; Power 2000; Bejtlich 2004). 
 
Access to external networks should also be controlled and limited to those employees 
who need the access for specific reasons. The amount of information that can flow 
into or out of an organizations computer network is usually limited and often 
companies pay large amounts of money to provide a basic level of capacity, referred 
to as bandwidth. Any use over and above the assigned bandwidth will result in delays 
that could cost the organization money in terms of lost revenue or the firm may need 
to spend additional money on expanding their bandwidth.  To control network traffic 
and related expenses management may authorise only certain activities can occur, 
such as ordering from suppliers or communications to customers. Other activities 
such as browsing the Internet may be limited to certain sites and certain users. All of 
these restrictions are controlled and enforced by a firewall system. 
 
The procedures and practices that are designed to safeguard a network must be 
actively monitored (Eshehbeck 2000; Power 2000; Bejtlich 2004). Any improper 
access to a network must be detected so that the appropriate action can be taken to 
rectify any security breaches or to modify security procedures. Most firewall systems 
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allow system managers to monitor and audit what traffic is being passed through the 
firewall. This information will include both internal information flowing to external 
networks and external information flowing to internal destinations. Armed with this 
information systems management can determine how effective their security 
procedures are and if there have been any instances of attempted breaches or any 
actual breaches (Escamilla 1998). 
 
Empirical data collected on the use of firewalls indicates that they are a popular 
security tools (Power 2000; Briney 1998). In one study conducted in the US, which 
tracked security tools usage over the period 1998 to 2000, firewalls were used by 
81% of respondents in 1998, 91% of respondents used firewalls, however, the 
number dropped to 78% in year 2000. These figures did not compare as favourably 
as the use of anti-viral software, physical security of systems or access control 
mechanisms (Power 2000). In the 1995 Ernst and Young Survey of US and UK 
organisations, 70% of US organisations had firewalls in comparison to 30% of UK 
organisations. A later international survey involving Australian businesses indicated 
that Australia was leading the way in terms of adoption of firewall technology with 
77% of respondents indicating that they used firewalls in comparison to the US at 
62% and the UK at 53% (Ginnie 1999). A different industry survey conducted in the 
US indicated that 76% of respondents had employed firewalls while the remaining 
24% intended to employ firewalls in the near future (Briney 1998). 
 
A case study into a typical Australian business provides some support to the notion 
that firewalls are an important component of information security in the Australian 
context (Lichtenstein 1998). In this study the organisation under study used a firewall 
to protect itself from Internet threats and also to monitor the activities of employees. 
 
Most studies and authors agree that firewalls are an essential component of providing 
a secure computing environment (Eshehbeck 2000; Power 2000; Bejtlich 2004; 
Escamilla 1998; Khadraoui et al 2007), but also state that firewalls are not infallible. 
Without proper configuration management, monitoring, and an implementation 
strategy firewalls will offer little protection (Power 2000; Bejtlich 2004). 
 
2.3.3.4 Encryption 
 
The term encryption and cryptography are often used interchangeably, however for 
the purpose of this study cryptograph is defined  as the art or science that deals with 
the principles, means, and methods for rendering plaintext unintelligible and for 
converting encrypted messages into intelligible form. Encipherment is the action of 
converting plaintext to cipher text; encryption is often used as a synonym for 
encipherment, but it also covers the act of encoding a message (Caelli et al 1996; 
Bejtlich 2004; McClure, Scambray and Kurtz 2005). The diagram below depicts a 
high level view of encryption. 
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Figure 2-6: Basic encryption process 
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Ciphers can be categorised into two categories based on the kind of keying concept 
that they use, either symmetric or asymmetric (Caelli et al 1996).  Symmetric 
encryption uses the same key to both encrypt and decrypt, or if different it is possible 
to derive one from the other. Where symmetric keying is used the key must be 
transmitted to the remote end, symmetric keying is also called Private Key 
encryption. Asymmetric cipher uses different keys for encryption and decryption. It 
is computationally infeasible to derive one key from the other. This form of 
encryption is often called public key cryptography (Bejtlich 2004; Khadraoui et al 
2007).  
 
Encryption mechanisms rely on keys or passwords. The longer the key the more 
difficult it is to break. The Data Encryption Standard (DES), which is one of the 
more popular encryption algorithms, relies on 56 bit key length, which is 
computationally feasible to break. Stronger keys may be many hundreds of bits in 
length. As stated earlier there are two kinds of encryption mechanisms (symmetric 
and asymmetric) – Private-Key and Public-Key. Private-key uses one key to encode 
and decode data whilst public-key encryption uses one key to encode the data and 
another to decode the data. The name public key comes from the unique property of 
this mechanism – namely, one of the keys can be made public without compromising 
the privacy of the message of the other key. Virtual Private Networks (VPN) employ 
encryption mechanisms to provide secure transmissions over public networks such as 
the Internet (Holbrock and Reynolds 1991; Caelli et al 1996; Bejtlich 2004). 
 
In a recent study of security mechanisms employed by Australian organisations 47% 
of respondents used some form of file encryption to protect their data and 46% 
indicated that they used encrypted logins or sessions to ensure confidentiality 
(AusCERT 2006). In comparison in the USA 60% of organisations used encrypted 
logins and 58% used encrypted files (Power 2002). 
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2.3.3.5 Security Policies and Standards 
 
Policies are technology independent descriptions of the security precautions that are 
required for different types of information and access. Quite often security policies 
apply more than just implementation; they apply to all corporate resources. Policies 
are the primary building blocks for every information security design, defining the 
responsibilities of the organisation, the individual, and management. Polices specify 
what must or must not be done to fulfil the security principles (Khadraoui et al 2007; 
Caelli et al 1996; Bejtlich 2004). Policies and procedures are the cornerstone of 
information security (Power 1996). 
 
Policies and standards are used in organisations to provide a mechanism where 
directors and senior management can lay down a clear statement of direction and 
rules. If policy is created and implemented correctly, it will serve three main 
purposes for the organisation: 
a. Firstly, policy defines security requirements; without a security policy it 
could be argued that it isn‟t possible to have a security violation. 
b. Next policy allocates responsibility. 
c. Finally, the policy statement can actually contribute to control. 
 
Security policies can contain a variety of topics and material. There is however, some 
agreement that policies should at the very least have a number of common 
components.  Caelli et al (1996), Khadraoui et al (2007), and Betjlich (2004), all 
recommend that a security policy include the points listed below: 
 The responsibilities of owners, users, custodians, and specific 
departments 
 Risk management, risk assessment and data classification 
 Contingency planning and resilience 
 Systems development/Implementation 
 Access to data/systems and storage control 
 Telecommunications security 
 Personal computer security 
 Environmental and access control 
 Legal requirements 
 Personnel policies 
 
In the UK, the British Standards Organisation developed and implemented an 
information security standard called BS 7799 in late 1995. This standard defines 10 
key controls that organisations should implement in order to adequately address 
information security issues. These controls include: 
 Information security policy documentation 
 Allocation of information security responsibilities 
 Information security education and training 
 Reporting of security incidents 
 Virus controls 
 Business continuity planning processes 
 Control of proprietary software copying 
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 Safe guards of organisational records 
 Data protection 
 Compliance with security policies 
 
A survey conducted in the UK 12 months after the introduction of BS 7799 asked 
respondents if they had implemented the new standard. At the time of the survey 
only 2% of respondent organisations had implemented the standard (Kearvell-White 
1996). Many respondents were not aware of the standard (40%), whilst the remainder 
„intended‟ to implement the standard in the near future. 
 
In Australia, Standards Australia has followed the British Standards lead by firstly 
introducing AS/NZS 4444, Information Security Management, and then latter 
modifying the standard to be more in line the British Standard and standards in 
OECD nations, the new standard, introduced in 2001 was renamed AS/NZS 7799. 
No data on the implementation or take up rate of this standard was available. The 
international version of the standards, labelled as ISO 17799 indicates that 
approximately 41% of organisations had adopted that international standard. The 
financial sector recorded the highest take up rate at 25% (KPMG 2002). 
 
In terms of general security policies and procedures to combat information security 
abuses, one Australian survey revealed that Australian industry, on the whole, was 
poorly prepared in many areas, especially in terms of the US (Thompson 1997). This 
study indicated nearly 60% of respondents had no policy on how to deal with 
systems breaches (10% worse than the US). Other data on the use of security policies 
vary. In one international study, use of policies in Australian organisations was at 
68%, compared to the US at 61% and the global figure of 55% (Dinnie 1999). Other 
research indicated that the lack of policies is seen as a significant obstacle to 
information security (Briney 1998). 
 
Previous research would indicate that policies, standards, and procedures are the 
pillars of network security (Schumacher 1997). In fact many authors and industry 
practitioners would argue that they are more important than having the technology 
(Caelli et al 1996; Power 2000; Briney 1998; Khadraoui et al 2007). Having written 
policies is, however, only part of the picture. The issue with any set of policies is 
whether they are valid and enforceable. Little is known in regards to how effective 
organisational policies are, and if indeed once adopted they are maintained and 
audited. In a case study into the security practices of one large Australian 
organisation it was found that polices and procedures were used to effectively 
coordinate and manage the application of several countermeasures, such as anti-viral 
protection, firewall use, and employee responsibilities (Lichtenstein 1998). 
 
2.3.3.7 Incident response 
 
The response an organisation makes in the aftermath of a security incident will 
depend on a number of issues. Some organisations will simply want to press on with 
business while others will want to seek legal and financial recompense for any loss 
that may have been caused by the incident. There are three basic philosophies to 
responding to a security incident. They are: 
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Watch and Warn. The watch and warn method performs monitoring and notifies a 
key person when an incident is detected. It takes no actions by itself, except for 
notification. This process relies on the ability to rapidly contact a key individual 
about what decisions need to be made in relation to the incident and what additional 
warnings need to be generated. The watch and warn philosophy is the most passive 
method of intrusion detection and response (Khadraoui et al 2007). 
 
Repair and Report. The repair and report philosophy will attempt to close the 
incident as quickly as possible so as to be back to business as usual as soon as 
practicable (Khadraoui et al 2007; Power 2000). This requires the identification of 
the intrusion, repairing the vulnerability that allowed the intrusion, and reporting 
these actions. Typically, the reporting is done through an internal mechanism such as 
reporting the actions to an internal manager. 
 
Pursue and Prosecute. The pursue and prosecute methodology requires the 
monitoring of the attack, the collection and maintenance of evidence, and the 
involvement of law enforcement and legal counsel to prosecute the attacker 
(Khadraoui et al 2007; Bequai 1998). This philosophy takes an active role in 
fostering a protected information environment. In some instances it may include 
allowing the attacker to continue with the attack in a supervised way to ensure that 
the maximum amount of evidence is collected or to attempt to ascertain if the 
intruder has a specific target. 
 
Regardless of the philosophy adopted by an organisation a incident response plan is 
required to coordinate efforts in a effective and efficient manner (Schumacher et al 
1997; Eschelbeck 2000). A response plan will typically cover the following topics 
(adapted from Khadraoui et al 2007): 
 
a. Authority to respond 
b. Financial Limits 
c. Disabling Services 
d. Disconnection from the Network 
e. Communications 
f. Resources (People, tools, external support) 
g. Legal Review 
 
 Incident Response and Security Teams, or Computer Emergency Response Teams 
(CERT) have been formed in a variety of counties in order to provide organisations 
with expert advice and assistance in dealing with security incidents and to keep 
organisations informed regarding the latest information security trends and 
developments. Many of these specialist security organisations have formed the 
Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST), with the aim to promote 
information sharing and greater security awareness. Organisations that subscribe to 
such teams often report security incidents in attempt to receive expert advice and 
guidance or to have vulnerabilities removed (Power 2000; Khadraoui et al 2007; 
Briney 1998). 
 
In a recent survey conducted in Australia 24% of respondents reported the security 
incident to AusCERT (AusCERT 2002). This figure was up from 12% in 1999.  
More recent figures indicate that the policy of not reporting incidents outside the 
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organisation continues, with 69% of organisations not reporting incidents externally 
in both 2005 and 2006 (AusCERT 2006). The relevance of organisations such as 
AusCERT and the services they offer is worthy of further investigation in order to 
determine why organisations either use or do not use their services. 
 
2.3.4 Resource expenditure 
 
Very little is known about the current level of expenditure or budgets on information 
security in Australian businesses. It has been reported that up to 45% of Australian 
businesses do not budget for information security at all (Dinnie 1999). A comparison 
between Australian information security budgets to the determined level of threat 
would be extremely useful to the IT industry. 
 
A recent AusCERT survey indicated 70% of organisations indicated that they had 
increased their computer security related expenditure in the last 12 months as a result 
of computer security incidents or other perceived security concerns (AusCERT 
2002). This expenditure may have involved purchasing new or upgrading network 
security technologies, improving personal or physical security, training and 
documentation. The majority of Australian organisations believed they needed to 
spend more money on computer security (Dearne 2002b). 
 
The KPMG Global Security survey indicates that the average large organisation 
spend approximately 10.1% of their IT budget on computer security. 63% of 
respondents to this survey indicated that they would increase their security budgets 
by 19% in the upcoming year, while 10% of organisations stated that they would 
decrease their security expenditure. A concerning area was that 43% of respondents 
did not know how much money was spent on security and 30% did not know the 
percentage of the security budget when compared to the overall IT budget (KPMG 
2002). The limitation of the KPMG study remains the global nature of this study and 
the nature of the population and response rates received. The KPMG study 
concentrated on grouping organisations in geographic regions and on larger 
organisations. 
 
2.3.5 Reliance on Information Technology  
 
The use of information technology by Australian businesses has risen significantly 
since the early 1990s. Computer use has grown fairly steadily, rising from 49% of 
businesses in 1993-94 to 63% in 1997-98 and 76% in 1999-2000. Internet use grew 
more rapidly between 1997-98 and 1999-2000, the proportion of businesses with 
Internet access almost doubling from 29% to 56%. The proportion of businesses with 
Web sites or home pages more than doubled over the same period (from 6% to 16% 
of businesses) (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2000). 
 
The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), has conducted a number of studies into 
the impact and general use of IT by businesses. The extent to which Australian 
businesses use information technology is related to business size and industry. At 
June 2000, 100% of large businesses (those with employment of 100 or more 
persons) used a computer, 95% had access to the Internet and 68% had a Web site or 
home page. Very small businesses (those with employment of fewer than 5 
employees) had much lower adoption of information technology at June 2000, with 
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69% using a computer, 49% having Internet access and only 9% having a Web site or 
homepage (ABS 2000). 
 
 
Computer use and Internet access were highest in the Property and business services 
and Electricity, gas and water supply industries at June 2000. At least 85% of 
businesses in these two industries used computers and at least 76% had access to the 
Internet. Computer and Internet use was lowest in the personal and other services 
industry, where 60% of businesses used a computer and 39% had Internet access. 
Web site use was highest in the Electricity, gas and water supply industry, with 56% 
of businesses having a Web site or home page, and lowest in the Construction 
industry (6% of businesses) (ABS 2002). 
 
The ABS data clearly shows that, as expected the use of IT within business is 
growing to meet the demands of the new information economy. As highlighted in a 
National Office for the Information Economy Discussion Paper (2000), the rapid 
growth in the use of the Internet, which is underpinning the emergence of the 
information economy, is transforming Australia economically and socially. 
Australian businesses of all sizes and industry sectors are using technology and 
computers in general for far more of their business (Di Gregoria and King 2000; 
Williamson, Lichtenstein, Sullivan, Schauder 2006).  The development of the 
information economy and its adoption by business has opened up new markets and 
provided new sources of revenue. Businesses are becoming more reliant on their 
computing systems and therefore have more to loose should they suffer from a 
computer security related incident (Di Gregoria et al 2000; Dearne 2002a; Dearne 
2002b). 
 
The AusCERT research makes the linkages between the growth of the information 
economy and the subsequent reliance of businesses on IT clearer by identifying 
points of expose to security risks. The survey found that 98% of respondents had 
websites, 36% had websites that were „commercial‟ in that they were aimed at 
actually selling goods and services. Of those organisations that had commercial 
websites 27% earned more than 2.5 million dollars per annum, 36% earned between 
1 and 2.5 million dollars and 37% earned less than 500 000 dollars, (AusCERT 
2006) 
 
It follows that the more an organisation relies on their computing technology that the 
more they have to lose if that technology should be compromised. In an attempt to 
estimate the losses associated with computer security incidents AusCERT asked their 
respondents if their websites had suffered from a security incident and subsequently 
how much that incident cost their business. Of the 30% of organisations that had 
suffered from a loss from their commercial website 73% indicated that the losses 
were less than $50 000, with 27% indicated that the losses were between $50 000 
and $100 000 (AusCERT 2006). Where companies operate solely through an online 
presence if those sites were to be rendered inoperable they could lose many 
thousands of dollars for each hour that the site is not functioning. 
 
The KPMG global survey indicates the average organisation who had suffered from 
a website intrusion lost $32 000 (USD). It also lists the highest recorded cost for a 
security incident for one organisation as $10 million (USD) for a virus incident 
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(KPMG 2002). Research conducted in the USA has also found that organisations are 
increasingly relying on their computer technology and are suffering many millions of 
dollars of lost revenue due to security incidents (Rapulas 2000; Power 2000). 
 
Of interest in the Australian business context of information security is the match 
between the continual expansion of the information economy, businesses  of all sizes 
growing more dependent on the use of computers and the level of computer security 
incidents and the countermeasures (including funding commitments) employed to 
mitigate the risks.  
 
There is a relationship between how an organisation uses IT and how reliant the 
operation of their business is on IT. The strength of this relationship is often not 
known by organisations and therefore organisations can be under prepared for the 
impact on their business of the unavailability of core computing systems (i.e., those 
that they use to perform their core business function). In some cases it has taken a 
catastrophic event, such as the terrorist attacks on the world trade centre to raise the 
level of awareness in certain businesses (Withers 2002). Figure 2-7 below depicts the 
relationship between use and reliance, and in particular how increased use increases 
organisational reliance and therefore the business continuity impact that an 
organisation could potentially face. 
 
 
Figure 2-7: IT use and reliance framework 
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Source: Developed for this research 
 
2.4 Development of a theoretical framework 
 
The proposed theoretical framework for this research is depicted in Figure 2-8 below. 
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Figure 2-8: Theoretical Framework of Research Problem 
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The four aspects of the development of the proposed theoretical framework are: 
 
 To study, in general terms the reliance that Australian organisations have on 
their information technology assets and systems. 
 To study the nature and types of threats and information security incidents 
that are occurring in Australian businesses. 
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 To determine if Australian businesses are targets for people or organisations 
intending to perpetrate information security incidents and make a comparison 
between the results found in international studies. 
 To investigate how Australian businesses are protecting themselves from 
information security incidents. 
 To estimate the amount of resources that Australian businesses are 
committing to protecting their information assets from the identified threats 
and vulnerabilities. 
 
2.5 Research question 
The research question for the study focuses on the specifics of the enquiry at hand 
(Zikmund 1997; McPhail 2000; Yin 1994). The research question for the proposed 
study is as follows: 
 
In an Australian business context what are the information security threats to 
organisations, what type of companies are being targeted, how are organisations 
protecting themselves from these threats, and what are the costs of the protective 
measures? 
 
2.5.1 Research issues 
Research issues have been selected to guide the research to answer the research 
question (Yin 1994). Research issues for the proposed study are as follows: 
 
RI 1 – How reliant are Australian organisations on their IT? 
 RI 1.1 – How dependent are Australian organisations on their IT in terms of 
computing systems and the data that resides on those systems? 
 RI 1.2 – What is the likely impact of the loss of use of an organisation‟s IT 
capability? 
RI 2 – How is the threat to organisations‟ computers, data, and networks manifesting 
itself in Australian industry? 
RI 2.1 – What potential threats to computers, data, and networks are 
Australian organisations likely to face? (Potential security threats) 
RI 2.2 – What threat(s) do Australian organisations perceive to be the most 
likely and prevalent/significant? – (Perceived security threats) 
RI 2.3 – What is the level of actual information security incidents in 
Australian organisation? – (Actual security incidents) 
RI 3 – Is the information security greater in Australia? If so, why? 
RI 3.1. In comparison with the international experience, is there any 
difference in the extent to which Australian organisations are being targeted 
for information security related attacks? 
RI 3.2. If so, what are the identifiable differentiators? 
RI 4 – How are Australian organisations protecting their computer, data, and 
networks from information security risks? 
RI 5 – What level of resource expenditure are Australian organisations committing to 
protect their systems and data? 
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The above research issues were used to explore the stated research question and to 
direct the research study. Each of these research issues was developed into a series of 
questions to be used in interviews and surveys. 
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CHAPTER 3 - METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter describes the methodology used to provide data to investigate the 
research issues in chapter two, which were developed from the research question 
specified in chapter one. The purpose of this chapter is to identify and describe the 
appropriate methodology to explore the research issues and answer the research 
questions. This chapter provides justification for the research design and research 
strategy, and then explores the issues of validity and reliability. This chapter has four 
major sections. Firstly in section 3.1 the research purpose and commonly used 
strategies for collecting data to answer research problems are discussed, leading to 
the justification as to why the case study methodology was chosen over other 
potential methods. The multiple case study design for this research is then described 
in section 3.2. Section 3.3 outlines the process of how data was collected for the 
research, demonstrating how in-depth interviews were used to as the principle data 
collection technique. Finally, section 3.4 outlines how the data collected through 
interviews and other means were prepared for analysis and analysed. 
 
3.1 Research design 
 
A research design addresses the planning of inquiry for finding out something 
(Babbie 1995). There are three basic research designs: descriptive, causal, and 
exploratory. 
 
 The major purpose of descriptive research as the term implies, is to 
describe characteristics of a population or phenomenon. Descriptive 
research seeks to determine answers to who, what, when, where, and how 
questions (Zikmund 1997). 
 Causal research is initial research conducted to clarify and define the 
nature of a problem (Zikmund 1997). 
 Exploratory research is initial research conducted to clarify and define the 
nature of the problem (Cooper and Emory 1995). 
 
3.1.1 Research purpose 
 
The purpose of this research was to investigate information security in the Australian 
business context. Of the three types of aforementioned research types this research is 
primarily descriptive, but it also contains a small element of exploratory research in 
terms of the initial pilot study. 
 
The first type of research, exploratory research, is conducted to clarify or gain a 
better understanding of the research topic and is typically conducted in the initial 
stages of the research in the form of a pilot study to assist in the clarification of the 
aims of the study and to confirm the research design. 
 
The second type of research, descriptive is undertaken when the researcher seeks to 
describe the population or phenomenon, thus answering questions relating to who, 
what, when, where and how (Zikmund 1997). The purpose of this research was to 
describe the characteristics of the phenomena of information security in Australia 
and describe how Australian businesses are protecting themselves. The proposed 
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research question and associated research issues described in the earlier chapters suit 
a descriptive research design (Yin 1994). 
 
3.1.2 Research strategy 
 
Research strategy refers to a plan specifying the methods and procedures for 
collecting and analysing the needed information (Zikmund 1997). There are five 
types of research strategies, experiment, survey, archival analysis, history, and case 
study (Yin 1994). The research strategy should be aligned with the goals and 
characteristics of the study (Yin 1994). 
 
Table 3-1 outlines the conditions and the type of research strategies that are suitable 
for each type of question. 
 
Table 3-1: Relevant Situations for Different Research Strategies 
 
Strategy Form of research 
question 
Requires control 
of behavioural 
events 
Focuses on 
contemporary 
events 
Experiment How, why Yes Yes 
Survey Who, what, where, 
how many, how 
much 
No Yes 
Archival analysis Who, what, where, 
how many, how 
much 
No Yes/No 
History How, why No No 
Case Study How, why No Yes 
 
Source: Yin, 1994, p.6 
 
As the purpose of this research was to describe information security in the Australian 
business context, two research strategies were considered for this research: surveys 
and case studies. Experimental research was not considered appropriate, as there was 
no attempt to manipulate information security in Australia. Case studies and surveys 
are considered in further detail in following sections. 
 
Surveys are a data collection technique whereby data is collected from a sample 
population by use of a questionnaire and they are generally considered the most 
common mechanism for gathering primary data (Zikmund 1997). 
 
The greatest strength of the survey technique is its versatility. Abstract information 
of all types can be gathered through questioning others (McPhail 2000). In general, 
the major weakness of this method is that the quality of information secured depends 
heavily on ability and the willingness of respondents to cooperate (McPhail 2000; 
Zikmund 1997). As stated in chapter 2, information security research has largely 
concentrated on survey based research, which has historically recorded poor response 
rates. The 2002 AusCERT, Deloitte Touche Tohmatusu Australian Computer Crime 
and Security Survey for example had an 18% response rate. This figure is far below a 
level that would be considered sufficient to make the finding scientifically valid. 
Further detracting from this style of research, studies such as the one mentioned 
above typically target the top 300 or 500 companies in a country. This sample 
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completely omits a large proportion of the organisations that conduct business in any 
country, i.e. Small to Medium Enterprises (SME).  It could also be suggested that 
much of this research is often sponsored or even managed by organisations offering 
security services and as such could be seen as a marketing strategy. 
 
Given the historical weakness with surveys when used to conduct information 
security research, case study techniques were investigated due to their ability to 
allow the researcher to closely observe the variables under study. Results of case 
studies enable the researcher to expand and generalise on theories as opposed to 
making generalisations about populations. Generalisations about populations cannot 
be drawn from case study findings (Yin 1994). 
 
The purpose of this research was to investigate information security in Australia by 
adopting a more thorough and scientifically valid approach in comparison to 
previous studies conducted both in Australia and overseas. Therefore a case study 
approach was chosen ahead of a survey methodology. 
 
The primary approach to the collection of data for this research was to collect 
qualitative data. Qualitative data is in the form of words, or statements that can be 
based on observation, interviews, and documents. By being in close proximity to the 
variables being studied richer data and description can be obtained to improve the 
quality of the research results (Miles and Huberman 1994; Yin 1994). 
 
3.2 Case study design 
 
This section describes the research design based on a multiple case study approach. 
As a research design includes a number of pre-requisite decisions including what 
concepts will be studied, how these concepts will be studied, how they will be 
measured, who will be studied, how data will be collected, and how the reliability 
and validity of the research will be maintained (Perry 1998; Yin 1994; Zikmund 
1991). In addition to addressing these issues this section describes the principal 
instruments used for data collection for this research – namely in-depth interviews 
and virtual interviews. 
 
3.2.1 Unit of analysis 
 
The unit of analysis looks at what the „case‟ is or what the research will focus on. 
Examples of units of analysis include individuals, groups, organisations or specific 
projects. Defining the problem requires that the researcher determine the unit of 
analysis for the study (McPhail 2000; Perry 1998; Yin 1994; Zikmund 1997). 
 
The research problem can be used to determine the most appropriate unit of analysis 
for any particular research task (Zikmind 1997). This study investigated information 
security within the Australian business context; therefore the unit of analysis for this 
research is Australian businesses or organisations. These businesses are usually 
clearly defined groups of people (and assets) brought together to form an 
organisation with a specified purpose such as selling goods or services or providing a 
community service when describing some Government departments. Australian 
businesses come in all shapes, sizes, and sectors and have differing business 
objectives. The aim of using Australian businesses as the unit of analysis is to 
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provide an in-depth understanding of what the information security issues facing 
Australian businesses are. By using this unit of analysis it is also possible to make 
comparisons with other research in the field and to make useful comparisons to 
international studies. 
 
3.2.2 Number of cases 
 
In determining the number of cases, sampling logic, as applied to survey methods in 
quantitative research methods, does not apply to case study research as the goal of 
the research is not to generalise across a population or determine the frequency of 
some phenomena (Perry 1998;Yin 1994). For the purpose of this study a multiple 
case based design has been adopted. Multiple case designs allow for within case and 
cross-case analysis, and are also useful in determining if findings from individual 
cases are replicated (Yin 1994). 
 
When selecting the number of cases some authors advocate a minium of two case 
studies, but the usual view is that, „in practice four to six groups form a reasonable 
minimum for a serious project‟ (Hedges 1985, pp.76-7). For a maximum number of 
cases an upper limit of twelve cases should be set because of the high cost involved 
in conducting qualitative interviews, additionally large numbers of cases can make 
the research data collection and analysis overly complicated (Hedges 1985; Miles 
and Huberman, 1994; McPhail 2000). The accepted range would appear to be four to 
ten. 
 
In the context of this research, having determined that multiple cases would be 
studied, the ideal range was set for between eight and twelve cases. The number of 
cases should reflect the number of case replications the researcher hopes to achieve 
from the research, in turn, reflecting certainty in their findings (Yin 1994). Similar 
results indicate literal replication and sufficient cases should be included with hope 
of achieving literal replication (Perry 1998; Yin 1994)‟. Each case must be carefully 
selected so that it either (a) predicts similar results (a literal replication) or (b) 
produces contrasting results, but for predictable reasons (theoretical replication)‟ 
(Yin 1994, p.46). Due to the potentially sensitive nature of the subject matter it is 
important to emphasise the difficulty in attracting organisations to participate. This 
issue has been highlighted in numerous quantitative research studies conducted in the 
field of information security (Thompson 1997; Power 2000; AusCERT 2002). 
 
It was decided that a range between eight to twelve cases would provide sufficient 
evidence to demonstrate replication logic and therefore address the research issues 
appropriately. 
 
 
3.2.3 Number of interviewees 
 
After determining that between eight and twelve organisations would be included as 
cases for the research, it was initially determined that between two to three people 
would be interviewed for each organisation in order to collect data from the study. 
Two exploratory data collection techniques were used to derive this figure: 
secondary data resources (organisational charts and organisational literature), and a 
pilot study. Secondary data, experience surveys and pilot studies are three techniques 
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for collecting data for exploratory research (Zikmund 1997). The analysis and review 
of the secondary data determined that information security practitioners were 
generally integrated as part of the IT group or they held an advisory type role to the 
IT group. Regardless, of the organisational structures it was evident that there were 
limited numbers of people who could comment authoritatively on information 
security issues. Even in large organisations there may only be a single Information 
Security Manager as much of the „hack work‟ could or is outsourced to specialist 
service providers. As a result of the initial secondary data analysis the interview 
numbers were revised to, „as many as possible‟, with one or two per organisation 
being most likely. 
 
The pilot case study and supporting Internet questionnaire supported the secondary 
data and pointed to the requirement for a more industrious and innovative method for 
data collection in order to encourage greater participation. At this stage a further 
limitation became evident that if there were limited personnel to interview in large 
organisations then it would be even more difficult to gain participation from smaller 
organisations. Due to the significant importance of SME to Australian business it 
was decided that even if only one interview could be secured from an IT staff 
member who had security responsibilities then this should be sufficient to gain a 
picture of the information security issues in that organisation. It could also be argued 
that in smaller organisations with limited numbers of IT personnel that it may easier 
to get a more concise view as to what the information security issues are. 
 
3.2.4 Case Selection 
 
After setting the number of cases and interviews, the next issue to be addressed was 
case selection. Using two exploratory research data collection techniques: secondary 
data sources (Internet newsgroups, websites, journals, and experience surveys, which 
included discussions with academic staff and industry practitioners), twelve 
organisations were selected as cases for this research. Figure 3-1 below depicts the 
case selection matrix. A cross section of organisations was chosen to ensure that the 
findings can be used to make valid inferences about information security in other 
organisations in Australia.  
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Figure 3-1: Case Selection Matrix 
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Source: Developed for this research 
The twelve organisations were selected as cases for this research because of their 
ability to: 
 Predict similar results for predictable reasons (that is, literal replication). 
 Produce contrary results for predictable reasons (that is, theoretical 
replication) (Yin 1994; Stake 1994; Perry 1998) 
 Provide rich-information (Perry 1998) 
 Different characteristics (Perry 1998). 
 The researcher‟s familiarity with the organisations (Yin 1994). 
 
Each of these issues is now addressed in turn. 
 
Similar results for predictable reasons 
 
Cases predicted to result in similar findings (not the same) were selected to 
demonstrate literal replication and provide additional support for insights (Yin 1994). 
Organisational structures (organisational chart diagrams) and previous research 
findings were vital data to help select cases that could predict similar results. As all 
selected organisations used IT to support their business practices and all of the 
organisations had some form of external network connection to their own computing 
facilities it was determined that they would face similar information security issues. 
 
Contrary results for predictable reasons 
 
Cases predicated to produce contrary results were selected to demonstrate theoretical 
replication. Exploratory research indicated that some organisations may be targeted 
for specific reasons, additionally larger organisations were assumed to have larger IT 
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budgets and would, therefore would be more likely to have dedicated IT security 
professionals. 
 
Rich information 
 
Selecting information rich cases is necessary to provide valid and meaningful 
insights from the research (Perry 1998). Based on a number of discussions with IT 
practitioners and academics it was determined that the selected cases would provide 
rich sources of data for the research. 
 
Different characteristics 
 
Cases with different characteristics were deliberately included in this research, as 
maximum variation sampling (that is, selecting extreme cases) can provide valuable 
insights (Perry 1998). The characteristics of organisation size (number of employees, 
size of IT group, size of IT budget), public or private ownership, and industry type 
were used to identify cases that may offer theoretical replication in relation to 
information security issues with Australian organisations. 
 
Researcher familiarity with organisations 
 
The final consideration in the case selection process was selecting organisations that 
the researcher or the research supervisors were familiar with. The researcher had 
been employed by two of the organisations studied and had contacts with the IT 
organisations in four of the other cases. Given the sensitive nature of the subject 
matter it was considered important that wherever possible that contacts would be 
used to increase the chances of securing an interview. 
 
Preliminary contact was made with the IT Manager in each of the twelve 
organisations in order to gain the commitment to participate in the research. It was 
immediately evident that after sending a number of letters and making follow up 
phone calls that many organisations were reluctant to participate in the study. As this 
issues was predicated at the outset of the study as a potential limiting factor it was 
not a surprise. 
 
Scope change 
 
As an organisation either failed to respond or indicated their unwillingness to 
participate additional organisations were chosen to take their place in the research 
until the minimum figure of eight organisations had agreed to participate. 
 
3.2.5 Time Frame 
 
Another important research design issue is the time frame of the research. Research 
can be conducted either cross-sectionally or longitudinally (Zikmund 1997). In a 
longitudinal study respondents are questioned are different moments in time. The 
purpose of longitudinal surveys is to examine continuity of response and to observe 
changes over time. In such a study, various segments of the population are so 
sampled so that relationships among variables may be investigated (Zikmund 1997). 
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Either cross-sectional or longitudinal approaches could have been adopted for this 
research, a cross-sectional study was preferred, as it was not viewed as being 
required to observe changes overtime to provide the requisite research data. 
 
3.2.6 Data collection techniques 
 
Case study research often involves employing a variety of techniques to collect data 
from multiple sources. The use of multiple techniques improves the validity and 
reliability of results and also increases support for findings (McPhail 2000; Perry 
1998; Yin 1994). Due to the complicated nature of information security in Australia 
and the difficulty in securing access to organisations willing to participate, there was 
a requirement to use a variety of data collection techniques; of particular importance 
to the collection of data was the use of interview techniques. 
 
After the formulation and development of the research framework in section 2.4, five 
data collection techniques were selected for this research: in-depth interviews, a 
structured questionnaire, collection of data from secondary sources including the 
Internet and business documents, virtual interviews, and online structured 
questionnaires. This section details each of these five data collection techniques. 
 
In-depth interviews 
 
In-depth interviews are a relatively unstructured data collection technique used in the 
primary stages of the research process (Zikmund 1997). In-depth interviews were a 
primary method of data collection for this research. The in-depth interview is similar 
to the client interview of a clinical psychologist or a psychiatrist. The technique 
involves the interviewer throughout the session asking many questions and probes 
for elaboration after the subject answers. Unlike some other techniques the subject 
matter is generally undisguised (Perry 1998; Yin 1994; Zikmund 1997). 
 
Given the nature of the subject matter it was felt that interviews would achieve a far 
more comprehensive set of data on information security within the Australian 
business context. 
 
Interviewing provides the researcher a means to gain a deep understanding of how 
the participants interpret a situation or phenomenon than can be gained through other 
potential methodologies (Stainback 1998). It was important in the context of the 
research subject matter to include respondents‟ perceptions on the information 
security issues. Additionally, a basic assumption in in-depth interviewing research is 
that the meaning people make of their experiences affects the way they carry out that 
experience (Seidman 1997). Therefore, the importance that organisations place on 
information security should reflect their experiences in the subject area. 
 
The use of interviews as a data collection method for qualitative research does have 
its weaknesses. There is the possibility of respondent errors, omissions, or 
misstatements. The responses generated could be subject to interpretive errors made 
by the researcher in the review process (Stainback 1988; Seidman 1997; Yin 1994). 
To overcome this potential problem data was collected was collected in conjunction 
with the interview, most notably an exit survey was conducted in the form of a 
written questionnaire to allow for data triangulation to take place. 
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In-depth interview instrument design 
 
In-depth interviews were designed to collect data to address the research issues. The 
table below depicts the breakdown of the sections of the interview and how they are 
matched with the research issues to subsequently solve the research problem. 
 
Table 3-2 – Interview Protocol Design 
 
Research Issue Interview Protocol Section 
RI 1 - How reliant are Australian 
organisations on their IT? 
Section A of the interview protocol, IT in your 
organisation deals with this RI. The aim of this section 
is to identify to what extent organisations are reliant 
on their IT networks and what happens if they fail or 
are subjected to information security risks. 
RI 2 – How is the threat to 
organisations’ computers, data, and 
networks manifesting itself in 
Australian industry? 
 
Section B, Threats to computers, data, and networks, 
and Section C, Computer, data, and network security 
incidents deal with this RI. This section aims at 
identifying the type and nature of information security 
threats and how prevalent or serious they are. 
RI 3 – Is the information security 
greater in Australia? If so, why? 
 
Section B, Threats to computers, data, and networks 
deals with this RI. This section attempts to discover if 
organisations perceive that they are targeted for 
specific reasons, i.e. due to the type of organisation. 
Section C, which deals with specific incidents may 
provide evidence that the organisation has been 
targeted. The comparison component of this research 
issue can only be answered by review previous 
research. 
RI 4 – How are Australian 
organisations protecting their 
computer, data, and networks from 
information security risks? 
 
Section D, Security Practices and Procedures 
addresses this RI. The aim of this section is for the 
organisations to describe how they deal with the 
threat. 
RI 5 - What level of resource 
expenditure are Australian 
organisations committing to protect 
their systems and data? 
Section D. As part of this section the respondent will 
be asked to estimate the amount of money and 
resources that they commit to information security. 
 
Source: Developed for this research 
 
The interview protocol was developed in order to meet the collection requirements 
for the research and to allow all respondents to provide as much information 
regarding information security as was practical. The interview was broken into clear 
sections to aid in initial note taking and later data analysis. The organisation also 
assisted the respondents to „save‟ responses for the appropriate section where 
appropriate. The interview protocol used for the research is attached as Appendix A. 
 
In addition to questions, a number of probing points/issues were included as part of 
the instrument which were developed after initial pre-testing and through reviews of 
previous research. The probing statements were useful in cases where the 
interviewee may not have fully understood the question; when further elaboration 
was required, or to determine if there had been any omissions in the stated response 
(Zikmund 1997; Gillham 2000; Seidman, 1997; Stainback 1988). 
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Each interview started with a personal introduction and the exchange of pleasantries. 
The next part of the discussion included an outline of the research, including it 
purpose and scope. Importantly, due to the sensitive nature of information security 
issues the respondents were assured that all information provided would be kept 
confidential and that neither respondents nor their organisations would be identified 
in any of the research reports or findings. 
 
The first set of questions attempted to put the significance of information security 
into context. Respondents were asked about the nature of IT within their 
organisations, essentially how technology was used and how dependent the 
organisations processes were on that technology. Subsequent questions dealt with 
information security specific issues such as threats, incidents, and countermeasures. 
Concluding questions concentrated on organisational demographics and the 
respondents‟ position within the organisation. Again, table 3-2 illustrates the linkages 
between the interview protocol and the research issues. The research framework 
depicted in chapter 2 subsequently matches both by relating the focus area of reliance 
on IT, threats, incidents, countermeasures, and expenditure on security to each 
organisation. 
 
Structured written questionnaire 
 
Due to the nature and potential scale of the research topic it was envisaged that the 
research would either be a qualitative case based study, a quantitative survey based 
study or a combination of both. As a result lessons learnt during the review of the 
literature and the pilot study a cased based approach was considered the optimum 
methodology. Therefore, the prepared survey instrument was used to compliment the 
in-depth interview process and to allow for triangulation of results. 
 
In contrast to in-depth interviews, structured written questionnaires with fixed 
response categories (such as likert type scales) are: 
 Relatively cheap to administer (Frazer et al 2000) 
 A fast data collection method (Frazer et al 2000) 
 Good at obtaining hard to recall data (Frazer et al 2000) 
 Easy to respond to (Zikmund 1997) 
 Straight forward to analyse and interpret data easily (Davis and Cosenza 
1993; Frazer et al 2000; Zikmund 1997) 
 Not open to different interpretations by the researcher (Davis et al 1993; 
Gillham 2000) 
 
 
Structured written questionnaire design 
 
The structured written questionnaire designed for this research was designed to 
gather information across all five research issues in order to assist in solving the 
research problem. The questionnaire is attached as appendix B. The questionnaire is 
organised into five sections: 
a. Information technology in your organisation 
b. Threats to information security 
c. Information security incidents 
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d. Security practices and procedures 
e. Demographics. 
 
The questionnaire has 70 questions ranging from yes/no questions, selecting the most 
appropriate amount, and free text responses. Two different likert scales were used. 
Namely: 
a. 1 – 5 range of Strongly Agree to Strong Disagree 
b. 1 – 4 range of Least Frequent to Most Frequent. 
 
The likert scale was selected to measure the view point of the respondents, as these 
scales are often used for measuring attitudes and behaviours (Zikmund 1997). As 
mentioned above the survey also included several areas allowing for a free text 
response and sections asking for any general comments of potential omissions from 
the previous responses. This method allowed for the respondents to give a broader 
range of answers and to convey perceptions about the subject matter and the survey 
itself. 
 
To ensure that the designed questionnaire met the requirements of the research the 
questionnaire was carefully aligned with the research issues. Table 3-3 below depicts 
the relationship between the research issues and the questionnaire. 
 
Table 3-3 – Survey Instrument and Research Issue Matrix 
 
Research Issue Instrument Section 
RI 1 Section A, Questions 1 –16 
RI 2 Section B, Questions 1 – 14 and Section 
C Questions 1 – 15. 
RI 3 Section B, Questions 1 – 14 and Section 
C Questions 1 – 15. 
RI 4 Section D, Questions 1 – 17 and 19 
RI 5 Section D, Question 18. 
 
Source: Developed for this research 
 
There were a number of different survey instruments that were identified as part of 
the literature review process. These instruments were somewhat similar in their 
context and structure as there had been some attempts in the previous research to 
allow for comparisons between industry sectors and to a limited extent to allow for 
international comparisons. The most recent of the surveys being the CSI/FBI 2002 
Survey covering security incidents (and issues) in the USA and the AusCERT 2002 
Survey conducted in Australia in 2002. Whilst these surveys were used as reference 
points, the instrument for this research was designed well before these studies and 
attempts to create and illustrate linkages between the issues and the variables. 
 
Observation techniques 
 
Data collected through the interview process was triangulated with data collected 
through observation. Observation as a data collection technique involves witnessing 
and experiencing behaviours or events (Zikmund 1997), and provides the researcher 
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with the opportunity to collect data not possible via any other method (Yin 1994). 
Simply put observation has three main elements according to Gillham (p.45 2000): 
 Watching what people do 
 Listening to what they say 
 Sometimes asking them clarifying questions 
 
The observation technique of direct observation was used to collect data for this 
research. Direct observation involves witnessing events, whereas participant 
observation is actual participation in events (Yin 1994). Direct observation can also 
be called detached or structured; it involves watching from the „outside‟ in a 
carefully timed and specified way – counting and classifying what is seen (Gillham 
2000). 
 
Wherever possible the interviews for this research were conducted at the place of 
business or each organisation. This allowed direct observation of information 
security issues including threats, incidents, and displays of information security 
countermeasures. 
 
Observation techniques can be extremely useful in data collection, however, the 
researcher must be mindful of the techniques‟ limitations Gillham 2000; Yin 1994; 
Zikmund 1997). Researchers may assume both action and research roles and this 
combination is a prime source of confusion. Observer bias is a further limitation of 
using observation techniques (Gillham 2000; Yin 1994; Zikmund 1997). To reduce 
the likelihood of observer bias notes taken as a result of observations were compared 
with the other data collected and some issues were discussed with academics and 
practitioners. 
 
Virtual interview 
 
As indicated previously the subject matter can be very sensitive which would 
naturally result in potential participants being reluctant to divulge potentially 
compromising information. A review of previous research indicated that response 
rates for this kind of study were extremely low. In order to improve the quality and 
quantity of participant data a virtual interview system was developed. 
 
This unorthodox method for interview collection was introduced for a number of 
reasons including: 
 
 Early interview participants tended to get ahead of themselves in relation to 
answering subsequent questions in earlier parts of the interview 
 Participants tended to wander off topic and include issues that were not as 
relevant as some other areas 
 The potentially sensitive nature reduces the amount of potential participants 
therefore alternate methods are needed to increase the amount of people in 
the sample space 
 Some individuals preferred for interviews not to be taped, which made taking 
of notes more important 
 The design of an online interview method made use of modern technologies 
enabled the transcript to be actually generated by the participant. At the same 
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time the results were already in a format that was prepared for immediate 
coding and analysis 
 The format reduced the potential for interviewer bias or error 
 The web format made it possible to directly link the exit survey to ensure that 
there could still be triangulation of results 
 The virtual interview also opened up other parts of the country that may have 
been otherwise excluded from the study due to the cost of travel 
 Forms designed with long scrolling text boxes to allow respondents to type as 
much information as possible 
 Respondents were informed that they may receive a follow up e-mail to 
confirm their responses. In this way a more interactive approach could be 
adopted 
 
When presented with a choice the respondents preferred to take part in the virtual 
interview as they could: 
 Complete the interview in their own time, potentially outside normal business 
hours 
 Obtain more accurate data regarding instances 
 Track down reference documents that could be later used as secondary data 
 
A copy of the virtual interview is attached as appendix C. 
 
Online written questionnaire 
 
The structure written questionnaire was also developed into an online survey format. 
This allowed the written questionnaire to be distributed to a potentially wider 
audience but more importantly it was the basis of a triangulation tool that could 
follow either an in person interview or a virtual interview. 
 
 
Secondary data sources 
 
The secondary data for this research took the form of annual reports, organisational 
charts, strategic plans, information security strategic plans, information security 
policies and procedures, incident response plans, security audit documents, and 
vulnerability assessments. Wherever possible secondary data documents were 
collected prior to interviews. Documents were also collected during interviews to 
validate and compliment data collected through the interview process. Given the 
subject matter it was anticipated that some organisations would not wish to provide 
hard copy data. Additionally, because of the small size of some of the case 
participants many did not have formalised security of policy documentation to offer. 
Documents are an important source of data to corroborate and augment evidence 
derived from other sources (Gillham 2000; Stainback 1988; Yin 1994; Zikmund 
1997). Documents, policies and procedures were used with some caution as they may 
be incomplete or they could have been out of context with the scope of the study. 
 
3.2.7 Pre-testing 
 
After completion of the design of the in-depth interview protocol and the survey 
instrument pre-tests were conducted to ensure that the instruments were valid for 
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final data collection. Pre-testing is an important component of any research design 
(Zikmund 1997). Pre-testing can identify problems with data collection techniques 
and instruments, which could potentially compromise the validity of the research 
(Davis et al 1993). 
Pre-testing for this research initially involved administering the in-depth interview 
and structured written questionnaire to four industry professionals and two academic 
staff members. The pre-test candidates included general IT professionals and IT 
security professionals who had expressed interest in the content of the study. The 
intent of the pre-test was to ensure that the questions being asked were relevant and 
easily understood by all. 
 
After coding of the structured questionnaire in the Hyper Text Mark-up Language 
(HTML), the resultant hyperlink and introductory statements were posted on four 
Internet newsgroups that specialised in information security. Newsgroup readers 
were invited to take part and provide comments on the questionnaire design. 
 
The information derived and lessons learnt from the pre-test were invaluable in 
modifying the questionnaire for further use in the study. 
 
3.2.8 Pilot Case 
 
A pilot study is a collective term used to describe any small-scale exploratory 
research technique that uses sampling but does not necessarily apply rigorous 
research techniques (Zkimund, 1997). The main purpose of the pilot study for this 
research was to test both the interview protocol and the survey instrument. As 
previous studies had encountered difficulty in attracting participation the pilot study 
was also looked upon as an opportunity to explore alternative data collection 
strategies in order to maximise respondent participation. Essentially, the pilot study 
was aimed at validating the research approach and to confirm that respondents would 
be hard to find. 
 
The draft interview protocol was tested via a single in-depth interview conducted in 
the manner and style as intended for the research. The survey instrument, which was 
intended to be a method of triangulating results, was given to the interview 
participant at the conclusion of the interview. To gain additional feedback and to 
attract future participation in the subject a web site was created and Australian IT 
managers were invited to participate via a number of posts to security related 
newsgroups on the Internet. As part of the survey participants were asked to 
comment on the validity, content, and style of the survey instrument. 
 
Pilot testing is a critical part of any research design as it can potentially uncover 
flaws in the design of the research, therefore allowing the researcher to make the 
appropriate judgements before launching into the main component of the study 
(Seidman 1997; Yin 1994). 
 
The organisation chosen for participation in the pilot case was chosen due to the 
researchers‟ familiarity with the organisation and the interview participant. 
Additionally, as the researcher was familiar with the organisation and the subject in 
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context with the organisation the interviewees‟ responses could be evaluated with a 
high degree of certainty, therefore allowing more time to concentrate on the design 
of the various instruments. 
 
The survey instrument was tested at the conclusion of the first face to face interview 
and also via posting the information on a web site. A number of special IT security 
newsgroups were visited and Australian IT professionals were invited to take part in 
the survey.  
 
As a result of the pilot study a number of minor changes were made to the structure 
and wording  of both the interview protocol and the survey instrument. 
 
3.2.9 Validity and reliability in case study research 
 
Validity and reliability relates to the degree of confidence researchers and academics 
can have in research results and are essential elements to consider in the creation of a 
research design (Zikmund 1997). Validity refers to minimising research errors, 
ensuring the accuracy of the results (Davis et al 1993). Reliability refers to achieving 
consistency in the results of the research, if the research was repeated (i.e., it is 
repeatable), (Davis et al 1993; Yin 1994). There are three types of validity namely 
internal, external, and construct validity (Yin 1994). Each will be addressed in 
regards to the conduct of this research. 
 
Internal validity 
 
Internal validity is not relevant to descriptive studies (Yin 1994), except to say that as 
many explanations as possible were considered for variable relationships to ensure 
that unjustified claims are not made during the research‟s conclusions (McPhail 
2000). 
 
 
 
External validity 
 
The ability to make generalizations about the information security threat to 
Australian companies will be a useful product of the research. Comparative norms 
established from previous studies in the US will be used to judge the external validity 
of data developed in the research study (Zikmund 1997). This research, like others 
involving case studies will rely on analytical generalization to enable the results to be 
generalized to the broader area of theory on information security (Yin cited by 
McPhail 2000,p.5.19). By using similar questions in the survey component of the 
study it will be possible to identify differentiators and to validate the existing data 
against that previously collected. 
 
Construct validity 
 
Construct validity was ensured by having multiple sources of evidence (multiple 
cases) and having a limited group of interviewees review the case study report and 
interview transcripts to ensure that it is an accurate representation of reality (Healy 
and Perry 1999). Interview participants were also asked to complete a separate 
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questionnaire which was used to triangulate the results. As depicted earlier in this 
chapter a number of matrixes were compiled to ensure that questions could be linked 
to the research issues. 
 
Reliability 
 
A case study database was built and maintained to hold transcripts of interviews and 
other triangulation evidence such as annual reports obtained from external sources 
(Perry 1998; Yin 1994). As far as possible the research was conducted in easily 
reconstructed steps so that other researchers could follow the steps and achieve the 
same results. 
 
Other triangulation techniques that will be used in the study include the comparison 
of interview answers to the literature, including recent newspaper articles involving 
both cyber crime/warfare and the companies being studied. Audiotapes will be used 
to check hand written transcripts of interviews. More than one interview was 
conducted in each case organisation to ensure that there are fewer reporting errors 
introduced by the interviewee (Zikmund 1997). Additionally, interviewee‟s were in 
similar positions in each organisation. 
 
Analysis all data will be coded using two techniques and computer applications will 
be used to triangulate the results of the analysis methods (Perry 1997). 
 
3.2.10 Ethical considerations 
 
In addition to addressing validity and reliability issues, the ethics of this research had 
to be addressed. Ethical considerations are important for all research activities 
regardless of the participants and the subject material (Zikmund 1997). The sensitive 
nature of the subject matter and the potential for embarrassment related to any 
vulnerabilities or security incidents discovered meant that all organisations wanted to 
keep their identities confidential anonymous. Interview participants also wanted their 
identities kept anonymous for similar reasons. Ethical issues in this study were 
addressed by: 
 
 Reassuring the interviewees and organisations participating in the research 
that the information collected would remain confidential; statements 
regarding information would be generalised in such a way as to ensure the 
anonymity of the organisation. 
 Assuming honest responses were provided from interviewees in relation to 
interview questions and responses to the survey instrument and both forms of 
the online versions of the data collection tools. 
 Allowing participants to receive feedback from findings within the 
organisation. In fact, at the conclusion of the data collection respondents 
often asked for feedback on how their organisation compared against other 
organisations. 
 All participants were presented with copies of transcripts firstly to ensure that 
notes and transcripts were accurate (triangulation) and second to assure the 
information recorded had not been misrepresented. 
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3.3 Data collection process 
 
After the research design was completed and the data collection instruments had 
been tested and finalised the case studies were conducted. This section outlines the 
process taken to collect data from each organisation, with the first step being to make 
contact with the case organisations. 
 
3.3.1 Contacting organisations 
 
A variety of methods were used to contact organisations based on discussions with 
academic staff and lessons learnt during the pre-tests. Additionally, the researcher‟s 
contacts as an IT Manager helped open doors to some organisations. A variety of 
methods and techniques were selected and required to identify participants and how 
to gain the appropriate permissions to ensure participation (Seidman 1997; Stainback 
1988). The following approach was used for planning and conducting interviews and 
collecting information. 
 
In the first instance a letter, attached as appendix D, was sent to the IT Manager of 
the organisation to introduce the researcher and the research topic. The letter 
requested permission to undertake the research, specified the required commitment 
from the organisation (two interviewees for one hour each), assured confidentiality 
of the information collected and requested the organisation contact the researcher to 
arrange a convenient time to conduct the interview. 
 
In most instances the participating organisations were contacted by e-mail a week 
later to confirm their availability to participate in the study. The participants were 
again assured that the all information and organisational information would be kept 
confidential. Where participation was denied the organisation was struck off the list 
of cases. If face to face interviews were not practical or there was reluctance to 
participate the organisations were sent an e-mail containing the hyperlink to the 
virtual interview site. In some cases (where requested) the survey instrument was 
sent to the participants in order to finalise their participation or to help prepare them 
for the interview. 
 
3.3.2 Conducting interviews 
 
At the scheduled interview times the interviews were recorded using either a tape 
recorder or a mini-disc recorder. Hand written notes were taken throughout the 
interviews. At the completion of the interviews, the interviewees were asked to 
complete the written questionnaires. In some instances the interviewees indicated 
that they needed additional time to „properly‟ complete the questionnaire. In these 
cases the questionnaire was left with the organisation as well as the hyperlink for the 
online version of the questionnaire. 
 
After the completion of the interview secondary data (both documents and 
observation) was collected. This included tours of organisational IT facilities and 
copies of documentation. Notes were taken throughout the interviews and a request 
was made to each interviewee to allow for follow up or questions of clarification at a 
later date. 
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The conduct of the virtual interviews followed the same process as for the face-to-
face interviews. When participants arrived at the virtual interview site they were 
presented with information regarding the research subject and the researcher. Again, 
the confidentiality of participants was re-stated and then the interviewee was guided 
through the process. At the conclusion of the virtual interview the respondents were 
automatically guided to the online questionnaire. At the completion of both 
components of the online data collection the participants were thanked. As the online 
version of the interview protocol automatically compiled the interview transcript this 
transcript was sent to the interviewee and they were asked to verify it for accuracy. 
 
3.3.3 Post interview procedures 
 
Following interviews all interviewees were sent an e-mail message thanking them for 
their time. Additionally, the e-mail contained a copy of the interview transcript, less 
any notes taken by the researcher during the interview. A copy of this e-mail is 
attached as appendix F. An example interview transcript is attached as appendix E. 
 
3.3.4 Case study database 
 
To organise and sort the vast quantities of data collected from various sources a case 
study data base was created. A database is suggested for storage of data collected 
from case study research (Yin 1994). The database for this research comprised of 
manual and electronic information and was organised as follows: 
 Web newsgroup postings from relevant Internet newsgroups were stored 
electronically in folders sorted by topic. 
 Tape and mini-disc recorded interviews were transcribed, using the online 
interview tool and stored in electronic text files. Separate folders (directories) 
were created to compartmentalise the information from each organisation. 
 Surveys completed manually were converted to electronic format using the 
online questionnaire tool and then stored electronically with the relevant 
interview transcript. 
 Secondary data collected in hard copy format were stored in a filing cabinet. 
 Recorded observations were filed manually under the appropriate 
organisation‟s name. 
 
The case study database provided the source data for data analysis. 
 
3.4 Data analysis 
 
This section describes firstly how the collected data were prepared, and secondly 
how the data were analysed. Data analysis is the process of examining, categorising 
and tabulating data, providing answers to the research question (Yin 1994). 
 
3.4.1 Data Preparation 
 
Before data can be analysed, the data must be prepared for analysis, through the 
process of editing and coding (Zikmund 1997). The data collected by the in-depth 
interviews was converted to a common format using the virtual interview tool. Tape 
and mini-discs were translated into the tool in order to generate an accurate 
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transcript. Data from the survey instrument was converted, in the case of hand-
written survey responses into electronic format by the online questionnaire.  
 
In-depth interviews 
 
The in-depth interviews were designed to gain an understanding of IT security in the 
Australian business environment. The format of the interview transcript allowed for 
the automatic coding of the interview responses. With the assistance of academic 
staff a list of codes was established to enable interview responses to be meaningfully 
coded for analysis. The codes developed were divided into the following categories: 
 Risks (Threat – T, Incident – I, Target – Tg, General Risk - R) 
 Management (Countermeasures – C, Budget – B, General 
Management - M) 
 Differentiator – D 
 Unknown - ? (requiring further analysis or explanation) 
 
To prepare the in-depth interview data for analysis, the tape recorded data was 
transcribed. The transcripts were then verified with the original tapes (or discs) for 
accuracy.  
 
Structured written questionnaire 
 
The questionnaire was designed to triangulate and provide supplementary data to that 
collected through the interview process. Additionally, the questionnaire data 
provided a point of comparison to other research that was most quantitative in form. 
To prepare the attitudinal responses to questionnaire statements for analysis, scores 
shown in the table were assigned to the Likert scale response categories. 
 
 
Table 3-4 Likert scale conversion 
 
Likert 
Scale 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
Not 
Applicable 
Score 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Source: Developed for this research 
 
3.4.2 Data analysis 
 
The data collected for this research was analysed to understand information security 
in the Australian Business context. To understand information security in Australia 
the in-depth interview data were analysed first within each case and second across all 
cases. When a multiple case study strategy is adopted for a research design, 
individual-case analysis should be done before cross-case analysis (Perry 1998; Yin 
1994). 
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Within-case analysis 
 
Qualitative analysis techniques were used to analyse the data collected from in-depth 
interviews. Qualitative data analysis involves examining the data for consistent 
patterns and summarising these patterns in relation to the research problem (Yin 
1994; Zikmund 1997). The information security issues in each case were described 
by reviewing the themes that emerged from the in-depth interviews and searching for 
patterns in relation to reliance on IT, threats and incidents, Australian businesses as 
targets, countermeasures, and levels of expenditure on information security. The 
within case analysis method is further detailed in Chapter 4. 
 
Cross-case analysis 
 
In the cross-case analysis, data was analysed and insights gained in relation to each 
of the research issues. The intention of cross-case analysis is to generate insights, and 
not to prove anything or draw any generalisations (Yin 1994). The cross-case 
analysis method is further detailed in Chapter 4. 
 
3.5 Summary 
 
This chapter described and justified the use of a multiple case study methodology for 
researching information security in the Australian Business context. Next, the 
research design was detailed. The content and design of the in-depth interviews, 
written questionnaires, online questionnaires, and virtual interviews were described 
along with the procedures for their implementation. Finally, an outline was provided 
of how the data were prepared for analysis and then analysed within each case and 
the across all cases. The next chapter presents the results of the data analysis. 
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CHAPTER 4 - DATA ANALYSIS 
 
Chapter 3 described and justified the case study methodology used to collect and 
analyse the case study data. This chapter presents themes and patterns that emerged 
from the analysis of the data collected. 
 
The first two sections of this chapter provide fundamental background information 
on the ten case study organisations that participated in the research.  
 
The next part of the chapter provides an overview of how the data were analysed in 
each case studied followed by the within case analysis for each organisation. 
 
The chapter concludes with the cross-case analysis, which provides the major 
findings for each of the research issues across all ten cases. 
 
4.1 Background Information on case studies 
 
As discussed and justified in section 3.2.2 ten Australian organisations were selected 
as cases for this research. The organisations represent organisation drawn from New 
South Wales, the Australian Capital Territory, Queensland, and Victoria. The 
medium to larger organisations also had entities in the other states as well as some 
international interests. Maintaining the privacy of the organisations and individuals 
that participated in this research was an ethical consideration discussed in section 
3.2.10, so to protect their interests organisations or individuals have not been 
identified and employee numbers have been rounded. Some detail has been omitted 
so that easy identification of the case participants could not be achieved. The subject 
matter was potentially sensitive and participants were at times reluctant to provide 
details for fear of exposing vulnerabilities. These fears were addressed by providing 
generic descriptions of the organisations and their lines of business.  For analysis 
purposes, participating organisations are referred to as case A through to case J.  
 
Table 4-1 provides basic information about these organisations including the type of 
organisation, company size, and the details of when the interviews were conducted. 
The table illustrates how the research methodology in regards to case selection was 
implemented. 
 
Table 4-1 Participating Organisations 
 
Case Description Company Size Interview Period 
A Small wholesale business Small June 2002 
B Commonwealth 
Government agency – 
Defence Information 
Systems 
Medium February 2002 
C Commonwealth 
Government Agency – 
Defence 
Large February 2002 
D Resort Hospitality Company Medium July 2002 
E Software Company – Large March 2002 
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Security 
F Commonwealth 
Government Agency – 
Information 
Medium March 2002 
G Private Utility Company – 
Electricity 
Medium April 2002 
H Local Council Medium August 2002 
I State Government 
Department – Development 
Medium August 2002 
J State Government 
Department - Transport 
Large September 2002 
 
Source: Analysis of Secondary data and interview data 
 
The interview process was described in chapter 3 as part of the data collection 
methodology and included in-depth interviews, virtual interviews, review of 
secondary data, exit surveys, and personal observation. 
 
Interviewees displayed a frank and forthright attitude in their responses to the 
interview questions, both in the face-to-face interviews and the virtual interview. As 
will be demonstrated their answers provided a wealth of valuable insights into 
information security in their organisations. 
 
Table 4-2 presents a list of the IT professionals interviewed for each organisation as 
well as a generic position title that described the individual‟s role within each case 
organisation. 
 
Table 4-2 IT Professional Interviewed 
 
Case IT Professional 
A Support Services Administrator 
B Manager Information Systems 
Manager Corporate Services 
C Manager Corporate Technology 
Manager Information Security 
D Manager Infrastructure 
Manager Customer Services 
E Managing Director 
F Information Strategist 
G Chief Information Officer 
Information Security Manager 
H IT Manager 
I Director Information Systems 
Information Security Manager 
J Manager Information Technology 
Information Security Manager 
Source: Developed for this research 
 
4.2 Overview of within-case analysis method 
 
This section provides an overview of the processes undertaken in each of the ten 
organisations to analyse their information security issues. 
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Data from semi-structured interviews were analysed to gain an understanding of the 
information security issues facing Australian organisations. The data were analysed 
by reviewing interview transcripts for themes and patterns related to the research 
framework present in chapter 2, section 2.4. These are: 
 
a. Risk. The three elements within the sphere of risk were defined as: 
reliance on IT, Information Security threats and information security 
incidents, and Australian businesses targets 
 
b. Management. The two elements within the management sphere were 
defined as: countermeasures and level of security expenditure. 
 
c. Differentiators. This section of each case attempts to identify any 
potential differentiators that may explain the organisation‟s security 
posture as indicated in the sections on risk and management. 
Examples could include size, nature of the company, and connectivity 
to the Internet. These differentiators may help explain why there are 
differences between how organisations approach information security 
issues. They could also assist in identifying the differences in the 
security environments in nations that have been the focus of the 
research highlighted in Chapter 2, e.g., the USA and the information 
security environment in Australia. 
 
Throughout the analysis extracts from interviews are used to support findings and are 
referenced by the case, interview number and transcription line numbers. For 
example, „They are not overly reliant on IT, the main focus is on MYOB and office 
automation‟ (A:1.30) is a quotation from case A, interview number one, transcript 
line 30. „Investigations are conducted for serious activities in order to identify source 
and implement prevention‟ (C:1.172-173), is a quotation from case C, interview 
number 1, transcript lines 172-173. To further protect the privacy of the individuals, 
the interview numbers do not match the order the positions are listed in table 4-2.  
 
The within-case analysis for each of the organisations is presented next in sections 
4.3 to 4.12. This within-case analysis provides an information rich analysis of the 
information security issues with Australian organisations. This detailed analysis was 
used to prepare individual reports for each organisation on the information security 
issues affecting their organisation. Providing feedback to participating organisations 
was an ethical consideration of this research, as discussed in section 3.2.10. 
 
As part of the within case analysis a Strategic Grid was developed for each case in 
order to determine the strategic value of the IT for the case in terms of both the 
current systems and future developments (McFarlan, McKenny, and Pyburn 1983).  
The grid is demonstrated in Figure 4-1 below. 
 
The following definitions provided for each classification: 
 
a. Support role: IT has little relevance to a firm‟s existing or 
future success. 
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b. Key operational role: Current IT is important to the firm but 
future developments in IT are unlikely to improve the 
competitive advantage. 
c. Strategic role: Existing and future developments are critical to 
the firm‟s success. 
d. Turn around: Existing IT is unimportant but future 
developments are crucial to the firm‟s survival. 
 
Figure 4-1 Strategic Grid 
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Source: McFarlan et al 1983 
 
The final part of the within case analysis is the application of the information 
security assessment framework as defined in chapter 2. A table was created for each 
case listing the information security issues that each organisation faced. The 
assessment includes a subjective analysis (based on findings in chapter 2) as to 
whether the issue has a positive impact or a negative impact on the organisation‟s 
information security posture i.e. if the issue improves the posture a „+‟ is indicated in 
the table. If the issues expose the organisation to greater risk a „-„is recorded in the 
table. 
 
4.3. Case A – Small wholesale food business 
 
Case A is a small wholesale producer of food employing around 20 staff. They are 
located in the outskirts of a capital city. Their technology use could best be described 
as typical for a small business of this type and size (i.e. quite limited). Due to the 
small size and limited exploitation of technology within the organisation only one 
knowledgeable IT professional was available for interview. 
 
In order to provide a more logical link to the literature, this the analysis also includes 
information on security deficiencies and gaps, e.g. the organisation did not have any 
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form of anti-viral protection in place. This appeared to be a significant shortfall in the 
organisation‟s security posture and pointed to a failure in the risk management 
process to identify the risk of virus incidents and the management process to 
implement measure despite known virus incidents. 
 
4.3.1 Risks 
Reliance on IT 
 
Interview and observation data were analysed to gain an understanding of the 
reliance on IT within Case A. Overall the business reliance on IT could be 
considered as low.  
 
„They are not overly reliant on IT, the main focus is on the MYOB and 
office automation, there is some limited offline backup‟ (A:1.30-1). 
 
When posed the question of what would happen if the technology simply didn‟t work 
the response indicated the organisation would continue to be capable of undertaking 
its main function of producing food despite any technology setbacks. 
 
„If it didn‟t work, they have had problems in the past at the hardware 
level. It would delay the book keeping and cause some worries, but 
the product would still get sold‟ (A:1.33-5). 
 
The organisation appeared to use its IT (PC and servers) for the e-mail, running the 
business financials (MYOB accounting), access to the Internet file sharing – such as 
recipes and for office automation and the preparation and storage of business 
correspondence. 
 
This response indicates that whilst technology clearly has a role to play in the 
business it is a background support tool rather than a business enabler. Due to the 
relatively small scale of the business and its perception of where technology fitted 
into the conduct of the business, security issues did not rate highly on their list of 
priorities. 
 
Observational data further supported the assessment that Case A‟s reliance on IT was 
low. There were three PCs located at the company premises and one offsite – one of 
the PC doubled as a server. During the visit, the researcher observed that the PCs 
were not used by any of the employees as the staff were all involved in the 
production and dispatch of Case A‟s product. The survey instrument response also 
indicated the part-time nature of the IT support/security for the organisation. The 
staff member responsible for IT spent only 40% of his time providing IT support 
with the remainder being in direct support of the company‟s wholesale business. 
 
The organisation‟s computers were networked in a rudimentary manner to allow for 
limited resource sharing. The ad hoc manner in which computers were used and 
managed within the organisation highlighted that technology was not seen as a 
business enabler. 
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Whilst the technology is not directly related to the production of the organisation‟s 
core product there is frequent use of the Internet. 
 
'…(staff) use the Internet all the time‟ (A:1. 55).  
 
Little of the organisation‟s use of the Internet was described as being „business 
related‟, although follow up questions indicated this to be the case – the organisation 
did not have a mechanism for logging employee Internet use. As the majority of 
Internet use is not business related – the organisation is potentially introducing an 
unnecessary risk to the organisation. 
 
Figure 4-2 below depicts the application of the McFarlan and McKenny Strategic 
Grid (McFarlan et al 1983) to the organisation‟s IT. Case A has been placed in the 
support category to reflect the fact that technology is used primarily for basic office 
automation and some limited book keeping roles – IT has little relevance to the 
organisation‟s existing or future success. The organisations main product does not 
rely on technology for its creation. 
 
Figure 4-2 Case A Strategic Grid 
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Source: Analysis of interview and secondary data 
 
Threats 
 
The strongest threats that emerged when identifying the threats faced by the 
organisation in Case A were hackers and viruses. 
  
„Viruses are a big problem as they (staff) use the Internet all the time‟ 
(A:1. 55).  
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This statement highlights the fact that the virus issues faced by the organisation are 
related to the employee use of the Internet. After the hacker and virus threat the next 
greatest threat identified by the organisation was the systems internal users. 
 
The staff member responsible for IT within Case A believed that the organisation 
was under threat from hackers. 
„They (employees) use the Internet all of the time. Hackers are a 
problem, because of the fact that the system is online 24x7. I have 
noticed that we have had hits almost daily. People trying to get in‟ 
(A:1. 55-7).  
 
The absence of a policy on Internet use in Case A resulted in a lack of control over 
the employees in this area. The organisation significantly increased the risk of a 
security related incident due to the absence of measures to inform and control staff 
access to the Internet. 
 
The hacker threat was considered to be the most significant security threat that the 
organisation faced.  
 
„Probably hackers (are the most significant). If they did something to 
our data that would cause a big problem‟ (A:1. 70-1). 
 
The respondent in Case A indicated that the organisation had learnt about the threats 
the organisation faced through experience.  
 
„I know the threat through experience, having contact within the 
hacking community, plus consistent research on the net. What you do 
is see where the script kiddies are going, what they are doing and 
making sure that your system is patched appropriately‟ (A:1. 82-5). 
 
There was no evidence of a formal or informal risk management assessment. 
 
Incidents 
 
The organisation studied in Case A had suffered from a number of computer related 
security incidents that had been detected and had had an impact of the way the 
organisation used their IT.  
 
„We run server logs that record attacks. They are constant, sometimes 
we have 50 – 60 attempts (per day) to get through‟ (A:1. 117-8).  
 
Virus incidents have also been recorded by the organisation.  
 
„We have also had viruses uploaded, with 15 viruses getting through. 
This has been due to the lack of updating virus patches‟ (A:1.120 – 1). 
 
This statement demonstrated an understanding of the cause and effect nature of 
managing a security environment. The organisation had not managed its system 
updates and security patches and the result was increased incidents of virus attacks. 
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The lack of a virus policy and perhaps just as importantly the lack of proper position 
descriptions meant that responsibility for these tasks was not clear. 
 
The company had not noted any other type of security incident. When asked which 
type of incident was most prevalent the response was:  
 
„The most prevalent were the probes that are logged by the firewalls 
and then viruses‟ (A:1. 131). 
 
The organisation found it difficult to quantify the costs of any losses that had resulted 
from the observed incidents. 
„We have lost data because of the viruses in MYOB. They lost three 
weeks worth of work that had to be re-entered into the computer. It‟s 
hard to estimate (costs), basically the costs of re-entering the data‟ 
(A:1. 137-41). 
 
The business as a target 
 
There was clear evidence that the business was a target of information security 
incidents. The organisation put its „status‟ as a target into the following perspective:  
 
„We are a target because we use servers that are connected to the 
Internet, but I don‟t believe we would be a target for a controlled 
attack, (we are a target) mainly because it is there. If they have the 
opportunity to do it. Not many people would care about our financial 
position‟ (A:1.91-5). 
 
The lack of a robust risk assessment process within the organisation has led to a 
number of threats not being recognised by the organisation. The organisation has left 
itself open to attack because it has not assessed the risks. Even in a small 
organisation such as Case A a risk assessment would have revealed the virus threat, 
the evidence for which would be the number of actual recorded incidents. This in 
turn would have pointed the organisation in the direction of where it should best 
devote its limited resources in order to manage the risks more effectively. 
 
4.3.2 Management 
Countermeasures 
 
The organisation had a variety of countermeasures that it employed to address the 
threat and reduce the number of security incidents that it encountered. The company 
used a firewall to help protect its systems from Internet risks and had procedures 
(informal – not documented) to restrict access through the firewall device.  
 
„The server is locked down pretty tight, and so is the firewall. Only 
two ports are open‟ (A:1.170-1). 
 
The company also had rules that limited users‟ ability to install software on company 
systems, in particular software that may pose security problems for the company.  
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„(We have) processes and procedures that don‟t allow users to install 
software such as ICQ. I then go around and make sure that this is the 
case.‟ (A:1.173-4).  
 
The respondent made an interesting observation that seemed to be relevant to small 
businesses in relation to setting rules for computing systems. 
  
„It‟s hard to tell the owners of the company not to do certain things on 
their own computers‟ (A:1:176). 
 
The senior management of the organisation therefore seemed to lack awareness of 
the potential security issues that the organisation faced. Whilst the organisation used 
a number of anti-viral products they were not used to their full potential by, for 
example, enabling features such as disk scanning. 
 
The lack of documented security policies resulted in an uncoordinated attempt to 
manage the organisation‟s security environment. The organisation knew it should 
employ countermeasures but did not effectively manage the implementation or on-
going maintenance of those countermeasures. 
 
Level of security expenditure 
 
As might be expected for a company of its size and business type, Case A did not 
have a large security budget. All countermeasures used existing hardware and 
freeware software wherever possible. 
 
„We spend hardly anything, we use free stuff if possible such as 
zoneAlarm, a free Unix firewall in an attempt to minimise cost. We do 
pay for our anti-virus software‟ (A:1.183 – 6). 
 
It is reasonable to expect that the organisation had little capital to invest into 
information security. What little funds were available were, however, allocated in a 
random fashion. 
 
 
4.3.3 Differentiators 
 
The data collected through the interview process, observational data, and the exit 
survey revealed a number of potential differentiators regarding information security 
within Case A. The table identifies two potentially inconsistent issues. Firstly, the 
nature of the business indicates that as a small wholesale producer they are not 
highly reliant on IT, yet they have (an unexplained) high use of the Internet. 
Accordingly, and they use most of their security efforts in protecting themselves 
from Internet based threats. The differentiators are listed in the table below. 
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Table 4-3 Differentiators Case A 
 
Differentiator 
Number 
Differentiator Comments 
1 Nature of the business Case A was a small wholesale 
business that was not overly reliant 
on IT. This lack of reliance reduced 
the technology ‘footprint’ and reduced 
the significance and importance of 
security incidents. 
2 Size The size of the company impacted 
the amount of IT used, the amount of 
IT staff and amount of money spent 
on IT and IT security. 
3 Role of security professional Security was seen as a minor function 
of the person responsible for 
managing the businesses IT. It was 
not a stated role; it was done because 
the individual considered it important. 
4 Use of the Internet The company’s use of the Internet 
largely dictated its security response 
and the threat that it faced. Much of 
the security focus was aimed at 
protecting the business from the 
Internet. 
 
Source: Analysis of secondary data and interview data 
 
4.3.4 Case A – Security assessment framework 
 
Using the framework defined and developed in chapter 2, this study‟s assessment of 
the information security position for Case A is shown in the diagram below. The 
framework indicates that there are more negatives than positives. There a number of 
areas that require attention in order to appropriately manage information security 
issues.
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Table 4-4 Information Security framework Case A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(+) Factor has a positive impact on the organisation‟s security posture 
(-) Factor has a negative impact on the organisation‟s security posture 
 
Source: Analysis of secondary and interview data  
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4.3.5 Summary and recommendations 
 
The organisation‟s security posture suffered from the lack of alignment between the 
risks and the management of those risks. The absence of information security 
policies, which are subsequently implemented by technology, resulted in the 
organisation suffering from excessive security incidents. The failure to conduct a risk 
assessment exercise resulted in an uncoordinated and less than effective 
implementation of countermeasures.  
 
If Internet usage is business related then processes need to be implemented to 
mitigate the Internet based risks. 
 
The following recommendations are based on a comparison of the analysis of the 
current state of security in Case A with best practice as uncovered by the literature 
review (see chapter 2). If implemented the recommendations should significantly 
improve the organisation‟s security position: 
 
a. Risk assessment. The organisation should undertake a risk 
assessment to determine what threats they face and what 
vulnerabilities their systems have. Given the size of the organisation 
and its limited budget this assessment need not be overly complex or 
lengthy. 
b. Internet use. The organisation must establish guidelines for Internet 
usage. 
c. Policies. The organisation should establish policies regarding use of 
information systems and how security will be implemented. 
d. Position descriptions. The organisation would benefit greatly from 
written position descriptions that make it clear who is responsible for 
various security functions. 
e. Anti-virus countermeasures. The organisation should further exploit 
the capabilities of anti-viral software, in particular automated updates 
of software patches. 
f. Management awareness. The correlation between threats and 
incidents should be made known to management in order to provide 
the business case for implementing more robust management 
methods. 
 
4.4 Case B – Commonwealth Government agency 
 
Case B is a medium sized Commonwealth Government agency employing around 
2500 staff. They are located in all states of Australia in varying sized branch offices, 
with the major concentration of staff being located in a single capital city. The 
organisation‟s prime responsibility was the provision of information architecture and 
infrastructure to support a larger government department. 
 
The use of information is very important to Case B and as a result they use IT in a 
variety of ways in order to enable their core business to take place. Two senior IT 
professionals were chosen by the organisation to take part in the interviews. 
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4.4.1 Risks 
Reliance on IT 
 
Interview and observational data were used to gain an understanding of the reliance 
on IT within Case B. At the time of the organisational visits it was clear to the 
researcher that Case B could best be described as being highly reliant on IT. All 
employees had a computer on their desks and they used them consistently in the 
conduct of their routine tasks. 
 
„We are totally reliant on IT. This has progressed in the last 10-15 
years from very little or no reliance on IT, and lagging behind most of 
industry to actually leading industry in our use of IT, especially in 
regards to reliance‟ (B:1.21-4). 
 
The organisation used the Ethernet protocol for LAN connectivity and IP for WAN 
connectivity. Client/Server technology dominated, however, there were some 
instances of thin client implementation. Specialist application servers were 
maintained for specialist applications and for e-enabled services such as Intranet and 
Internet systems. 
 
There were limited specialised network management tools or applications as the 
organisation tended to adopt „vanilla‟ Microsoft software platforms. This was 
somewhat of an issue for the technical team within the organisation as they had 
recently changed network operating systems from Novell 5.0 to Windows NT Server. 
 
The researcher‟s impression was that the technical support team were appropriately 
trained and experienced to provide a high level of technical support to the 
organisation. 
 
The organisation‟s reliance on IT was increasing, highlighting that the organisation 
was, at one stage not very reliant on IT. However, this had changed over time. 
 
„In the past, say four years ago it was mainly just administration, a bit 
of e-mail here and there. Not many users. Now it is becoming a fully 
operational network, an integrated network, a network that people 
rely on. They are heavily reliant‟ (B:2.21-4). 
 
Intranet and Internet based activities are a key business requirement within the 
organisation, with a high reliance on Internet based technology (web browsers) and 
documents that reside on the Intranet or the Internet.  
 
„We use a whole of enterprise Intranet, connected by a corporate 
WAN‟ (B:2.37). 
 
„There are Intranet users for local branch information and for 
corporate wide issues such as policies and procedures, globally 
around the organisation‟ (B:1.27-8). 
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Whilst not specifically mentioned by the interview respondents it could be expected 
that the organisations reliance on interdependent systems would create broader 
information assurance issues. Data integrity becomes significantly more complex 
when remote updates of databases become an organisational imperative. 
 
The IT within Case B is used for a wide variety of functions. 
 
„Pay, leave, logistics functions all happen on our networks. Asset 
management, personnel management, they are centrally located in 
data centres, so it happens over the wire‟ (B:2.50-2).  
 
„Things like finance, pay is all done through IT based programs. They 
are many and quite varied‟ (B:1.36-7). 
 
Internet access and general connectivity to the outside world is also considered 
important to the organisation. 
 
„There is obviously Internet access, which is needed because we are 
so diverse in the things we do. The Internet is surfed like it would be 
in any large organisation and because of the business that we do. So 
the organisation is also reliant on our connectivity to the Internet‟ 
(B:1.30-3). 
 
One of the best indicators of how reliant an organisation is on its IT is to look at what 
happens when the IT doesn‟t function.  
 
„IT enhances the way we do business; if we don‟t have it we don‟t 
work. It is just as bad as if the power goes off, you can‟t do anything. 
We also do things like VoIP (Voice over IP), so if the networks go 
down we lose our phones also, so we are totally stuffed, So you can‟t 
call people when you have a problem either‟ (B:2.54-8). 
 
The other interviewee had a slightly different slant on the issue. 
 
„When IT doesn‟t work, well you can‟t say that the organisation stops, 
but a lot of administration stops‟ (B:1.43-4). 
 
This last statement indicates that there may be room for improvement in the 
organisation‟s Business Continuity Plan (BCP). 
 
The survey responses from the organisation strongly supported what the interviewees 
reported verbally; the organisation used IT as a business enabler. 
 
Figure 4-3 below depicts the application of the McFarlan and McKenny Strategic 
Grid (McFarlan et al 1983) to the organisation‟s IT. In this case the organisation has 
been assessed as being in the key operational quadrant because IT was seen as an 
enabler to the business and was employed in a wide variety of applications – current 
IT is important to the firm but future developments in IT are unlikely to the 
competitive advantage. 
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Figure 4-3 Case B Strategic Grid 
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Source: Analysis of interview and secondary data 
Threats 
 
Perhaps the strongest theme discovered in the analysis of the interview data from this 
case was the wide variety of threats that the organisation faced. 
 
„Hackers, organised groups of hackers, internal disgruntled systems 
users, and foreign governments are all potential threats to our 
systems‟ (B:1.84-5). 
 
Contrary to findings reported in the literature, the organisation did not list ex-
employees as a potential threat. A review of secondary data provided a possible 
explanation. It uncovered a number of procedures that involved deactivation of user 
accounts and verbal de-briefs from security officials regarding non-disclosure of 
sensitive information. 
 
Viruses were seen as a problem for the organisation although the respondents were 
quick to point out that they had taken a number of steps to reduce the virus threat.  
 
„The biggest threat that we have at the moment is viruses coming 
through the firewall, people‟s e-mail mainly‟ (B:2.79-80). 
 
„Viruses are probably as big a threat as they were. We do get viruses 
that give port 80 a hammering. That has the potential to give us a 
hard time. Anything that will attack an IIS server is particularly 
critical for us at the moment‟ (B:1.93-6). 
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The organisation believed that they faced a hacking threat not only because of who 
they were and what they did but also because of their relationship with other 
organisations.  
 
„People trying to hack in. It could be individuals it could be very hard 
to tell. The only time you know is if you catch what they are doing. So 
its definitely a threat because we have relationships with other 
companies, governments and organisations. It may be that those are 
not popular and people may attack us because of that relationship‟ 
(B:2.96-102). 
 
The IT within the Case operated in an encapsulated or segregated manner. For 
example, the organisation‟s more sensitive information often resided in separate 
computing domains. This design strategy was a clear attempt to reduce the threat to 
the more sensitive information; however, there were still threats that could impact 
upon that sensitive information.  
 
„We have people transferring data from one segregated network to 
another. From a highly sensitive system to a network designed for 
public information. So we have to look at issues like information 
sanitisation. This is to prevent the systems users stuffing up and 
degrading the security of the network‟ (B:2.80-5). 
 
The respondents differed in their views as to what was the most significant threat that 
the organisation faced.  
 
„The internal threat is the most significant. We have a vast 
organisation, although access is now tighter than in the past‟ 
(B:1.104-5).  
 
„Viruses are the most significant threat. They do the most damage and 
are the most damming. They are the most prolific, because we are on 
NT. That‟s one of the reasons why we went to Lotus Notes rather that 
Outlook and Exchange‟ (B:2.127-9).  
 
Analysis of the survey responses would seem to indicate a linkage between the 
internal threat and the virus threat, i.e. the actions of the users increase the risk of 
viruses. 
 
Both interviewees indicated that their on the job experience was how they learnt 
about the threats their organisation faced.  
 
„Experience based on my previous roles in this organisation and in 
others. We talk quite frequently to the security people (hands on 
practioners), we spend time with the staff and look at the issues that 
they are facing. I read a lot of the information put out about the risks‟ 
(B:2.139-43). 
 
This last statement highlights that the organisation had not put a lot of emphasis on 
hiring staff with credentials in this area. The researcher believed that this was due to 
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the changing focus of the organisation and the need to keep staff employed. Staff 
were shifted from areas of lower demand to new areas often with little training or 
experience in those new areas. 
Incidents 
 
The organisation in Case B had suffered from a number of differing information 
security incidents ranging from virus attacks to instances of internal systems user 
access abuse.  
 
„We had a user who thought he had administrator capabilities when 
in actual fact he had access to a number of Lotus Notes ID files for 
the e-mail. He had access to every e-mail in the company right from 
the CEO to the lowest level. It included information that was 
commercial-in-confidence. There was enough information to know the 
business of 2500 people‟ (B:1.104-15). 
 
 This incident was an example of poor internal security that was exploited by a 
system user for their own purposes. 
 
Earlier viruses were identified as a significant threat to the organisation so it was not 
surprising that the organisation had encountered virus related incidents.  
 
„The modified Nimda virus was one issue. All of the IIS servers were 
turned off, we had to disable port 80. It shut everything down, we 
basically had to shut down the entire Intranet, and we couldn‟t get 
through to the Internet. All of which cut down access to a lot of work 
productivity tools‟ (B:2.193-6). 
 
The organisation also suffered from spamming or e-mail misuse incidents.  
 
„Another big one that is causing us a lot of grief at the moment is 
people spamming. Chain e-mails, pyramid letters, “you‟ve got to send 
this on to 10 people otherwise you will suffer bad luck – your dog will 
die‟ (B:2.209–12).  
 
An interesting variation of the spamming incidents was an e-mail that prayed upon 
virus fears. 
 
„The classic is the virus alert (e-mail) where people are told to send 
the alert (e-mail) to everyone in their address book and if you have 
2500 people in your organisation and all of them send it to all of the 
other people there is going to be a lot of e-mail traffic and things will 
stop pretty quickly‟ (B:2.215-8). 
 
The organisation had also been the victim of a number of incidents where external 
contractors who had been granted temporary access to the company‟s systems had 
abused that privilege. 
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„Contractors are forever trying to get inside knowledge of the 
company‟s future needs and directions. So there is potential for 
information to be leaked to other organisations and the media‟ 
(B:1.192-8). 
 
The Case B organisation had recent experience with theft and loss of its computing 
equipment in the months leading up to the interviews.  
 
„Theft of laptops is a big issue. We normally contact the Police. A 
dedicated asset manager has been appointed to check on this and 
laptop hard drives are now encrypted. We have a lot of stuff stolen or 
misplaced‟ (B:2.234-6) 
. 
Whilst hackers were mentioned as a potential threat there did not appear to be a great 
deal of hacker activity against the organisation. 
 
„There is nothing specific from the hackers that I can recall recently‟ 
(B:2.232). 
 
The survey responses indicated only „routine‟ port scanning and no hacker incidents. 
The two interview respondents differed in their view of which type of incident was 
the most significant or the most prevalent. 
 
„The viruses are the most prevalent. The Nimda viruses‟ (B:2.247). 
 
„The most significant is employee access abuse, the most prevalent is 
systems users having inappropriate access to information‟ (B:214-6). 
 
Reviews of the survey responses indicated that viruses were certainly the most 
prevalent in terms of the number of incidents encountered. Both interviewees 
indicated that the organisation had suffered monetary losses as a result of 
information security incidents and tended to believe that the losses were hard to 
quantify.  
 
„No not really (couldn‟t estimate a value of losses), it would be pretty 
huge. Mainly in lost time, a five minute outage has to be multiplied 
out by the amount of users that are impacted‟ (B:2.254-5). 
 
Whilst the organisation appeared to have comprehensive policies and procedures the 
number and nature of the incidents indicates that many of these policies are not being 
followed and there are control issues. 
The business as a target 
 
The interview responses and the survey responses indicated that the organisation was 
a target for individuals and groups. 
  
„There is a foreign government threat because of who we are and 
what we do and who we share information with. There is a real 
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espionage threat and an information warfare threat. We could and 
would be a threat in that area‟ (B:1.147-51). 
 
„(We are targeted) because of the nature of what we do. Especially 
from foreign nationals, issue motivated groups also. Because we have 
relationships with some bigger international organisations some may 
see us as an easier target to get information about those bigger 
organisations. If they couldn‟t get it from them they would try us. We 
are seen as a softer target, because of our association with our 
business partners we could be seen as a backdoor into their networks 
or information‟ (B:2.150-5). 
 
Whilst the organisation had detailed a number of threats and re-counted a number of 
security incidents they did not correlate the incidents with the fact they believed they 
were a target. They believed that foreign governments were a potential security 
threat, however, they did not know how many (if any) of their incidents could 
potentially be linked to the foreign government threat. 
 
4.4.2 Management 
Countermeasures 
 
The organisation employed a variety of countermeasures to protect their IT and 
information from information security incidents. These countermeasures include 
policy and procedures as well as technology based solutions. Of these, the policies 
and procedure aspect of the countermeasures were seen as being the vital 
underpinning factor to the organisation‟s security posture. 
  
„We have organisational wide information systems security practices 
and procedures. They are about 12 – 18 months old. They are signed 
off by me as the system manager and then the regional manager for 
each site‟ (B:2.282-4). 
 
„There is a generic set of procedures that will go to all levels with an 
overview from the top and go down to the lowest level, so that any 
local branch procedures can be dovetailed into the procedures and 
can be monitored and controlled from the highest level‟ (B:1.254-7). 
 
The organisation‟s use of security technology focused on the use of firewalls and 
anti-viral software. 
  
„Firewalls are central (to our security posture)‟ (B:2.296). 
 
„The organisation uses firewalls‟ (B:1.273). 
 
The secondary data presented by the organisation showed extensive use of anti-viral 
products throughout the organisation. Daily updates of anti-viral patches were 
conducted through the system log-on process. This provided an effective manner of 
controlling and managing the process. The organisation had identified that this was 
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an important function that could easily be missed by an individual so they invested in 
an automated solution. 
 
Controlling system access was also an important factor for the organisation. Whilst 
system access was defined and regulated by system policies and procedures, the 
interviewees strongly emphasised that management of system access was a key 
countermeasure in itself. 
 
„Everyone who wants access to our systems must read our policies so 
they are aware of the security implications of their actions and what 
is required of them‟ (B:2.288-93). 
 
The survey and secondary data collected illustrated that the organisation had 
developed and implemented Disaster Recovery Plans (DRP) and Business Continuity 
Planning (BCP), however, the interviewees indicated that more work was required in 
this area.  
 
„We have a DRP but in the past they haven‟t been very successful. We 
are re-writing it to improve the survivability‟ (B:2.303-4). 
 
„Disaster recovery plans, capacity and continuity plans exist. Most of 
the independent area used to do their own thing, only when pain was 
felt did they do any planning‟ (B:1.268-70). 
 
The organisation did have a reasonable degree of correlation between their assessed 
threats and the countermeasures they employed, however, there seemed to be a lack 
of formal risk assessment at the start of the security process which detracted from the 
overall integration of the security picture. The organisation appeared to be doing the 
right thing in many aspects of their security landscape, however, there appeared to be 
a lack of organisational acknowledgement on the real significance of information 
security to the organisation. 
Level of security expenditure 
 
There was a 100% variation in the amount of money claimed to be spent by the 
organisation on Information Security.  
 
„There is the cost of staff, which I think is four, cost of the firewalls, 
software and the production of the procedures. The organisation does 
keep its steps quite, we would spend about $1 million per year‟ 
(B:1.280-3).  
 
This differs from the other response. 
 
„In the last year we have spent about $500K on a security system. The 
normal budget is about $2 million per year, which includes funds for 
firewalls. Standards, audits, staff and the like‟ (B:2.320-1). 
 
The reason for the difference in response was not made clear to the researcher. It was 
probably due to differences in what was considered to be included under 
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„information security‟. It did, however, potentially point to the fact that the 
organisation and also potentially the respondents did not understand information 
security as well as they perhaps should. It could also illustrate that higher IT 
management may not have an intimate day to day knowledge of information security 
issues. 
 
4.4.3 Differentiators 
 
A number of potential differentiators were uncovered during the study of the Case B 
organisation that may have an impact on the organisation‟s security posture. These 
differentiators are listed and described in the table below: 
 
 
Table 4-5 Differentiators Case B 
 
Differentiator 
Number 
Differentiator Comments 
1 Dispersed nature of the business Case B had a number of different 
branch offices that were in different 
states requiring the use of inter-
connected networks. This adds 
additional complications to security 
solutions. 
2 Size and structure The size of the company impacted 
the amount of IT used, the amount of 
IT staff and amount of money spent 
on IT and IT security. As a bigger 
organisation they have been seen as 
a high pay-off security target. The 
organisation’s hierarchical structure 
made it easier to pass on instructions 
on policies and procedures 
3 Value of organisational 
information. 
Information was a key resource and 
at times the information needed to be 
kept away from public viewing. This 
information could be specifically 
targeted. Thus the organisation was 
more likely to face dedicated attacks 
rather than attacks of opportunity. 
4 Reliance on the Internet The company was heavily reliant on 
the Internet, which dictated that they 
needed to have an available 
connection to the outside world rather 
than having a closed and more 
secure network: the security versus 
functionality trade off. 
5 Reliance on IT The organisation was heavily reliant 
on IT and as such needed to take 
extra measures to ensure the 
continued operation of their systems. 
6 Relationships with other 
organisations or companies. 
The organisation faced additional 
threats because they dealt with other 
organisations that were likely targets 
for security related attacks. The Case 
B organisation had to strengthen its 
security posture because of this. 
7 Lack of information security The organisation did not appear to 
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vision make information security a priority 
issue for the organisation. There was 
no mention for example that security 
was included as part of the corporate 
planning function. 
8 Lack of contingency planning If the systems are organisational 
administration is stopped. 
 
Source: Developed for this research 
 
4.4.4 Security Framework 
 
Using the framework defined and developed in chapter 2, this study‟s assessment of 
the information security position for Case B is shown in the diagram below. The 
table illustrates that because of the organisation‟s reliance on IT they are more likely 
to be impacted negatively from the loss of their systems. The left hand side of the 
table summarises the risks to the organisation. The right hand side of the table 
highlights the organisation‟s efforts to balance or mitigate those risks with the 
appropriate countermeasures and management practices. The summary and 
recommendations that follow the table offer suggestions on how the organisation‟s 
security posture can be improved. 
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Table 4-6 Information security framework Case B 
 
 
(+) Factor has a positive impact on the organisation‟s security posture 
(-) Factor has a negative impact on the organisation‟s security posture 
 
Source: Analysis of secondary and interview data  
Risk Management 
Research Issue 1 
Reliance on IT 
Research Issue 2 Research Issue 3 
Australian Business as Targets 
Research Issue 4 
Countermeasures 
Research Issue 5 
Level of Security 
Expenditure 
Threats Incidents 
Office 
Automation. 
- 
Formal risk 
assessment. 
+ 
 
System 
privilege abuse. - 
The organisation believed 
that they were a significant 
potential target due to the 
nature of the work that 
they do. 
- 
Well defined and 
enforced system 
security policy. + 
Significant 
security budget 
with some 
linkage to 
threats. 
+ 
Payroll 
processing. - 
Hackers. 
- 
Significant virus 
incidents. - 
International and national 
organisations could have 
Case B as a target. 
- 
Procedures and work 
instructions on the 
use of IT. 
+ 
 
 
Corporate wide 
intranet. 
- 
Organised 
groups of 
hackers. 
- 
Chain e-mails 
(SPAM). 
- 
Issues motivated groups 
could also have the 
organisation as a target. 
- 
Anti-viral software 
with automated 
updates of virus 
definition files. 
+ 
 
 
Document 
management. 
- 
Foreign 
governments. 
- 
Contractors 
abusing access 
privileges. 
-  
 
High-end hardware 
based firewall 
products that meet 
national certification 
standards. 
+ 
 
 
Integration of 
telephone 
systems. 
- 
Viruses. 
- 
Laptop thefts 
(numerous). 
-  
 
System access 
controls. + 
 
 
Logistics 
tracking. 
- 
System users 
(internal threat). 
- 
‘Routine’ port 
scanning. 
-  
 
Capacity planning. 
+ 
 
 
Self assessed as 
very high 
reliance on IT 
- 
 
 
   
 
Disaster Recovery 
plans. + 
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4.4.5 Summary and recommendations 
 
 
The organisation presented a picture of a reasonable robust security environment. 
The organisation had developed a series of comprehensive security policies and had 
implemented these policies with a number of supporting technologies. There was, 
however, a lack of formal risk assessment in regards to the threats and how these 
threats could be best managed. A lack of integration with overall corporate planning 
indicated that the organisation did not place a great deal of emphasis on information 
security. 
 
The following recommendations are based on a comparison of the analysis of the 
current state of security in Case B with best practice as uncovered by the literature 
review (see chapter 2). If implemented the recommendations should significantly 
improve the organisation‟s security position: 
 
a. Risk assessment. Implement a formal risk assessment regime to 
clearly identify the risks and threats that the organisation faces. 
b. Corporate planning. Integrate information security planning with the 
corporate planning process in order to improve the visibility of 
information security issues. 
c. Contingency planning. Review and revise the DRP and BCP to 
enable work to go on in the event of system failures. 
d. Expertise. The organisation should consider hiring security experts in 
order to coordinate the information security process more effectively. 
4.5 Case C – Large Commonwealth agency 
 
Case C is a large Commonwealth Government agency with approximately 60 000 
staff. They are located in every state of Australia and also in a variety of overseas 
locations. As with the previous case the use of information in Case C was deemed to 
be extremely important. IT and communications technology are important in the 
conduct of day-to-day business within the organisation. Two senior IT professionals 
took part in the interviews. One represented the general management structure of IT, 
whilst the other was responsible for the management of the organisation‟s large 
Information Security Division. 
 
The description of the organisation has been reduced to avoid making it obvious just 
which Commonwealth agency is involved. 
 
4.5.1 Risks 
Reliance on IT 
 
Interview, observational, survey, and secondary data analysis were reviewed in order 
to gain an understanding of Case C‟s reliance on IT. Case C could be best 
characterised as highly reliant on IT.  
 
„We are totally reliant on IT for administrative support and highly 
reliant for operational activities. The use of the Internet for e-
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Commerce is driving the rest of the organisation to follow suit‟ 
(C:1.20-2). 
 
„The organisation is totally reliant these days on technology. In 
particular the e-mail component as well as for the storage component 
and the distribution of information either through e-mails or the 
Intranet that the organisation uses‟ (C:2.20-2). 
 
Web based technologies offered important functionality to the business and this 
Intranet capability also offered Internet access. 
  
„The Intranet is a key component of the work place. People are 
publishing things on it in order to make things happen in their work 
place. Very little is published these days in hard copy‟ (C:2.32-4). 
 
„Most of our work is done on our Intranet and that has external 
Internet connectivity (C:1.24). 
 
Whilst there was little doubt that the information and its supporting infrastructure 
was important to the organisation there was no mention of contingency planning. IT 
is clearly a business-enabling tool with the IT underpinning many work functions. 
  
„The infrastructure supports applications that manage personnel 
within the organisation so that people can be paid, take leave, and 
have their work competencies managed. Financial management and 
management information systems are also important. There are a lot 
of applications that are embedded into our infrastructure‟ (C:2.38-
41).  
 
There are 60 000 IT users within the organisation which speaks volumes in itself for 
the vastness of the IT in the organisation. In general, it is reasonable to assume that 
the larger the infrastructure the more complicated the security environment becomes, 
particularly in regards to the cohabitation of various independent applications with 
multiple access control mechanisms. The organisation faced the very real problem of 
users having to remember multiple passwords to gain access to diverse systems. 
 
The potential non-availability of systems can have serious consequences for the 
normal workflow of the organisation. 
  
„When things don‟t work we get situations where people actually go 
home. Which is an interesting situation. When we have a major failure 
people will pack up and go home even in the middle of the day‟ 
(C:2.43-5). 
 
The survey responses supported the statements made by the interview participants in 
relation to the organisation‟s reliance on IT. Furthermore, an analysis of other 
documentary evidence, such as systems security manuals highlighted not only the 
importance of the systems; (e.g. „critical technology and infrastructure‟), but also the 
importance of the information that was processed on those systems. This highlighted 
the interdependence of information and IT. 
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Ensuring that staff understood their security responsibilities and what they could and 
could not do on systems was far more complicated than simply producing a manual 
and requiring staff to read the manual. Compliance and comprehension were very 
real issues for this organisation. 
 
Figure 4-4 below depicts the application of the McFarlan and McKenny Strategic 
Grid (McFarlan et al 1983) to the organisation‟s IT. Due to the existing and future 
developments of IT being critical to the organisation‟s continued successful 
operation IT was seen as being strategically important to the organisation. 
 
Figure 4-4 Case C Strategic Grid 
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Source: Analysis of interview and secondary data 
 
Threats 
 
The organisation at Case C identified a number of key threats that their organisation 
faced. Of particular note, however was the manner in which the organisation 
expressed the interdependency of the threats upon each other. There was a strong 
belief within the organisation that the vast majority of their threats could be 
attributed to the actions of systems users.  
 
„The highest threat is due to complacency, i.e. users not following 
security guidelines that have been implemented. Breaching 
Information Systems Security Practices and Procedures, connecting 
unauthorised machines to the network that have been compromised or 
are infected with a virus‟ (C:1.62-4). 
 
The other interviewee related the system user threat to the information processed on 
the systems. 
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„In this environment the threats are people getting access to 
information that they have no need to access for the conduct of their 
job. They could gather that information internally and then use it for 
an external purpose‟ (C:2.68-70). 
 
Viruses were listed as a problem for the organisation, however, they too were related 
to the actions of individual staff members.  
 
„Know viruses are not a problem if security procedures are followed – 
all problems experienced by the organisation are a result of someone 
not following the rules; an administrator fails to do a patch‟ (C:1.62-
5). 
 
„The organisation detects 3-4000 virus attacks each week through e-
mail alone‟ (C:2.77-8). 
 
The Case C interviewees explained that there was a good reason why they considered 
the internal threat (system users) to be greater than the external threat. They proposed 
that because of their highly robust security systems it was highly unlikely that an 
external attack would be successful. 
  
„Security controls limit the potential impact of external agencies. The 
main type of attack they could attempt would be a Distributed Denial 
of Service (DDOS) attack which would simply result in the 
organisation disconnecting from the Internet‟ (C:1.69-71). 
 
„I think that we have a very secure network. I think that the more 
secure the network the more unlikely that outsiders will get in and 
therefore the insider threat is seen as a bigger issue‟ (C:2.103-5). 
 
The organisation was able to make good use of the international dateline to protect 
the organisation from viruses.  
 
„An unknown virus that propagates rapidly during working hours 
could be a risk but it is extremely unlikely due to the time difference 
between Australia and the United States‟ (C:1.67-9). 
 
This statement expresses the organisation‟s belief that generally speaking viruses 
tended to be released in North America first, which typically gave this Australian 
organisation an early indicator of potential trouble looming on the horizon. 
 
The hacker threat was played down by the organisation.  
 
„There is a hacker threat to the organisation. I don‟t know of any 
attacks that have come to fruition. I don‟t have any figures for hacker 
attacks but I‟m sure that they do occur (C:2.81-3). 
 
The interview respondents indicated that they were made aware of the information 
security threat from a variety sources.  
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„Experience, study, research, conferences and advice from experts in 
the field are all used to keep me up to date‟ (C:1.81-2). 
 
„Through study and through management reports that are generated 
each month that list the threats and changes to the environment‟ 
(C:2.116-7). 
 
Incidents 
 
Due to the size and profile of the organisation it was not surprising to learn that the 
organisation had experienced the full gamut of security related incidents.  
 
„Hacking discovered within the organisation tends to be people 
“playing” and not understanding the ramifications i.e. launching a 
ping of death against the firewall – discovered in time and security 
measures implemented so that can no longer occur‟ (C:1.116-8). 
 
In this case the organisation further restricted staff‟s use of their desktops. Staff 
could not save executable files on their PC. Additionally, Internet downloads were 
further restricted to stop all staff from being able to download files. These incidents 
prompted changes to policy and management measures. 
 
The organisation suffered from a huge number of detected viruses. 
 
„We detect and destroy about 3-4000 viruses per week delivered 
mainly through e-mail‟ (C:2.168). 
 
„Some viruses are connected to some unauthorised connections to the 
network. Launching executable e-mail attachments from someone you 
don‟t know, and even sending some hoax virus warnings‟ (C:1.119-
20). 
 
There had been a number of cases of employee access abuses recorded by the 
organisation. A number of the more significant incidents had been perpetrated by 
trusted system administrators. 
 
„We had a situation where a network administrator accessed 
information that he shouldn‟t have by abusing his administrator‟s 
privileges. That was detected in an employment interview.  After 
asking two questions we knew the person had had access to the 
questions as well as looking for key points in the answers and that 
was verified through the remainder of the interview. We ended up 
putting a dummy document on the system to catch him out and get 
around it‟ (C:2.162-7). 
 
This incident implies that there is a potential lack of auditing and supervision of staff 
with high degrees of access to resources with the IT environment. There appeared to 
be a lack of policy and perhaps acknowledgement that this type of event was 
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possible. The interviewer for example could have kept this information in a less 
obvious place to avoid temptation or installed auditing and tracking procedures to 
track the culprit. 
 
„Unauthorised access has included housing of movies including porn 
on a server which can only be accessed by a system administrator or 
one of their friends. They have also allowed access to systems by 
contractors who have not been granted permission to use these 
systems‟ (C:1.121-3). 
 
In this incident the system administrators were abusing their access to system 
resources to store data that was prohibited in accordance with system policies. The 
system administrators in question further abused their authority by granting 
permission to the contraband data to their personal friends. 
 
These two incidents highlight that system administrators are in positions of extreme 
trust and in some cases they abuse that trust. Organisations such as the Case C 
organisation are faced with the dilemma that it could be impractical to deny 
administrators access to data that they may have no right to view. The more practical 
solution may be to increase the rigour of the personnel selection process to reduce 
the risk of organisations hiring less than trust worthy staff. This practice could then 
be monitoring and audited. 
 
Theft of computing assets, in particular laptops, was also encountered by the 
organisation.  
 
„We have instances of people stealing laptops with information on 
them. It does happen in this organisation. A small amount per year‟ 
(C:2.170-1).  
 
„Laptops disappear all the time. When machines were upgraded the 
RAM was stolen and replaced with less capable RAM‟ (C:1.125-6). 
 
At the time of the interview the organisation had yet to devise a strategy or policy 
that could be subsequently implemented as a countermeasure to adequately deal with 
the theft of hardware and software assets. 
 
The organisation considered that the highest risk or most significant type of incidents 
involved system users.  
 
„Employee access to information is the highest, abuse of privileges, 
people using information that is available – leaking of information‟ 
(C:2.179-80). 
 
„Data destruction can be significant, but controls should reduce the 
damage any one individual can do – highest risk is leak incidents – 
the negative press causes damage to the organisation and causes a lot 
more in the subsequent “damage control”. Access abuse is the most 
prevalent, i.e. non-work related activity or activity which if discovered 
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could damage the reputation of the individual/organisation, i.e. 
pornography and the like‟ (C:1.132-7). 
 
Viruses were reported as the most prevalent form of information security incident 
experienced by the organisation.  
 
„Viruses are certainly the most prevalent (type of incident)‟ (C:2.182). 
 
Neither respondent could accurately determine the extent of losses suffered as a 
direct result of Information Security incidents. 
 
„Loss is mainly in unproductive time which no effort has been made to 
capture‟ (C:1.143). 
 
„Couldn‟t really say; what is embarrassment worth for example?‟ 
(C:2.188-9). 
 
The business as a target 
 
The nature and the profile of the organisation when combined with the recorded 
number of incidents encountered pointed to the organisation being a target. The 
organisation clearly believed it was a target and was able to provide secondary data 
as evidence to support this assertion.  
 
„There is a lot of attention because of our profile, so I would say that 
we could be both the subject of a deliberate attack as well a target of 
opportunity. It is more than just the fact that we are there so let‟s have 
a go at them‟ (C:2.124-6). 
 
„Yes (we are targeted) our evidence would suggest we gain some 
interest but it would not appear to be any higher than other large 
organisations connected to the Internet. Anything connected should 
expect to be probed or spammed to some degree‟ (C:1.88-90). 
 
A review of the source data from the organisation observations made by the 
researcher support the assertion by the organisation that they are a likely target for a 
variety of groups and threats. The organisation was unable to quantify this belief by 
pointing to particular incidents of note, in particular they could not produce evidence 
of foreign government attacks on their computing systems in anything other than 
anecdotal form. This may, however, reflect a limitation of gathering data in this area 
with this kind of organisation; national security considerations were an issue, which 
meant that at times the whole story might not have been revealed. 
 
4.5.2 Management 
Countermeasures 
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As might be expected of an organisation this size, Case C employed a sophisticated 
array of countermeasures to protect its IT from information security risks. Due to the 
size of the organisation and the value given to information within the organisation, it 
employed its own CERT to improve its security posture. The organisation also 
concentrated on foundational countermeasures such as valid and enforceable policies 
and procedures.  
 
„There are procedures and practices manuals or policies that people 
have to sign off that they have read, Information Systems Security 
Practices and Procedures (ISSPP), they read and sign. It tells them 
what they are allowed to do on a computing system‟ (C:2.217-9). 
 
As mentioned earlier the organisation had taken the unusual step of creating their 
own CERT.  
 
„There are people who monitor the network for hacker attacks and 
monitor for viruses. This is a CERT, it has been operating for about 
three months, it also does intruder detection and investigations‟ 
(C:2.221-3). 
 
The investigation and reporting function for information security incidents was 
advanced.  
 
„Security incidents are recordable and some are mandatory reporting 
under the ISIDRAS (Information Security Incident Detection, 
Reporting and Analysis Scheme) guidelines. Investigations are 
conducted for serious activities in order to identify the source and 
implement prevention strategies‟ (C:1.170-3). 
 
The organisation employed a number of technologies in the defence of their 
computing systems.  
 
„Firewalls exist, primitive IDS with more advanced corporate 
solutions as well as a range of commercial off the shelf products 
being procured‟ (C:1.176-7). 
 
„We run fairly sophisticated anti-viral programs. Most things are 
centrally located for firewall management. We run IDS‟ (C:2.229-
231). 
 
The survey responses from the organisation highlighted that the organisation used 
national and international standards for information security in order to benchmark 
their countermeasures and overall security posture. AS/NZ 77/99 and the 
international version of that standard ISO 17799 were both mentioned as key inputs 
into the formulation of security plans and responses for the organisation. 
Level of security expenditure 
 
It was evident from the size of the organisation and scope of the security 
technologies and general countermeasures employed for the organisation that its 
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security budget was large. The organisation estimated that the total security budget 
was in the vicinity of $8 million per year. This figure did not include any special 
projects or security costs absorbed as part of the network infrastructure.  
„Approximately $2.7 million over the next three years has been 
allocated to the CERT alone‟ (C:1.186).  
 
A review of the secondary data provided showed an extremely detailed approach to 
information security and confirmed the annual security spend was $8 million. 
 
4.5.3 Differentiators 
 
A number of potential differentiators were uncovered during the study of the Case C 
organisation that may have an impact of the organisation‟s security posture. These 
differentiators are listed and described in the table below: 
 
Table 4-7 Differentiators Case C 
 
Differentiator 
Number 
Differentiator Comments 
1 Profile Case C is a high profile 
commonwealth government agency 
that meant that it was more likely 
attract the attention of other of would 
be attackers. 
2 Size The organisation was extremely large 
which meant that it also had a good 
deal of influence within government 
and industry circles. The organisation 
was expected to be a leader in the 
use of technology and information 
security applications. 
3 Importance of data/information Information was a key resource and 
at times the information needed to be 
kept away from public viewing. This 
information could be specifically 
targeted. This would mean that the 
organisation was more likely to face 
dedicated attacks rather than attacks 
of opportunity. 
4 Access to technology The organisation had access to 
leading edge technology; in fact they 
had access to their own R&D facilities 
which could be employed to 
developed customised technology 
solutions including those in the arena 
of information security. 
5 International footprint The organisation had offices and 
business interest in many countries. 
This exposed the organisation to 
additional threats such as 
international espionage and other 
nation/state threats. 
6 Relationships with other 
organisations or companies 
The organisation faced additional 
threats because they dealt with other 
organisations that were likely targets 
for security related attacks. The Case 
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C organisation had to strengthen its 
security posture because of this. 
7 Study participants Due to the size and nature of the 
organisation the respondents were 
very senior managers and therefore 
their responses to the interview 
questions tended to be more on the 
strategic side rather than the technical 
side. 
 
Source: Analysis of secondary and interview data 
 
4.5.4 Security Framework 
 
Using the framework defined and developed in chapter 2, this study‟s assessment of 
the information security position for Case B is shown in the diagram below. The 
analysis and application of the information framework for this organisation shows 
key areas of organisational risk – driven by the organisations high reliance on IT as 
well as the size and profile of the organisation. The risks are, however, well managed 
as is shown in the management section of the table – clear countermeasures are in 
place and dedicated security budgets have been established.  
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Table 4-8 Information Security Framework Case C 
 
Risk Management 
Research Issue 1 
Reliance on IT 
Research Issue 2 Research Issue 3 
Australian Business as 
Targets 
Research Issue 4 
Countermeasures 
Research Issue 5 
Level of Security Expenditure Threats Incidents 
Information seen 
as a key resource 
or asset. 
- Complacency. -  
System 
privilege 
abuse. 
- The organisation 
believed that they 
were at risk of 
deliberate 
targeted attacks. 
- Well-defined and 
enforced system 
security policy. 
+ Significant security budget 
with linkages to business 
justifications and 
outcomes. 
+ 
Payroll, intranet. 
Document 
management key 
to organisational 
operation. 
- Hackers. - Significant 
virus incidents. 
Several 
thousand per 
month. 
- International and 
national 
organisations 
could have Case 
C as a target. 
- Procedures and 
work instructions on 
the use of IT, 
including 
mandatory 
reporting of 
incidents, 
+ Budget separated into 
functional security areas 
including policy, hardware 
countermeasures, security 
personnel, CERT function. 
+ 
Integrated logistics 
systems. 
- Organised 
groups of 
hackers. 
- Chain e-mails 
(SPAM). 
- Issues motivated 
groups could also 
have the 
organisation as a 
target. 
- Anti-viral software 
with automated 
updates of virus 
definition files. 
+   
Connection to 
some business 
partners. 
- Foreign 
governments. 
- Contractors 
abusing 
access 
privileges. 
-   High-end hardware 
based firewall 
products that meet 
national certification 
standards. 
+   
Self assessed as 
very high reliance 
on IT 
- Viruses. - Computing 
hardware 
thefts. 
-   System access 
controls. 
+   
 - System users 
(internal 
threat). 
- Hacking. -   Internal CERT 
capability. 
+   
 -   Data 
destruction. 
   Disaster Recovery 
plans. 
+   
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(+) Factor has a positive impact on the organisation‟s security posture 
(-) Factor has a negative impact on the organisation‟s security posture 
 
Source: Analysis of secondary and interview data  
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4.5.5 Summary and recommendations 
 
 
The organisation had a highly professional approach to the management of 
information security issues. The dedicated risk management process undertaken by 
the organisation provided clear guidance for how and what security countermeasures 
should be employed. The organisation was sufficiently large, in terms of budget and 
staff, to have a CERT of their own. This move in itself demonstrated that the 
organisation had a significant investment in protecting its valuable information and 
that there was a need for such a facility. 
 
The organisation‟s belief that the insider threat was the most significant was 
particularly interesting. Whilst this belief is not uncommon in organisations this 
particular organisation had a slightly different explanation as to why this was the 
case with their organisation. Essentially the organisation believes that with the array 
of countermeasures that they have deployed it is highly unlikely for external 
originated security incidents to occur. Therefore, the majority of their security 
incidents were believed to be capable of being tracked back to an inside source. 
 
The organisation‟s capability in conducting detailed investigations into security 
incidents confirmed this assertion. 
 
The following recommendations are based on a comparison of the analysis of the 
current state of security in Case C with best practice as uncovered by the literature 
review (see chapter 2). If implemented the recommendations should significantly 
improve the organisation‟s security position: 
a. Education program. The organisation had comprehensive policies 
and procedures; however, more needs to be done to ensure that staff 
understand their obligations rather than simply handing them a large 
manual to read. 
 
b. Contingency planning. Review and revise the DRP and BCP to 
enable work to go on in the event of system failures. 
 
c. Retention. The organisation should consider staffing policies that 
improves their staff retention. Currently highly skilled and qualified 
staff are difficult to keep due to comparatively low wages in 
comparison to private organisations. The good staff tend to be 
poached by higher paying organisations. 
 
4.6 Case D – Resort/Hospitality Company 
 
Case D is a medium sized publicly listed company that operates an island resort 
facility. They are located primarily on the resort island operating base; however they 
also have a small office in a capital city that handles much of the organisation‟s 
administrative functions. Two line managers who performed management and „hands 
on‟ technical functions were chosen to take part in the research interviews. 
Interestingly, there was no dedicated IT manager. The various technical staff 
reported directly to the organisation‟s administration manager. 
Master of Information Technology   
 
 
94 
 
4.6.1 Risks 
Reliance on IT 
 
Interview and observational data were used to gain an understanding of the reliance 
on IT within the Case D organisation.  Case D described itself as highly reliant on its 
technology; however, it appeared that whilst failure of the technology would disrupt 
the business, manual systems could operate within the organisation for a reasonable 
amount of time without unduly impacting upon the business bottom line.  
„The organisation is highly reliant on IT and the availability of IT. 
Whilst most of the processes in and around the organisation could 
continue if the systems were to fail, they would be severely crippled‟ 
(D:1.20-2).  
 
„Very reliant. All guest information is entered into the Fidelio hotel 
management system by the reservations office in Sydney. This 
information is not only used to allocate rooms to guests prior to 
arrival, it is also used for financial forecasting, staff rostering, 
allocating room numbers and times for the house keepers to service 
the rooms, tracking room charges from all outlets across the island, 
updating the PABX, routing messages, managing conference groups, 
first level accounts, and generating a variety of marketing statistics‟ 
(D:2.20-6). 
 
Approximately half of the organisation‟s staff regularly used computers as part of 
their normal work routine. The other staff, typically, cleaners, ground staff and 
general hospitality staff have little or no contact with computers. There was evidence 
of interconnection of systems with external networks to allow for bookings through 
third party networks belonging to holiday agencies.  
„Although the company does have a web presence and it is possible to 
book a stay via the web, it does not currently engage in Business to 
Business (B2B) electronic transactions‟ (D:2.30-1).  
 
„External services which are dependent on our systems internally at 
this time are only web and e-mail facilities. We do have a web 
presence, but this is handled by a third party offsite‟ (D:1.24-6). 
 
When the computing facilities are not working much of the company‟s work 
continues „as normal‟, for instance rooms are still cleaned, restaurants still operate. 
There are a pre-defined set of actions that take place when IT fails.  
„When the network stops working or the servers go down the 
reception staff fall back on a set of pre-defined contingency reports. 
These detail guest accounts are current, room status, and are printed 
off every half an hour‟ (D:2.33-5). 
 
These procedures demonstrated an informal contingency planning and business 
continuity arrangement. Printed reports could be used in this instance to coordinate 
work throughout the resort. In other cases staff were instructed to keep manual 
records of transactions in places like bars and restaurants in the event of an IT 
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failure. When systems were brought back on line batch processing could update 
organisational data. 
 
Figure 4-5 below depicts the application of the McFarlan and McKenny Strategic 
Grid (McFarlan et al 1983) to the organisation‟s IT. Whilst the interviewees deemed 
that the organisation was highly reliant on IT, technology was fundamentally a 
limited business enabler – with many functions capable of being operated without IT. 
The organisation was assigned the support quadrant as IT has little relevance to the 
firms existing or future success.  
 
Figure 4-5 Case D Strategic Grid 
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Source: Analysis of interview and secondary data 
Threats 
 
The age of the technology employed by the organisation was considered by the 
respondents to be contributing factor to the kinds of threats encountered. 
  
„Due to the age of technology used by Fidelio, all users have total 
control over the applications data folder on the server and could 
easily completely cripple the island‟s most critical business systems.‟ 
(D:2.57-9).  
 
The staff were considered a threat to the organisations IT, mainly as a result of 
technology vulnerability identified above but also for their general use patterns.  
 
„Due to the high turnover of staff, something that has suffered is the 
management of user accounts. The existence of generic and password 
free accounts allows anyone with knowledge of this to possibly access 
sensitive information. Also where you have one account being used 
for several staff members, tracing malicious use and planning 
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responsibility for its misuse is very difficult to say the least, taking 
into account the style of business. A restructure of processes would be 
required for this to be effective‟ (D:1.52-8). 
 
The high staff turn over was as a result of seasonal or holiday workers forming a 
large component of the organisation‟s work force. The high turn over typically meant 
that there was little time to conduct appropriate security training and threat 
awareness. Additionally, there was little „ownership‟ of security issues with transient 
staff as they typically would not be around to deal with the consequences. 
 
Viruses were also considered a threat to the organisation.  
 
„Viruses – the obvious and most widespread threat to any 
organisation with an IT infrastructure, including ours. The origin of 
the viruses is usually e-mails and our external links coming in 
attachments‟ (D:1.48-50). 
 
The organisation seemed to overlook the reasonably obvious threat of viruses being 
introduced through recordable media. The transient staff had a high proportion of 
University students who frequently used the organisation‟s PCs for university related 
work, often introducing personal floppy discs into the environment. 
 
Both respondents indicated that the system users were the biggest threat to the 
organisations security.  
 
„I feel that users pose the most significant risk to the integrity of these 
systems. Realistically valid users tend to be the most significant risk 
imposed against any IT system. They are the instigators and also the 
carriers for hacking, electronic fraud and virus infection, just to name 
a few‟ (D:1.66-9).  
 
„Although the security of the Fidelio server is a problem, all users are 
told that being caught even browsing the network share is grounds for 
instant dismissal. Given the senior managements attitude to staff, they 
have been quite lucky, largely due to the users‟ lack of knowledge of 
this vulnerability‟ (D:2.71-5). 
 
These statements highlight a number of broader issues for the organisation. Firstly, 
access control is obviously an issue in relation to system account access as well as 
physical security problems. Secondly, the response indicates that management is not 
overly popular with the staff and this may increase the likelihood of disgruntled staff 
attempting to create problems with the system. 
Incidents 
 
The organisation had suffered from three types of Information Security incidents. 
Viruses, thefts, and access abuse.  
„The only issues that I have come across in my time with the 
organisation is that of virus infections. While the infections were not 
serious, they outlined the need for constant monitoring of virus 
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pattern signature updates, and also the status of virus protection 
systems themselves. One major issue that was highlighted was the 
Interscan Viruswall system, which scanned all incoming and outgoing 
e-mail. The problem was the shortest interval for triggering a virus 
pattern update from the products central server on the Internet, was 
that of a day. Some viruses can propagate in a matter of hours, 
perhaps sometimes minutes it is important to upgrade the software 
which allowed for per hour updates‟ (D:1. 116-24).  
 
„Approximately $15 000 worth of equipment was stolen from the 
Sydney office over three months. When the IT member of staff for the 
Sydney office was let go, the thefts stopped and had not re-occurred. 
In another incident a member of the island staff was found to have 
caused server faults out of hours to generate call outs and therefore 
receive time off in lieu. The manger at the time was unable to 
understand the evidence, consequently that staff member is still here‟ 
(D:2.123-8). 
 
The organisation believed that the virus incidents were the most prevalent kind of 
security incident that they encountered.  
 
„Viruses are definitely the most frequent form of incident‟ (D:2.130-
1). 
 
The organisation was unable to estimate the losses attributed to security incidents. 
The business as a target 
 
The Case D organisation did not believe that it was a specific target for Information 
Security incidents.  
 
„No (we are not a specific target). The island‟s competitors do not 
have the expertise to defeat the firewall. The island has been running 
for 20 years so we don‟t even get attention from the environmentalists 
anymore‟ (D:2.93-6). 
 
„I don‟t feel the organisation is targeted specifically from external 
threats, but it does tend to get caught up in the „general run of the 
mill‟ probing which comes via our external data connections. I 
attribute this to the organisation‟s minimal Internet presence, and 
non-complicated data network structure which to external perceptions 
is unappealing‟ (D:1.81-4). 
 
4.6.2 Management 
Countermeasures 
 
By their own admission the organisation employed limited security countermeasures.  
„Current countermeasures that exist in our organisation would be 
limited to that of perimeter security for the systems and network. This 
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comprises of virus protection systems and firewall devices. Internally, 
the built-in security of the operating system is relied upon to deter 
internal threats‟ (D:1.163-6).  
 
„We are protected from external hackers by a firewall managed by 
our ISP. Our data is protected by nightly complete backups, with a 
weekly set sent to the Sydney office for permanent archiving. We are 
able to restore Fidelio to any day in the past six weeks‟ (D:2. 171-4). 
 
The survey responses supported the evidence presented during the interviews, with 
anti-viral methodologies, firewalls and operating system controls all playing a vital 
part of protecting the organisation‟s information assets. 
Level of security expenditure 
 
The organisation indicated via the interview data and survey data that it spent 
approximately $50-70K per annum. These funds were primarily spent on firewalls 
and anti-viral products. 
 
4.6.3 Differentiators 
 
A number of potential differentiators were uncovered during the study of the Case D 
organisation that may have an impact of the organisation‟s security posture. These 
differentiators are listed and described in the table below: 
 
Table 4-9 Differentiators Case D 
 
Differentiator 
Number 
Differentiator Comments 
1 Reliance on one central 
application. 
The Case D organisation relied 
almost exclusively on one main 
application for the conduct of its 
electronic business. The application, 
‘Fidello’ allowed the organisation to 
book guests into rooms, charge 
accounts, as well as more mundane 
tasks such as arranging for room 
cleaning. The organisation could not 
function for prolonged periods without 
the application. 
2 Senior Management Attitude 
towards staff 
The staff believed that there was a 
general attitude that staff were not 
well cared for by management. This 
led to a higher degree of disgruntled 
staff who could potentially be 
motivated to conduct malicious acts 
upon the organisation’s computer 
systems should they have the pre-
requisite technical knowledge to 
launch a successful attack. 
3 Lack of policies and procedures. There were very few formal policies 
and procedures in place within the 
organisation that related to IT. This 
led to a disjointed and at times 
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uncoordinated approach to the 
delivery of IT and therefore of the 
appropriate security measures. There 
were no formal IT security plans. 
4 No IT management structure. The IT staff within the organisation 
were essentially all equal peers. This 
resulted in a lack of direction and 
failure for key individuals to accept 
responsibility for general IT 
management functions including the 
management of information security 
related issues. 
5 Some components can function 
without IT 
There were some functions in the 
resort that could function without IT, 
albeit in a less coordinated fashion. 
The physical work of cleaning and 
cooking for example could continue 
despite computer outage. 
 
Source: Analysis of secondary and interview data 
 
4.6.4 Security Framework 
 
Using the framework defined and developed in chapter 2, this study‟s assessment of 
the information security position for Case D is shown in the diagram below.  
 
The summarised findings show a lack of balance between the risks and the 
management sides of the information security equation. The negatives highlighted on 
the risk side of the framework are not adequately mitigated on the management side 
of the equation – which indicates a poor security posture. The summary and 
recommendations section provides some suggested improvements that this 
organisation could make to improve their current security posture. 
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Table 4-10 Information Security Framework Case D 
 
 
 
(+) Factor has a positive impact on the organisation‟s security posture 
(-) Factor has a negative impact on the organisation‟s security posture 
Source: Analysis of secondary and interview data  
Research Issue 1 
Reliance on IT 
Research Issue 2 Research Issue 3 
Australian Business as 
Targets 
Research Issue 4 
Countermeasures 
Research Issue 5 
Level of Security 
Expenditure 
Threats Incidents 
Use IT for booking of 
guests. 
- 
Close integration of key 
applications. 
- 
 
System 
privilege 
abuse. 
- 
Not a specific target. 
Only seen as a 
target of opportunity. 
- 
Anti-viral 
software. 
+ 
Unable to 
identify 
security 
budget.  
- 
Organisation of some 
work activities. 
- 
Staff, very high turn over. 
- 
Several 
viruses 
- 
 
 
Some firewall 
products. 
+ 
 
 
Billing, customer 
accounts. 
- 
Management attitude 
towards staff could 
increase instances of 
‘disgruntled insider’. 
- 
Hacking. 
- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Much work can be done 
without IT, for example 
cooking, cleaning, 
grounds upkeep. 
+ 
Viruses. 
- 
15K of 
hardware 
theft. 
-  
 
 
 
 
 
Self assessed as high 
reliance on IT 
- 
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4.6.5 Summary and recommendations 
 
The organisation‟s overall security posture was poor. The lack of policies, 
procedures, and a clear IT management structure resulted in no clear responsibilities 
for information security related tasks. The transient nature of a large proportion of 
the workforce combined with a reportedly strict general management regime created 
an environment where serious security incidents could and did occur. 
 
The insider threat within this organisation was significant. Resentment towards 
management from staff coupled with lax or non-existent security measures presented 
motive and opportunity to would be internal hackers. The organisation assessed itself 
as highly reliant on its IT, however, it did have the capability to continue to operate 
for short to medium terms in the event of system failures. 
 
The following recommendations are based on a comparison of the analysis of the 
current state of security in Case D with best practice as uncovered by the literature 
review (see chapter 2). If implemented the recommendations should significantly 
improve the organisation‟s security position: 
 
a. Risk assessment. The organisation should implement a formal risk 
assessment process to identify risks and threats. 
 
b. IT management. An IT Manager position should be created and this 
position should be assigned responsibility for information security. 
 
c. Policies and procedures. Comprehensive system security policies 
and procedures should be developed and then implemented, wherever 
possible through the use of technology. 
 
d. Access controls. System access controls should be defined to ensure 
that system users can perform only authorised functions on computing 
systems. 
 
e. Education and awareness. Firstly, management should be made 
aware of the current security posture and all identifiable risks. Wider 
training should be conducted for all system users to ensure they are 
aware of their responsibilities to help protect systems. 
 
4.7 Case E – Software Company 
 
The organisation studied, as Case E is an Internet based software development 
company. The organisation had five staff each of whom fulfilled a specialist role 
within the organisation. The organisation is privately owned by a number of the staff 
members. The company had a close affiliation with information security issues as 
they produced a number of computer security related products. Due to the small size 
of the Case E organisation only one IT management professional was available to 
take part in the research interview. The company was located in a capital city with all 
staff and IT assets being located in one small office. 
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4.7.1 Risks 
Reliance on IT 
 
The nature of the Case E organisation pointed to a natural reliance on IT. A software 
development company will obviously use IT to create, develop and distribute their 
software products. The Case E organisation considered themselves to be completely 
reliant on IT.  
 
„We are utterly dependent on computers. With about two machines 
per employee, in addition to computers in mobile phones and 
Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) they support every aspect of our 
business‟ (E:1.20-2). 
 
The organisation believed that they could not operate their business should the 
technology fail. Additionally, if the unavailability of the IT was related to security 
incident then this would impact upon the company‟s reputation as security software 
provider.  
 
„Without computers we wouldn‟t have a market for our security 
technology‟ (E:1.24). 
 
The company‟s systems were connected to the Internet and documentary evidence in 
the form of LAN and WAN diagrams demonstrated the organisation‟s reliance on 
Internet based technologies with the Internet providing access to the company‟s 
market, its customers, and open source information. Internally an Intranet was used 
to store and publish shared information between staff members. Observational data 
collected by the researcher whilst at the company‟s premises indicated that despite 
the fact that all staff were seated close enough to talk comfortably with all other staff 
they used e-mail even for the simplest and most informal messages between 
themselves. 
 
Figure 4-6 below depicts the application of the McFarlan and McKenny Strategic 
Grid (McFarlan et al 1983) to the organisation‟s IT. This organisation was heavily 
reliant on the use of IT and its core products relied upon vulnerabilities in computing 
systems in order to create a market. Existing and future developments of IT are 
critical to the organisation‟s success – therefore IT is of strategic importance to the 
organisation. 
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Figure 4-6 Case E Strategic Grid 
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Source: Analysis of interview and secondary data 
Threats 
 
The organisation considered itself as being subjected to a wide variety of threats.  
 
„The main threats come from individual hackers, organised groups of 
hackers, issue motivated groups, foreign governments, systems users, 
competitors, viruses and poor quality code‟ (E:1.45-53).  
 
The comprehensive listing provided by the organisation indicated that they had put 
considerable thought into the potential threats faced by the organisation. This in itself 
was not surprising given the organisations place as a software provider in the 
information security marketplace. 
 
The company considered viruses to be the most significant threat faced by the 
organisation based on the premise that the viruses were the most frequent and the 
hardest to detect.  
 
„E-mail viruses – because they are so hard to detect, especially the 
newest ones, and they come from any vector – inside, external, and 
trusted partners‟ (E:1.59-60). 
 
The organisation discovered or learnt about the threats that their organisation faced 
through a combination of evidence, study, and research.  
 
„We use a variety of methods, market research is important. We look 
at things like the KPMG and Ernst and Young research, although a 
lot of that tends to support their consultancy business‟ (E:1.66-73). 
 
Master of Information Technology   
 
 
104 
Incidents 
 
The organisation had experienced a variety of information security incidents, 
however they did not wish to elaborate on specific incidents and indicated that their 
incidents were the „run of the mill‟ type of incidents that any organisation connected 
to the Internet would expect to face.  
 
„We have had a variety of incidents including viruses, port scans, 
script kiddie tools, and the loss of a laptop‟ (E:1.104-105). 
 
There appeared to be no alarm or undue weight placed on these incidents. Secondary 
data (documents) and observation data recorded whilst viewing server and firewall 
logs pointed to a large number of port scans. When the respondent discussed these 
issues (outside the interview context), he expressed the belief that much of the 
industry warnings revolved around these relatively „minor‟ kinds of incidents. When 
asked to identify which type of incident was the most frequent the respondent 
indicated that they all occurred frequently.  
 
„All of them. All occur easily, and almost every day‟ (E:1.110). 
 
The organisation could not estimate the financial impact of any of the security 
incidents that they encountered.  
 
„No, not really (estimate financial losses) – some time in virus 
eradication and the loss of the laptop. All of the others have yet to 
cause damage/loss‟ (E:1.116-7). 
 
The business as a target 
 
The business did not consider itself a specific target although it was evident by 
examining secondary data that the organisation had considered the possibility of it 
being a target.  
„Not especially more than anyone else is a target. We maintain a low 
profile with competitors and have now removed the financially 
sensitive information available in our Internet connected site‟ 
(E:1.79-80). 
 
4.7.2 Management 
Countermeasures 
 
The Case E organisation used a variety of countermeasures to protect their systems 
from incidents.  
 
„We have a central firewall, security policies and procedures which 
are enabled through technology wherever possible such as system file 
permissions or turning on server logs. Working in the security 
industry is a help in this regard as our staff are aware of the risks. We 
of course employ the normal range of anti-viral countermeasures and 
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perhaps most importantly assure that the patches are kept current‟ 
(E:1.140-4). 
 
Level of security expenditure 
 
The organisation had a very limited security budget, however, it did employ a variety 
of freely available tools to perform the security function.  
 
„We would spend between $250 and $1000 in a 12 month period, we 
use a lot of open source tools‟ (E:1.147-9). 
 
4.7.3 Differentiators 
 
A number of potential differentiators were identified as part of the study of the Case 
E organisation. These differentiators include: 
 
Table 4-11 Differentiators Case E 
 
Differentiator 
Number 
Differentiator Comments 
1 Size The organisation had five staff who all 
worked within a small office. This 
enabled a high degree of trust and the 
sharing of knowledge on a variety of 
issues including security. Policies 
could be quickly developed, 
implemented and monitored. 
2 Reliance on IT As a software development 
organisation each staff member had 
two computers. The extremely high 
reliance on IT increased the potential 
impact of a security incident. 
3 Use of open source products As a small business the organisation 
did not have large amounts of capital 
to invest in security. The organisation 
turned to a variety of Open Source, 
free tools to minimise its security 
threat. The organisation was able to 
customise these tools using their own 
skills to further enhance their security 
posture. 
4 Use of the Internet The Internet was a valuable research 
tool for the organisation and a method 
of testing their product. This constant 
reliance and connection to the 
Internet was seen as an unavoidable 
exposure by the organisation. 
5 IT Security a key part of the 
business 
The organisation developed and sold 
software tools that provided security 
countermeasures. As a security 
product provider the organisation had 
a better understanding than most of 
the security threats that they faced. 
The staff had a high level of technical 
security expertise that ensured tools 
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and systems were appropriately 
implemented and configured. 
 
Source: Analysis of secondary and interview data  
 
4.7.4 Security Framework 
 
Using the framework defined and developed in chapter 2, this study‟s assessment of 
the information security position for Case E is shown in the diagram below. 
 
The security posture presented in the framework appears to be relatively well 
balanced. Whilst there are a number of risks that the organisation faces, it has 
employed a number of countermeasures in order to better mitigate those risks.  The 
framework indicates a relatively low budget for security related items and assesses 
this as a negative. In context however, this organisation is relatively small and as 
such does not have liquid assets to dedicate to numerous security countermeasure – 
therefore they must be selective. This action in itself indicates a level of maturity in 
their risk management approach. 
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Table 4-12 Information Security Framework Case E 
 
 
 
(+) Factor has a positive impact on the organisation‟s security posture 
(-) Factor has a negative impact on the organisation‟s security posture 
 
Source: Analysis of secondary and interview data  
Research Issue 1 
Reliance on IT 
Research Issue 2 Research Issue 3 
Australian Business as 
Targets 
Research Issue 4 
Countermeasures 
Research Issue 5 
Level of Security 
Expenditure 
Threats Incidents 
Business centred on the 
use of IT. Used to develop 
company product 
(software). 
- 
Individual 
hackers. 
- 
 
Did not want to 
elaborate too 
much on detail. 
- 
Didn‟t consider itself as 
a specific target. 
+ 
Security policies and 
procedures that are 
enabled through 
technology. 
+ 
Low budget 
(several thousand 
dollars). 
- 
Business not capable of 
working if IT not 
available. 
- 
Organised 
groups of 
hackers. 
- 
A number of 
virus incidents. 
- 
In a niche industry with 
a security product. 
Could be a target of 
competitors. 
- 
Firewalls. 
+ 
Mitigated risk 
and costs by 
using open source 
products. 
+ 
Used IT based 
communication in 
preference to face to face 
communication 
- 
Poor quality 
code. 
- 
Laptop theft. 
- 
 
 
Anti-viral software with 
automated updates of 
virus definition files. 
+ 
 
 
 
 
Issue motivated 
groups. - 
Attacks from 
automated 
scripting tools. 
-  
 
Patch management 
procedures. + 
 
 
  Viruses - Port scans.        
  Competitors.          
Master of Information Technology   
 
 
108 
4.7.5 Summary and recommendations 
 
The organisation‟s overall security posture was good. It had a systematic approach to 
identifying risks and then implementing appropriate countermeasures. The 
organisation‟s reliance on the Internet for research and for testing its product 
introduced a number of threats to the organisation. This additional risk is somewhat 
counteracted by the fact the organisation is involved in the security industry, and as 
such was generally more aware of the security issues than the average company. 
 
The number and type of virus incidents that they detected, mainly through their e-
mail system supported the organisation‟s assessment that virsuses were the most 
significant threat they faced. The organisation placed on emphasis on anti-viral 
defence and the backbone of this strategy included a comprehensive patch 
management program. 
 
The following recommendations are based on a comparison of the analysis of the 
current state of security in Case E with best practice as uncovered by the literature 
review (see chapter 2). If implemented the recommendations should significantly 
improve the organisation‟s security position: 
 
a. Contingency planning. Due to the organisation‟s extreme reliance on 
its systems routine, system backup and recovery should be enhanced. 
The creation of DRP and BCP should be given a priority to reduce the 
impact of system failures. 
 
b. Network segregation. The organisation develops its products on 
systems that are connected to the Internet (albeit through firewalls). 
This approach should be reviewed with the aim of creating a physical 
air gap between their development system and the system connected 
to external networks. 
 
4.8 Case F – Small Commonwealth Government Agency 
 
Case F is a small Commonwealth Government department with approximately 500 
staff. They are located within a single capital city where they service their clients, 
mainly other government departments and large business through their online 
presence. IT and the publication of government policy form the core businesses of 
this department. Due to the small size of the organisation and the fact its IT is largely 
outsourced meant there was only one individual within the organisation who could 
speak authoritatively about information security issues. 
 
4.8.1 Risks 
Reliance on IT 
 
The organisation at Case F described itself as highly reliant on IT. As one of the 
newer government departments much of the technology that it employed was new. 
As part of its core business was in the provision of advice and policy on the use of IT 
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it deemed important to „practice what it preached‟ especially in the area of e-
commerce adoption and the use of secure web technologies.  
 
„Users have a degree of dependency on the network. The primary role 
of this department is to outreach to the Australian public and business 
for the development of IT for the development of PKI (Public Key 
Infrastructure) and Business to Business (B2B). There is a strong 
reliance on the Internet and Intranet availability to deliver these types 
of services‟ (F:1.22-5). 
 
The organisation was part of a group of government departments whose IT is 
outsourced. It was evident that the organisation was less than happy with the 
outsource arrangement. Perceived poor performance from the outsourcer coupled 
with the organisation‟s high reliance added to the level of user dissatisfaction.  
 
„IT is outsourced in a government environment. The network often 
runs slow and is subject to constant failure, i.e. loss of external or 
internal link‟ (F:1.20-1). 
 
The relationship with the department and its service provider in this instance could 
be considered in itself a risk, especially given what would appear to be limited 
requirements to report why external links were not available, e.g., did they fail for 
technical reasons or for security reasons. 
 
Analysis of the survey data indicated that disruptions to service were relatively 
frequent (at least twice per month). This frequency of system outages meant that the 
organisation‟s staff were well versed at finding alternative activities when the IT 
didn‟t function. 
 
Figure 4-7 below depicts the application of the McFarlan and McKenny Strategic 
Grid (McFarlan et al 1983) to the organisation‟s IT. The organisation is highly reliant 
on technology and is involved in drafting a number of policies and practices on the 
use of e-technology. It is important for the profile of the organisation that are seen to 
be innovative in the use of technology. The existing and future developments of IT 
are critical to the success of the organisation. 
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Figure 4-7 Case F Strategic Grid 
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Source: Analysis of interview and secondary data 
Threats 
 
The organisation focused quite strongly on a number of key threats. Viruses were the 
first and perhaps the paramount threat the organisation considered it faced.  
 
„The department runs a strong anti-virus regime to combat what is 
obviously a well known and everyday threat‟ (F:1.45-7). 
 
The organisation believed that there was a significant external threat.  
 
„Undetected external entry into the network where many government 
initiatives are planned and implemented would be a significant threat‟ 
(F:1.56-7).  
 
Secondary data indicates that there was generally little external access to 
organisation‟s networks. There was access (protected) to other networks through the 
Internet and theoretical or logical connections to the organisation‟s IT outsource 
partners through their common IT service providers and vendors. The maturity of 
this relationship required the interchange of „cleared‟ information to „cleared‟ 
partners.  
 
„All outsourcing partners are cleared to the level required to operate 
the system. There is no external connectivity to the network. Though 
executive officers have remote access to the network from home‟ 
(F:1.47-50). 
 
The organisation also considered itself subject to a significant internal threat. Due to 
the organisation‟s function in the development of IT policies and standards for the 
Commonwealth Government, there is considerable interest in the policies and 
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standards under development. This interest also applies to those organisations that 
provide the IT service to the case organisation and therefore would have free access 
to information on the organisation‟s network. 
  
„The contracted service provider has an intimate interest in the 
policies of this Department – a significant insider risk‟ (F:1.58-9). 
 
The interview respondent indicated that they were aware of the risks faced by their 
organisation from experience in managing computer based networks and from the 
completion of recent studies in security management.  
 
„Throughout my career I have managed and implemented several 
large computer based networks. I have nationally recognised 
qualifications in computer management and have recently completed 
a Diploma of Security Risk management‟ (F:1.69-72). 
Incidents 
 
The organisation had encountered only one form of information security related 
incidents: viruses.  
 
„The Department uses Norton‟s anti-virus and other protection 
software. The occasional virus causes problems. Whilst it is the policy 
that all external disks are to be checked prior to their use in desktop 
PC this would appear to be the main source of this type of attack‟ 
(F:1.106-110). 
 
Survey data collected from the organisation supported the interview data regarding 
the number and type of incidents that were encountered. It appeared that the visibility 
of the organisation‟s security related incidents was greatly reduced as a result of its 
outsourcing arrangement. 
The business as a target 
 
There was a general lack of evidence pointing to the organisation being a specific 
target for information security incidents; the low number of incidents and the lack of 
anecdotal evidence suggested a somewhat benign threat environment. The 
organisation did, however, believe that contrary to evidence they were a prime target. 
 
„I firmly believe that our IT infrastructure is targeted. However the IT 
outsourcing contract seems to lack the requirement for the IT 
outsourcer to detect and report these problems when they occur‟ 
(F:1.80-2). 
 
Due to the experience and knowledge of the interview respondent, coupled with the 
information provided as part of the analysis of the threats, including the profile and 
business of the organisation it is reasonable to conclude that the organisation could 
be a targeted organisation. 
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4.8.2 Management 
Countermeasures 
 
The organisation‟s outsourcing arrangement made it difficult to determine the exact 
nature of the countermeasures employed. It was surprising that there appeared to be 
little contract coverage to ensure that the appropriate countermeasures (whatever they 
were determined to be) were being taken. 
 
 „There is no risk management analysis of the threats to the IT of this 
department. There is little executive support for this type of analysis‟ 
(F:1.150-2) 
 
A review of the secondary data, mainly in the form the outsourcer‟s change 
management documentation indicated that there were „extensive security 
mechanisms‟ in place including firewalls, anti-viral protection, and system policy 
and procedures. In fact the change management procedures aim was to „maintain the 
integrity and security‟ of the organisation‟s computing systems. 
Level of security expenditure 
 
The nature of the outsourcing contract obscured the total security expenditure that 
the organisation made. 
 
4.8.3 Differentiators 
 
A number of potential differentiators were identified as part of the study of the Case 
F organisation. These differentiators are detailed in the table below: 
 
Table 4-13 Differentiators Case F 
 
Differentiator 
Number 
Differentiator Comments 
1 Outsourcing arrangement The organisation received its IT 
support through a multi-agency 
outsourcing arrangement. This 
arrangement had been described as 
sub-optimal with very few if any 
security KPI integrated into the 
outsourcing agreement. Reporting on 
incidents was problematic. 
2 Commonwealth Government 
Department 
The organisation was a reasonably 
high profile department that could 
draw the attention of a range of would 
be attackers attempting to have their 
political message heard. 
3 Responsible for IT policies One of the key functions of the 
Department was to produce 
Commonwealth IT policy. This 
included policies on e-commerce and 
security related issues. This could be 
seen as both a positive and negative 
in terms of the organisation’s security 
posture. Positive  potentially a 
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better understanding of what the 
issues are. Negativecould be a 
higher profile target due to this role. 
4 Use of the Internet The Internet was a valuable research 
tool for the organisation and a method 
of testing their product. This constant 
reliance and connection to the 
Internet was seen as an unavoidable 
exposure by the organisation. 
5 Relatively new organisation The organisation was essentially a 
greenfield site that enabled policies 
and infrastructure to be set to the 
appropriate standard from the outset. 
There were fewer change 
management issues that needed to 
be considered when implementing 
security issues. 
 
Source: Analysis of secondary and interview data  
 
4.8.4 Security Framework 
 
Using the framework defined and developed in chapter 2, this study‟s assessment of 
the information security position for Case F is shown in the diagram below. 
 
The table presents a relatively balanced framework, indicating that the organisation 
is managing its risk profile – or factoring in risks when determining appropriate 
countermeasures. Of interest is the potential positive or negative of having an 
outsourced arrangement for security services. 
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Table 4-14 Information Security Framework Case F 
 
 
Research Issue 1 
Reliance on IT 
Research Issue 2 Research Issue 3 
Australian Business as Targets 
Research Issue 4 
Countermeasures 
Research Issue 5 
Level of Security Expenditure Threats Incidents 
Office automation 
- 
Virus 
- 
Viruses 
- 
Yes because of potential 
weakness in outsourcing 
arrangements 
- 
Managed by 
outsourcer +/- 
Not discernable due to the 
nature of the outsourcing 
arrangement 
 
Publication of 
policies and 
procedures 
- 
Hackers 
(undetected 
external entry) 
- 
 
 
Profile of the organisation, 
producing policies on IT 
and e-commerce 
- 
Firewalls 
+ 
 
 
Automated pay and 
financial 
management 
- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Anti-viral 
products + 
 
 
Reliance on IT 
outsourcing 
arrangement 
- 
 
 
   
 
Policies and 
procedures + 
 
 
 
(+) Factor has a positive impact on the organisation‟s security posture 
(-) Factor has a negative impact on the organisation‟s security posture 
 
 
Source: Analysis of secondary and interview data  
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4.8.5 Summary and recommendations 
 
The organisation‟s overall security posture was below average. They had little or no 
control over various aspects of their outsourcing agreement, in particular there were 
no specific Key Performance Indicators (KPI) that focused on security issues and 
reporting. The organisation‟s reliance on its‟ technology means that they are at risk 
of losing the use of their systems and productivity in the event of system failures. 
The nature of their Service Level Agreements (SLA) with their service provider 
meant that they were unable to differentiate between system outages that were a 
result of technical problems from those that could be security related. They reported 
frequent availability issues with the network either down or not available. It was 
frequently unclear to the organisation why its‟ systems were not available. 
 
The organisation only reported one form of security incident – viruses. It is unclear 
as to whether this was the only incident that actually occurred – or rather it was the 
only type of incident that the organisation actually knew about. 
 
The following recommendations are based on a comparison of the analysis of the 
current state of security in Case F with best practice as uncovered by the literature 
review (see chapter 2). If implemented the recommendations should significantly 
improve the organisation‟s security position: 
 
a. Outsourcing contract. The organisation should, at the earliest 
possible time renegotiate their existing support contract to include 
reporting on security related incidents and events. Additionally, the 
contract should include KPI that focus on monitoring and improving 
the organisation‟s security position. 
  
b. Audit and investigation. As the organisation is currently not fully 
aware of its‟ security exposure an independent, external audit is 
recommended. This audit and investigation should include a review of 
the policies and procedures of the service provider. Security 
penetration testing should also be a priority to prove the robustness of 
the any security countermeasures employed. 
 
c. Information security ownership. The organisation should review 
„ownership‟ of information security within the organisation. Whilst 
the authority for the management of information security may be 
outsourced to a service provider – the organisation‟s leadership should 
retain responsibility and accountability for ensuring the system‟s 
security is maintained. This will help ensure the organisation conducts 
appropriate due diligence activities to ensure that the service provider 
is meeting the organisation‟s requirements. 
 
4.9 Case G – Medium Sized Utility Company 
 
The Case G organisation is a privately owned utility company employing 
approximately 800 employees operating within one State. Their services are provided 
across that State. The organisation had a number of remotes site that were connected 
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to the organisation‟s central office via a number of telecommunications and 
information systems. Two IT professionals were chosen to provide information on 
the organisation‟s security issues. 
 
4.9.1 Risks 
Reliance on IT 
 
Interview and observational data were analysed to gain an understanding of the 
organisation‟s reliance on IT. 
 
„Our organisation is totally reliant on IT. IT forms a central 
component of the way we do business, regardless of if we are talking 
about our administrative systems, where we have a heavy reliance on 
an ERP, in our case SAP‟ (G:2.20-2). 
 
IT appeared to be ubiquitous within the organisation. There were very few functions 
that did not have some reliance on technology, whether it be the delivery of its 
service or booking a conference room for a meeting. 
 
„Our business is very reliant on our computing assets. We have a 
number of diverse systems that enable our business. We have 
approximately 700 users in a central business HQ and a couple of 
hundred users in another State and throughout this State. As a 
minimum they would all interact with our corporate network, and 
many would interact with systems that controls the flow of our 
commodity‟ (G:1.20-4). 
 
The organisation divided its computing facilities into its corporate network and a 
separate network for controlling and managing its commodity. For security purposes 
this created two major computing domains and a third domain existed to allow 
controlled access to customers and national controllers for the commodity in 
question. 
 
„Our customers have access to our systems as well as national market 
information. We have an external web site, which is mainly used for 
communication of issues to the general public‟ (G:2.29-31). 
 
This evidence highlights the importance of access to the organisation‟s computing 
systems from external computing networks. Therefore, not only is Case G reliant on 
its IT but external organisations are also reliant on those networks. 
 
 „We are heavy users of an ERP, SAP. Most of our applications have 
some hook into SAP and all of our staff use SAP for their day to day 
work, even if it is only submitting their time sheets‟ (G:1.29-31). 
 
The highly interdependent nature of the applications with a central ERP heightened 
the organisation‟s reliance on IT, every staff member had to interact in some fashion 
with IT. That interaction could range from simple time entry sheets to controlling the 
flow of the organisation‟s commodity. 
Master of Information Technology   
 
 
117 
 
The organisation could put on an estimate on the worth of their reliance on 
technology by knowing how much money the organisation would lose if their 
networks were not functioning. 
 
 „If the IT doesn‟t work then the organisation can lose $1000 per 
second in lost revenue‟ (G:2.33). 
 
 „Overall, I would say we are very reliant on our systems. When things 
don‟t work people‟s productivity goes down. Even the phone systems 
rely on computing so you may not even be able to use the phone‟ 
(G:1.36-8). 
 
The organisation‟s heavy use of IT and the potential consequences in terms of losses 
that could result if the organisation‟s IT didn‟t function properly pointed to a high 
reliance on IT. 
 
A review of the survey responses provided by the organisation confirmed the views 
provided in the interviews; the organisation was highly reliant on IT with the vast 
majority of the organisation‟s staff interacting in some way with IT. 
 
Figure 4-8 below depicts the application of the McFarlan and McKenny Strategic 
Grid (McFarlan et al 1983) to the organisation‟s IT. The amount of revenue that can 
potentially be put at risk is an indicator of the organisation‟s reliance on technology – 
networks and systems monitoring their control systems are critical. IT is important to 
the organisation but future developments are unlikely to improve the competitive 
advantage, therefore IT is seen as playing a key operational role in the organisation. 
 
Figure 4-8 Case G Strategic Grid 
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Source: Analysis of interview and secondary data 
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Threats 
 
Both respondents believed that viruses were the biggest information security threat 
that the organisation faced. 
 
 „The biggest threat to our organisation would be viruses‟ (G:1.61). 
 
 „Viruses are potentially our greatest threat‟ (G:2.54). 
 
The respondents recognised that there were potentially other threats that the 
organisation faced. 
 
 „Although as part of the national information infrastructure we can 
expect probes or investigations from hackers‟ (G:2.54-5). 
 
 „We receive the usual amount of port scans and spam e-mail, but 
there is no evidence of hacker attacks. Because of the nature of being 
in the utility business it doesn‟t mean there isn‟t any potential for 
hackers, foreign governments, or even terrorists it just hasn‟t 
materialised‟ (G:1.61-5). 
 
These responses point to an understanding that there is a potential for a wide variety 
of threats to the information security of the organisation. However, as the 
respondents have pointed out, there is little evidence that these other threats have 
actually occurred. This would seem to indicate that this organisation‟s risk analysis 
has have identified the gamut of potential threats and which of these present the 
greatest risk to the integrity of their systems. 
 
 „Again, I would have to say viruses (are the most significant threat), 
just because of the amount that we detect, block and clean‟ (G:1.71-
2). 
 
 „Viruses are probably the most frequent, and we encounter them on a 
daily basis. A hacker could be more significant if they come in and 
start turning things off‟ (G:2.68-9). 
 
These statements acknowledge the existence of other threats; however point to the 
most frequent threat being synominous with the most significant threat faced by the 
organisation. 
 
Observational data recorded whilst on the organisation‟s premises supported the 
answers given by both respondents, potentially indicating that a degree of effort had 
been placed into the consideration of security issues, that there was a reasonable 
level of knowledge, and that perhaps more importantly there was a high degree of 
staff commitment to information security issues. 
 
This opinion was reinforced when the respondents were asked to identify how they 
knew about the threats that their organisation faced. 
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 „Experience, we keep logs on these issues. We have also had a 
number of threat assessments conducted on our company which points 
to these areas. Most of the IT management team have a good working 
knowledge of security issues‟ (G:2.80-3). 
 
 „From a variety of sources, discussions and benchmarking with other 
organisations with similar profiles. One thing I think is relatively 
obvious is that there is a fair amount of hype and scare mongering out 
there about threats. Whilst security and the threats/risks are serious, 
the business case is hard to justify when there is little evidence. You 
read about it, but not many people that I have contact with that have 
suffered from hackers for example. Plenty moan about viruses on the 
other hand‟ (G:1.82-91). 
 
Responses such as these demonstrate that this organisation and in particular the 
reluctant staff members put a great deal of thought into security issues. There was 
also a degree of cynicism detected in the later response. 
Incidents 
 
There was a direct correlation between the perceived security threats faced by the 
organisation and the type of incidents encountered by the organisation. This in itself 
was not surprising given the responses to the threat section of the interviews. 
 
 „As I have indicated previously  we get about two hundred plus 
viruses per month that are detected. Very few are able to get through 
our series of protection mechanisms‟ (G:1.129-130). 
 
 „We have about one hundred viruses a month. They come in all shapes 
and sizes, mainly through the Internet and through mail attachments, 
many of them non-work related‟ (G:2.115-6). 
 
The difference in the number of estimated viruses per month can probably be 
attributed to the fact that one of the respondents was directly responsible for 
information security, whilst the other was responsible for IT in general. 
 
 „We have had a high amount of laptop thefts, somewhere in the order 
of 14 in the last 12 months, mainly from a couple of break ins at the 
corporate head office but also because of the employees leaving them 
in cars. We really don‟t know about the loss of associated data that 
could have been retrieved from those systems‟ (G:1.132-5). 
 
The theft of computing assets could have potentially had a very serious impact on the 
organisation and its core business. Not only could they be embarrassed by the loss of 
sensitive company information but it is possible for laptops to turn on and off their 
systems or impact on the distribution of their commodity. This point was not lost on 
the organisation. 
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 „You only have to look as far as Queen vs Bowden to see the impact of 
stolen and misused computing equipment and what it can do to a 
utility‟ (G:1.104-5). 
 
 „We have had a number of instances of laptop theft, where we have 
had break ins with machines stolen from the back seats of cars and 
also from our head office facilities‟ (G:2.118-9). 
 
Potential access abuse to computing facilities is another area where potential 
incidents have been recorded. The nature of these incidents within the organisation 
has made some of the incidents hard to detect or verify. 
 
 „We have had a few suspicions regarding access abuse, people using 
mail delegations incorrectly for example‟ (G:1.137-8). 
 
 „There have been occasions where there have been accusations of 
employee access abuse, however, we have not been able to prove any 
of this‟ (G:2.121-2). 
 
The organisation indicated that there were at least two incidents that could be 
classified as the most serious, namely theft and viruses. 
 
 „In our case, they could be different. I would say viruses are the most 
prevalent, and if not caught could easily be the most significant. A 
stolen laptop could be significant if it has damaging information or it 
allows people to gain access through your system. This is particularly 
the case if there are cached passwords on your systems‟ (G:2.130-3). 
 
 „Viruses. They have so many potential access points, through e-mail, 
web mail, and disks. We have most incidents from viruses‟ (G:1.146-
7). 
 
The respondents found it difficult to estimate the amount of money or resources they 
had lost as a result of information security incidents. There were, however some 
areas where they could provide some information as well as some general opinions 
about the measurement of such losses. 
 
 „Hard to say. We have lost about 100K in hardware alone. We spend 
about 10K per month looking for viruses‟ (G:2.139-140). 
 
 „We have lost about $80 000 in stolen laptops alone. I am very 
sceptical about the figures I read regarding losses as a result of 
viruses. Whilst it is quite easy to estimate the amount of time to re-
build a server and how much that resource costs. It is quite a different 
matter to estimate to estimate lost organisational time/productivity. If 
a machine is down for 15 minutes because of virus infection what‟s to 
say that staff were not in a meeting, doing paper work or choosing to 
take a coffee break while the repair work was being done. If you could 
measure things like that with any level of certainty surely you would 
have an easy time justifying things like infrastructure upgrades 
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because you would be able to estimate the cost of slow networks‟ 
(G:1.153-161). 
 
The business as a target 
 
The organisation did not believe that it was specifically targeted because of who they 
were or what they did. 
 
 „Not specifically (are we targeted) at the moment, but given 
justification I believe that we would be good targets. If you could get 
through you could cause a great deal of havoc‟ (G:2.90-1). 
 
 „Not at the moment. I guess like many organisations we are targets of 
opportunity. One reason we may not see hackers is they give when 
they get bounced from our firewall. We get some suspicious hits from 
universities‟ (G:1.98-9). 
 
4.9.2 Management 
Countermeasures 
 
The organisation had a comprehensive approach to applying a variety of security 
countermeasures including technology based measures and policy implementations. 
 
 „We have a fulltime security manager, an IT security committee with 
executive membership‟ (G:1.188-9). 
 
This statement emphasises the organisation‟s approach to promoting security issues 
outside of the IT area. Non IT executives were actively involved in a security 
committee that subsequently ratified and helped enforce security policies. 
 
Much of the organisation‟s technical security services were provided by a managed 
security service provider. In this case the organisation‟s security manager effectively 
controlled the service providing company in order to manage systems in line with 
organisational policies. 
 
 „We arrange a managed services security provider that has all of the 
Internet traffic flow through their trust centre. They run anti-viral 
services/anti spamming services as well as host based IDS on their 
systems, we run network based IDS on our systems with several 
probes in different parts of the network‟ (G:1.193-6). 
 
 „We outsource some of our security in a co-source arrangement. We 
have web and content filtering and we go through a trusted managed 
services provider‟ (G:2.180-3). 
 
Policies and standards were an important component in the organisation‟s defence 
strategy. 
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 „We are aiming at ISO 17799 in the near future. We have extensive 
security policies and procedures and disaster recovery plans‟ 
(G:1.202-3). 
 
 „We are aiming to meet standards such as IS18 AS/NZS 7789. We are 
looking at the ITIL framework for the implementation of best 
practices in security delivery‟ (G:2.175-6). 
 
The organisation used a suite of hardware based security devices, with an array of 
advanced applications to allow integration with their standard IT infrastructure. 
 
 „We have a number of firewalls, in a layered approach with fail over 
of services, vendor separation also‟ (G:2.178-9). 
 
 „We have dual layers of firewalls, two different brands‟ (G:1.190). 
 
The organisation put emphasis on the selection of different firewall vendors, using 
different firewall technologies. This approach was seen as advantageous by the 
organisation as it ensured that any vulnerability in one technology or product would 
not automatically compromise all of their systems. 
Level of security expenditure 
 
The organisation was able to show documentary evidence of its level of expenditure 
on information security. 
 
 „We have spent $1.5m in the last 12 months‟ (G:2.187). 
 
 „Our annual security budget is about $1.2 million. We have just spent 
over $1 million introducing new infrastructure policies and security 
hardware‟ (G:1.212-3). 
 
4.9.3 Differentiators 
 
The study of the Case G organisation revealed a number of potential differentiators. 
These differentiators include: 
 
Table 4-15 Differentiators Case G 
 
Differentiator 
Number 
Differentiator Comments 
1 Nature of the organisation As a major utility the organisation 
forms part of the national critical 
infrastructure. Disruption to its 
services could have a serious impact 
on an entire State. 
2 Managed services The organisation had a number of 
services including some information 
security services provided by external 
service providers. This had a 
potentially positive impact on the 
organisation’s security posture in that 
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subject matter experts could be 
employed to run critical infrastructure 
and systems. On the other hand there 
is potential for some loss of control of 
some services due to the ‘hands off’ 
nature of these arrangements. 
3 Segregation of networks The organisation partitioned its 
various networks through the use of a 
series of firewalls. This improved the 
organisations posture as potential 
problems could not traverse the 
breadth of the organisation’s systems 
without passing through a number of 
security checkpoints. 
4 Multiple layers of firewalls The organisation operated multiple 
layers of firewalls. This provided a 
more robust arrangement as any 
would be attacker would have to 
defeat a series of firewalls. The 
firewalls were configured in such a 
fashion that if one firewall failed 
another could handle its function. 
5 International standards The organisation benchmarked its 
security services against international 
standards such as ISO 17799. 
6 Government owned corporation The organisation was a government 
owned corporation, which meant that 
it was required to adopt and comply 
with certain government initiatives 
and policies regarding information 
security. 
7 Audited by other government 
agencies 
As a quasi government organisation 
the security posture of the 
organisation was quite frequently 
audited by government accounting 
and auditing agencies to monitor 
compliance and security issues. 
8 Reliance on IT/Internet The organisation had a number of 
interdependent IT systems that 
required access to Internet for data 
retrieval purposes. This reliance 
increased the complexity of providing 
security services to the organisation. 
 
Source: Analysis of secondary and interview data  
 
4.9.4 Security Framework 
 
Using the framework defined and developed in chapter 2, this study‟s assessment of 
the information security position for Case G is shown in the diagram below. 
 
The framework indicates that risks the organisation faces are adequately addressed. 
A number of strong management countermeasures have been implemented and the 
organisation is aware of the potential cost of system outages and attempts to mitigate 
the risks. 
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Table 4-16 Information Security Framework Case G 
 
 
 
(+) Factor has a positive impact on the organisation‟s security posture 
(-) Factor has a negative impact on the organisation‟s security posture 
 
 
Source: Analysis of secondary and interview data  
Research Issue 1 
Reliance on IT 
Research Issue 2 Research Issue 3 
Australian Business as 
Targets 
Research Issue 4 
Countermeasures 
Research Issue 5 
Level of Security 
Expenditure 
Threats Incidents 
High reliance on 
integrated 
applications and 
networks. 
- 
Viruses 
- 
Viruses 
- 
Not a specific target but 
would make a good, i.e. 
A high pay off for effort. 
- 
Fulltime security 
manager. 
+ 
Detailed security 
budget with linkage to 
threats and incidents. 
+ 
Office automation. 
- 
Hackers 
(Port 
Scans) 
- 
Laptops 
thefts. - 
Target of opportunity 
- 
Managed security 
service provider who are 
security experts. 
+ 
Spend $1.2 to 1.5M 
annually. + 
Payroll and finance. 
- 
Insiders 
- 
Access 
abuse 
- 
 
 
Policies and standards. 
+ 
 
Data sources from 
the Internet and 
external networks. 
- 
 Auditting 
+ 
ERP - Layered firewalls + 
  Anti-viral protection + 
 Disaster recovery + 
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4.9.5 Summary and recommendations 
 
The organisation‟s overall security posture was good. Whilst the organisation faced a 
variety of threats, they were able to identify and order information security risks and 
had implemented a comprehensive suite of countermeasures. They had a clearly 
identifiable security program with its own budget. Their actions, process, procedures 
and countermeasures were subject to both internal and external audit. The following 
recommendations are based on a comparison of the analysis of the current state of 
security in Case G with best practice as uncovered by the literature review (see 
chapter 2). If implemented the recommendations should significantly improve the 
organisation‟s security position: 
 
a. Hardware theft. The organisation should investigate improving 
hardware security – especially for laptop and desktop computers. 
Physical security mechanisms that could be considered include the use 
of security locks and the installation of video cameras in high risk 
areas. 
  
b. Benchmarking. Whilst the current security arrangements are robust 
its important for the organisation to continue a process of monitoring 
trends and the measures employed at other organisations. By 
benchmarking their security against trusted peers within the utilities 
industry the organisation can help ensure that it remains in a strong 
position. The additional benefit is that IT staff will be able keep the 
business informed by making direct comparisons with other like 
organisations. 
 
4.10 Case H – Small Sized Local Council 
 
The Case H organisation is a local council with approximately 750 employees. They 
have a central office and a number of small site offices. One qualified IT professional 
was able to provide information for the research. The organisation could be best 
described as stereotypical of a small government agency in that it had a range of 
work activities that needed to be supported by a variety of information systems. This 
work ranged from manual labour such as road works and garbage removal to office 
administration and rates billing processes. The virtual interview and online survey 
techniques were used to obtain data from this organisation. 
 
4.10.1 Risks 
Reliance on IT 
 
Data from the virtual interviews and secondary data analysis were analysed to gain 
an understanding of the Case H‟s reliance on IT. Case H described itself as heavily 
dependent on IT. 
 „Our organisation has approximately 750 PCs distributed in 20 
offices with the majority of staff (450) in our central office. We use 14 
servers and link our remote sites using private networks. We are 
heavily dependent on IT and have been so for the past 20 years, 
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Major applications include business processing, office administration 
(MS office suite), e-mail, Intranet  based applications and a few 
Internet based applications‟ (H:1.20-4). 
 
This statement provides a comprehensive list of the users of IT within the 
organisation. The organisation‟s reliance on IT can be further extrapolated by 
matching the number of staff to the number of computers. The one to one match of 
staff to computers could be considered somewhat surprising given that there are 
sections of the council that are manually labour intensive rather than office based. 
 
Figure 4-9 below depicts the application of the McFarlan and McKenny Strategic 
Grid (McFarlan et al 1983) to the organisation‟s IT. The integrated nature of the 
technology used in the organisation – and the reliance on distributed networks 
accessing central databases and file stores from central servers meant that many of 
the organisation‟s services could not be effective without access to IT. IT was 
assessed as being key operational  to the case, current IT is important but future 
developments in IT are unlikely to improve competitive advantage. 
 
Figure 4-9 Case H Strategic Grid 
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Source: Analysis of interview and secondary data 
Threats 
 
The organisation identified viruses and the Internet as the main information security 
threats that it faced. 
 
 „In general we would be regarded as a low risk target. Not too many 
people are targeting the local council. However threats and attacks 
do take place‟ (H:1.45-6). 
 
 „Internet – we find our site is constantly probed for possible security 
flaws, generally with the intention of using these to conduct attacks on 
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other systems. Nimda is an example here. Viruses are a constant 
threat with approximately 20 infected e-mails arriving at our site per 
day‟ (H:1.46-50). 
 
The nature of the organisation brought about a unique form of risk. As an operator of 
public libraries the council also offers free public access to the Internet. This service 
could be used to expose the organisation to threats and also for would be hackers to 
launch attacks on other networks. 
 
 „We provide public access to library users for catalogues and Internet 
use. This is a prime area for security threats and we have had people 
attempt to load password cracking software on the computers‟ 
(H:1.52-4). 
 
This threat potentially exposed the organisation on a number of fronts. Firstly it 
provides would be attackers an excellent platform for their activities; an outside job 
could then look like an inside job. Secondly there are potential legal liability issues 
that the organisation could face if their public access facilities were used to launch an 
attack on another organisation. 
 
When asked to identify which threat was considered to the most significant the 
organisation nominated viruses. 
 
 „The only one that appears to have been successful in the past has 
been one virus incident‟ (H:1.63-4). 
 
The organisation assessed its‟ threats through a number of sources. 
 
 „Experience, research, and study. We monitor our systems to see what 
is happening. We talk to other organisations and software suppliers‟ 
(H:1.71-9). 
 
Incidents 
 
The organisation identified a number of incidents that had been encountered within 
the previous 12 months. Viruses, hacking, and hardware theft were specifically listed 
as reportable incidents. 
 
 „The love letter virus. This occurred when virus signatures arrived too 
late due to a distribution server error. This incident took a day to 
clean up wasting significant resources. We have had the hacking 
attempts from the libraries as already mentioned. We have also lost 
around six PCs in the last 12 months from theft (break and enter)‟ 
(H:1.110-4). 
 
Viruses were identified as the most prevalent form of information security incident 
experienced by the organisation. 
 
 „Most prevalent is virus attack occurring daily and if it succeeds then 
it can be disastrous. As more systems are exposed to the Internet, 
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attention will need to be placed on ensuring they are not 
compromised‟ (H:1.120-2). 
 
The organisation could not accurately estimate the cost of any losses. 
 
 „Difficult. A virus incident such as love letter. Five IT staff for one day 
to tidy up. Loss of productivity from 400 staff (No e-mail, missed 
appointments etc) while the system is cleaned. We‟d be talking about 
tens of thousands of dollars probably‟ (H:1.128-130). 
 
The business as a target 
 
The organisation could identify random firewall probes but did not believe that it was 
a specific target. 
 
 „Not specifically, most sites are probed with port scans, viruses etc, 
however we had no hacker attacks. The closest thing we had was a 
security consultant using our site for some testing‟ (H:1.86-7). 
 
4.10.2 Management 
Countermeasures 
 
The organisation employed a modest arrangement of security countermeasures 
ranging from technical to policy-based countermeasures. 
 
 „Security is considered in everything we do. Databases have 
appropriate security employed. Policies exist to ensure data integrity 
and cover disaster recovery. Investigations lead by the internal 
auditor drawing on IT resources as needed. Anti-virus software is 
deployed to all computers. It runs on the mail server doing real-time 
monitoring. Single Internet facing firewalls are used currently but this 
is being revised to provide a single perimeter and one internal 
firewall‟ (H:1.157-161). 
 
The policy and strategy based countermeasures are the corner stone of the 
organisation‟s response to the determined threat. The organisation had formulated a 
disaster recovery plan in the event of a serious compromise. There was however no 
evidence that the disaster recovery plan had recently been tested to determine its 
effectiveness. 
 
The organisation emphasised the role of the external auditor who in effect „kept the 
organisation honest‟ by reviewing security issues and recommending further 
technical investigations if required. This was theme was strongly emphasised in the 
organisation‟s response to the survey instrument. 
Level of security expenditure 
 
The organisation did not provide evidence about the size of their information security 
budget. They were, however, capable of providing an estimate of the budget. 
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 „We spend in the vicinity of $30 000 in a 12 month period‟ (H:1.171). 
 
4.10.3 Differentiators 
 
A number of potential differentiators were identified as part of the review of the 
organisation‟s information security posture. 
 
Table 4-17 Differentiators Case H 
 
Differentiator 
Number 
Differentiator Comments 
1 Local government The organisation was a local 
government and as such it provided a 
number of information services that 
could be exploited. The library service 
could be used to launch an attack on 
either the organisation’s networks 
(e.g. viruses) or to launch hacking 
attacks on other organisations. 
2 Use of external auditors The organisation used external 
auditors as a key countermeasure 
and tool to ensure that organisational 
security policies were enforced. This 
was a positive way of ensuring that 
systems were appropriately 
maintained. 
3 Disaster recovery Although the organisation was 
relatively small it had developed a 
comprehensive disaster recovery plan 
that could be implemented in the 
event of a significant incident. 
4 Small budget The organisation stated that it had a 
small security budget and as such 
had to be creative in the manner in 
which it provided security. This 
included making some services 
unavailable, as funds were not 
available to provide the systems to 
adequately secure them. 
5 Many remote sites The organisation operated a number 
of remote work sites and depots. This 
potentially created a number of 
physical security problems. 
Computing hardware could be stolen 
from site offices for example. 
 
Source: Analysis of secondary and interview data  
 
4.10.4 Security Framework 
 
Using the framework defined and developed in chapter 2, this study‟s assessment of 
the information security position for Case H is shown in the diagram below. 
 
Given the relatively small size of the organisation‟s IT department it was able to 
deploy a range of countermeasure to mitigate the information security risks to 
achieve a relatively balanced framework. 
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Table 4-18 Information Security Framework Case H 
 
(+) Factor has a positive impact on the organisation‟s security posture 
(-) Factor has a negative impact on the organisation‟s security posture 
 
Source: Analysis of secondary and interview data  
Research Issue 1 
Reliance on IT 
Research Issue 2 Research Issue 3 
Australian Business as 
Targets 
Research Issue 4 
Countermeasures 
Research Issue 5 
Level of Security 
Expenditure 
Threats Incidents 
Self assessed as 
heavily dependent 
on IT. - 
Viruses 
- 
Multiple virus 
incidents. 
- 
Not a specific 
target, mainly 
seen as a target 
of opportunity. 
+ 
Database access 
security. 
+ 
Estimated at 30K per 
annum, which meant 
that the organisation 
had potentially deny 
some services. 
 
Office automation. 
- 
Internet – Site 
constantly probed 
for weakness and 
security flaws 
- 
Hacking attacks, 
including use of 
internal 
resources to 
conduct attack. 
- 
 
 
Policies and 
standards. 
+ 
 
 
Some e-commerce 
and billing 
functions. - 
Internal and 
potential outsider 
from within, e.g., 
library users on 
Internet. 
- 
Laptop theft. 
- 
 
 
Disaster recovery 
plans. 
+ 
 
 
Customer or 
community 
information 
accessible through 
Internet. 
- 
 
 
   
 
External auditing 
of information 
assets and 
policies. 
+ 
 
 
Important document 
management – 
approvals, plans, 
regulations. 
- 
 
 
   
 
Anti-virus, with 
real time 
monitoring on e-
mail. 
+ 
 
 
        Firewall. +   
Master of Information Technology   
 
 
131 
4.10.5 Summary and recommendations 
 
The organisation‟s overall security posture was good. The organisation faced a 
variety of threats including some unique threats based on the Internet service that 
they offered to the general public. The organisation not only had to ensure that their 
own networks were secured from security threats but also had to ensure that their 
networks were not used by the general public to launch attacks on other 
organisations. The following recommendations are based on a comparison of the 
analysis of the current state of security in Case H with best practice as uncovered by 
the literature review (see chapter 2). If implemented the recommendations should 
significantly improve the organisation‟s security position: 
 
a. Intrusion detection and prevention. The organisation should 
investigate the implementation of intrusion detection and prevention 
systems. There was no evidence of a system that could monitor any 
security penetration that breached the organisation‟s firewalls. 
  
b. System segregation. The public access Internet facilities pose a 
number of threats to the organisation. Currently there is some 
connectivity between the organisation‟s networks and the systems 
offered to the general public for Internet access. It is recommended 
that the public Internet access be provided on standalone computing 
systems – not connected to organisation‟s normal computing 
networks. This will significantly reduce the risk of potential incidents 
being launched from these facilities. 
 
 
4.11 Case I – Small sized State Government Department 
 
The Case I organisation was a small State government department with 
approximately 900 staff. IT operated a number of regional and international offices 
that provided a presence for the organisation to conduct its core business. The small 
nature of the organisation meant that in a number of instances it shared resources and 
components of IT infrastructure with other organisations. Two senior IT 
professionals took part in the interviews. 
 
4.11.1 Risks 
Reliance on IT 
 
The Case I organisation‟s core business involved the distribution and dissemination 
of information and services across regional and international boundaries. It was 
therefore not surprising that the organisation deemed itself to be highly reliant on IT. 
 
 „The Department is a distributed environment. We have 18 regional 
offices located around the state and 10 international offices. There 
are approximately 500 – 600 staff employed within the central 
business district itself. The network is large and it is shared with 
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another state government department. They have approximately 800 
people and have a similar number of regional offices although they 
have no international offices‟ (I:1.20-6). 
 
 „(We have) a high reliance on IT, both internally for office 
automation, and externally to the department itself. Internal IT is 
shared and maintained by another department‟ (I:2.20-5). 
 
The degree of reliance on IT by the organisation can be seen in its statement about 
how the organisation would function if the supporting IT was to fail. 
 
 „The whole organisation is structured around the IT infrastructure 
and if the infrastructure doesn‟t work then nothing gets done. I could 
use a recent example when we had a fire in the south of Brisbane that 
cut the electricity. The building went down and we had to wait for the 
generators because when it came up it blew a circuit and what 
happened was that systems in one of our buildings were down for half 
a day and what it meant was that no one could do any work and 
basically we gave them the option to go home or do filing. If the 
system doesn‟t work then the organisation doesn‟t work because it 
can‟t access its files and records and the records management system 
is paper based but it is indexed electronically. So no access to the 
computer screen and there are no manual processes‟ (I:1.49-60). 
 
Further evidence of the organisation‟s reliance on IT can be seen in the 
organisation‟s dependence on ERP and e-commerce based applications. 
 
 „The organisation runs three major ERP packages. They being SAP 
for financials, HR which is Aurion we a business package called 
Organisation Online, it comprises three components. There is a CRM 
component, which is Applix, which is all the workflow and history of 
all of the department‟s clients. There is a component called Smart 
Licence that allows for business licenses to be obtained online. The 
third component is called virtual campus that is actually an online 
learning facility‟ (I:1.34-45). 
 
 „E-commerce is more like e-Government, with a focus on providing 
information and advice to the department‟s clients – mainly the 
State‟s business community‟ (I:2.27-9). 
 
The survey results provided by the organisation further confirmed its dependence on 
IT and the resulting interdependent nature of applications and infrastructure. The 
organisation provided an extensive amount of information to support the interview 
data. 
 
Figure 4-10 below depicts the application of the McFarlan and McKenny Strategic 
Grid (McFarlan et al 1983) to the organisation‟s IT. The organisation‟s stated 
reliance on the current IT infrastructure coupled with the fact that future 
developments were unlikely to improve competitive advantage led to an the 
conclusion that IT was key operational. 
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Figure 4-10 Case I Strategic Grid 
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Source: Analysis of interview and secondary data 
Threats 
 
The organisation was able to identify a number of threats that could potentially 
impact on the normal operation of their IT. 
 
 „Threats originate mainly from internal leaks of confidential 
information – commercial-in-confidence or cabinet-in-confidence‟  
(I:2.55-7). 
 
A more comprehensive listing and analysis of the potential threats was provided by 
the other respondent. 
 
 „We have four threats: 
1. The internal threat of the dissatisfied user. 
2. External threat from someone who will try and write a virus 
and try and infect the system. 
3. The natural disaster threat, that‟s beyond our control. 
4. Because we operate internationally people who live there are 
also a potential threat. 
These threats determine how we structure to operate the IT 
environment‟ (I:95-102). 
 
The respondents differed in their analysis regarding which particular threat was the 
most significant that the organisation faced. 
 
 „Anything that makes the newspaper or is raised in parliament: leaked 
documents or deleted websites‟ (I:2.73-4). 
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 „The one that is giving us the most trouble is viruses. I would put the 
risks in order of viruses first, natural disaster second, internal and 
international equal third. They are low risk‟ (I:1.114-6). 
 
The organisation was aware of the security threats through a comprehensive risk 
analysis process. The requirement for business continuity planning directs this 
analysis within the organisation. 
 
 „As part of the organisation‟s tasks we are actually responsible to do 
the business continuity plan, and as part of the business continuity 
plan we do a risk assessment. With regard to network vulnerabilities. 
Internally we do our reviews. We believe that the only way we will 
know what is really going on is to go and ask ourselves. With regard 
to viruses and hacking we engage third parties‟ (I:1.126-35). 
 
The other respondent from the organisation put his knowledge of the organisation‟s 
threats down to more simple mechanisms. 
 
 „Experience‟ (I:2.85). 
Incidents 
 
The organisation described a variety of security incidents that it had encountered 
over the previous 12 months. Viruses received the most coverage when the 
organisation discussed the threats that it faced. It was therefore not surprising to see 
that theme continue when the interview topic turned to incidents. 
 
 „Nimda virus – got through to five or so PCs before it was stopped. 
Code Red defaced one web site‟ (I:2.122-3). 
 
 „Code red virus. The department‟s website is hosted externally by [a 
provider]. What happened was that our web development people 
actually managed that server and even though they had received the 
warnings to update the service packs on that server for code red but 
they hadn‟t done it so when code red was released it affected that 
server by dropping it off the air. The other one was the Nimda virus, 
with that one it actually got inside our system. As soon as that 
happened we cut all external links out to the rest of the world and 
eradicated the virus and rebuilt the system and then re-opened up the 
systems‟ (I:1.193-8). 
 
Theft of computing assets was also a problem for the organization. 
 
 „Theft is an issue, mainly from an external point of view. We have had 
instances of people breaking into buildings and stealing laptops, in 
the last six months we have lost two, in the last 12 months there was 
something like 78 reported incidents of thefts of laptops in the city 
CBD‟ (I:1.203-6). 
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The respondents differed in their assessment of what they believed to be the most 
prevalent or significant incidents that had occurred to the organization. 
 
 „Viruses are the most prevalent. We do updates frequently. Because 
we have problems getting people to log on and off, we had to write a 
script to get machines to log out, automatically. Automatic updates 
are occurring‟ (I:1.217-9). 
 
 „Information leaked – public embarrassment‟ (I:2.138). 
 
The organization found it difficult to estimate the monetary loss that resulted from 
security incidents from the security incidents. 
 
 „Don‟t put a monetary value on it. We have lost probably two weeks 
over the last financial year‟ (I:1.225-6). 
 
 „Laptops - $3000 each. Leak of information no dollar value, but 
conversely has the most impact on the organisation‟ (I:2.141-2). 
The business as a target 
 
The organisation believed that they were not a specific target for any particular 
group. Rather the organisation felt it was either part of the global target base or a 
target of convenience. 
 
 „No evidence of that (being targeted). We run our own packages to 
actually check for that. Historically, it‟s mainly university students 
trying out what they have learnt. Looking at firewall logs every 
University in Australia is represented there. There is a lot of SPAM 
activity that comes up against the firewall, but there has been no 
evidence of any specific attacks, other than – let‟s visit and see what 
we can do and once they realise that it‟s a firewall on the front they 
tend to go away‟ (I:1.155-60). 
 
 „Not so much targeted from external attacks (e.g. mass virus, web site 
defacement) these seem to just be a part of a mass attack. Internal 
attacks from staff (disclosure of information) may be targeted due to 
information held‟ (I:2.92-6). 
 
4.11.2 Management 
Countermeasures 
 
The organisation employed a comprehensive range of countermeasures to combat the 
identified threat. At the core of the organisation‟s security posture was the State 
Government‟s mandated security policy, Information Standard 18. 
 
 „The Queensland Government has a significant information security 
standard, called Information Standard 18, it is available on the web 
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it‟s a generic document that each department has to apply. In some 
cases it is specific, and other places it is generic‟ (I:1.253-5). 
 
 „Whole of government mandatory security policy based upon AS/NZ 
7799‟ (I:2.174). 
 
The organisation also indicated a significant number of other technical and policy 
based countermeasures. 
 
 „We use the following: 
 Passwords. 
 User accounts. 
 Specific approvals for remote access. 
 Policies. 
 Firewalls, DMZ, Covered circuits (VPN). 
 Closed networks, that they are compartmentalised. 
 Physical security. 
 Backup and offsite storage. 
 Specific security areas that are discrete and not accessible. 
 Anti-viral software. 
 Clearances for contractors, security clauses put into staff contracts. 
 Firewall logs. 
 Third party auditors to review the system and checks. 
 Staff training. 
 Security advisors. 
 Configuration control. 
 Risk management used to determine how we do. 
 Disaster Recovery Plan (Separate Facility) 
 We have a database of security incidents. 
 We have a security professional and he can do investigations. 
 We run security applications. 
 Physical systems are located in all our buildings, buildings have 
closed circuit TV (CCTV)‟(I:2.257-82). 
 
The completeness and the conciseness of this response indicated that this 
organisation had put a significant amount of time into information security. 
Level of Security Expenditure 
 
The organisation was able to produce accurate information regarding the level of 
security expenditure. This information was supported by documentary evidence. 
 „It‟s on going investment. Security is a cost of doing business these 
days. We have a facilities management contract, which covers all 
services and expenditure. We would spend about 50k – 100k per 
annum for software, probably all up over 200k per year‟ (I:1.287 – 
91). 
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4.11.3 Differentiators 
 
A number of potential differentiators were identified as potential influencing factors 
in determining the organisation‟s security posture. 
 
Table 4-19 Differentiators Case I 
 
Differentiator 
Number 
Differentiator Comments 
1 Mandated security policy from 
State Government. 
As a State government department 
this organisation was required to 
adhere to the State’s information 
standards. These standards were 
derived from national and 
international information security 
standards. These policies directly 
influenced the manner in which 
information security was managed 
within the organisation. 
2 Organisation has international 
offices. 
The organisation operated a number 
of small international offices. This 
direct exposure to foreign intelligence 
gathering organisations increased the 
risk the organisation faces. 
3 Facilities management 
agreement with other agency 
The organisation essentially sub-
contracted its infrastructure support to 
another government department. This 
arrangement meant that some 
security issues and the day-to-day 
management of incidents were at 
arms length to the organisation. 
4 Focus on physical security The organisation had a high 
integration with physical security and 
information security. Access control to 
systems hardware and infrastructure 
was tightly controlled including the 
use of CCTV to ensure that 
unauthorised use of systems was 
minimised. 
5 Importance of information to the 
organisation 
Information was seen as a key asset 
to the organisation and as such the 
organisation adopted a proactive 
approach to managing information 
assets. 
6 High level of security knowledge The respondents for the organisation 
presented very polished and 
knowledgeable responses to the 
interview questions. Source data for 
the questions were readily available. 
 
Source: Analysis of secondary and interview data  
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4.11.4 Security Framework 
 
Using the framework defined and developed in chapter 2, this study‟s assessment of 
the information security position for Case I is shown in the diagram below.  
 
The framework indicates that the organisation had a good understanding of the risks 
and more importantly could link the risks to appropriate countermeasures to mitigate 
the risks. 
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Table 4-20 Information Security Framework Case I 
 
 
 
 
(+) Factor has a positive impact on the organisation‟s security posture 
(-) Factor has a negative impact on the organisation‟s security posture 
 
Source: Analysis of secondary and interview data  
Research Issue 1 
Reliance on IT 
Research Issue 2 Research Issue 3 
Australian Business as 
Targets 
Research Issue 4 
Countermeasures 
Research Issue 5 
Level of Security 
Expenditure 
 Threats Incidents    
Self assessed as 
highly reliant. 
- 
Internal 
threat 
(System 
users) 
- 
Several virus 
problems. 
- 
No evidence of 
direct targeting. 
+ 
Linkage between threats 
and incidents. 
+ 
Security expenditure 
in vicinity of 200K. 
+ 
Shared information 
resources with other 
organisations. 
- 
Viruses. 
- 
Theft of 
computing 
assets. 
 
- 
Perhaps from 
university 
students refining 
their skills. 
- 
Emphasis on physical 
security including video 
surveillance. 
+ 
Some costs hidden 
by facilities 
management 
agreement. 
- 
When the IT doesn’t 
work the staff go 
home 
- 
Natural 
disaster 
(physical 
threat). 
- 
Information 
leakage. 
- 
 
 
Implementation of 
standards and policies 
that are then audited. 
+ 
 
 
ERP and e-commerce 
focus for information 
tools. 
- 
Foreign entity 
threat. - 
   
 
Risk management 
+ 
 
 
ERP. 
- 
 
 
   
 
Security professionals 
employed. 
+ 
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4.11.5 Summary and recommendations 
 
The organisation‟s overall security posture was very good. The organisation had 
conducted comprehensive risk assessment exercises and had implemented 
appropriate countermeasures to mitigate the identified risks. Their facilities 
management contract did complicate their security environment to some degree, 
however, the organisation implemented proactive steps to ensure its service provider 
met or exceeded its‟ expectations. The following recommendations are based on a 
comparison of the analysis of the current state of security in Case I with best practice 
as uncovered by the literature review (see chapter 2). If implemented the 
recommendations should significantly improve the organisation‟s security position: 
 
a. Benchmarking. Whilst the current security arrangements are very 
good the organisation should implement a process of monitoring 
trends and the measures employed at other organisations. By 
benchmarking their security against trusted peers within the utilities 
industry the organisation can help ensure that it remains in a strong 
position. The additional benefit is that IT staff will be able keep the 
business informed by making direct comparisons with other like 
organisations. 
 
  
b. Audit and investigation. As the organisation is involved in a 
facilities management arrangement an independent, external audit is 
recommended. This audit and investigation should include a review of 
the policies and procedures of the service provider. Security 
penetration testing should also be a priority to prove the robustness of 
the any security countermeasures employed. Once established the 
audit program should be undertaken regularly. 
4.12 Case J – Large State Government Department 
 
The Case J organisation is a large sized State Government agency employing around 
7500 staff. They have offices throughout the State of varying size that access central 
information systems. The department operates a number of interdependent 
relationships with other State government departments in either a service provider of 
client role. 
 
In instances where the department operates as a service provider, it provides access 
to the organisation‟s databases, primarily providing another department with end 
customer details. These relationships highlight the importance of information and 
information systems to the organisation. 
 
Two senior IT professionals were chosen by the organisation to take part in the 
interviews. 
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4.12.1 Risks 
Reliance on IT 
 
The Case J organisation‟s core business involved recording qualifications and 
certifications for a large proportion of the state‟s population: The organisation shares 
its clients information with a number of other organisations by providing controlled 
access to the organisation‟s databases. The Department describes itself as heavily 
reliant on IT. 
 
 „The Department‟s Information Services Branch provides IT Services 
to the Department and one other major government department. Both 
departments have a heavy reliance on IT for service delivery to our 
customers and for internal business processes‟ (J:1.20-2). 
 
 „We are highly reliant on IT. The main sources of reliance are key 
enterprise applications, communications, information sharing across 
a widely distributed organisation and desktop productivity (probably 
in that order of importance). Without our key enterprise application, 
we should probably be out of business in days‟ (J:2.20-23). 
 
The Department‟s information systems support essential applications, third party 
organisations and large numbers of customers. 
 
 „The enterprise network has approximately 6500 users across 150 
sites geographically dispersed throughout the State. There are many 
B2B exchanges and these are continuing to increase. E-Commerce 
activities are not extensive at this stage however this is now becoming 
a focus via emerging electronic service delivery and will continue to 
evolve. The department has an extensive Intranet with many different 
systems. Novell – File/Print, Lotus –Mail/Workgroup databases, 
Lotus Domino – Websites, Tn3270 – Mainframe access, SAP for 
financials and many Oracle databases‟ (J:1.30-5). 
 
 „There are a number of e-commerce systems in place and a number 
projects underway, E-commerce will become increasingly important. 
Although there is minimal transaction/order processing currently, we 
are developing an online payment service to accept projects and 
future applications. This environment is reasonably complex and 
includes web front ends, Borland Application Server middleware 
(Java Beans), and back end applications such as TRAILS which runs 
on a mainframe‟ (J:29-35). 
 
The organisation‟s reliance on IT is further highlighted by the interviewees‟ 
responses to the question regarding what happens when the IT doesn‟t work. 
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 „What happens when the IT doesn‟t work? – This is a broad question. 
If we take one example – our customer service centres most critical 
application is used for interaction with the general public – in the 
event of loss of this system the users utilise a local offline processing 
system (access database) on a file server which batches transactions 
up when connectivity is restored. In the event of total IT loss at the 
customer support centre there is a certain amount of transactions that 
can be still be performed via paper based transactioning‟ (J:2.37-43). 
 
 „In case of problems with IT, we have a number of levels of support 
ranging from helpdesk from level 1 support through to technical 
experts in the relevant operational areas for more detailed assistance. 
The prime focus of these support arrangements is to restore normal 
services as quickly as possible. This is important due to the heavy 
reliance on automated systems‟ (J:2.41-4). 
 
A review of the organisation‟s system documentation provided a comprehensive list 
of the applications maintained. The organisation had a large Internet site, which 
provides information to the public. 
 
The survey data provided by the interview respondents supported the data provided 
during the interviews and the secondary data provided by the respondents. In 
particular the survey data highlighted the interdependent nature of applications and 
the interconnection of infrastructure between other government agencies. This data 
confirmed the organisation‟s heavy reliance on IT and the reliance of other 
organisations on the department‟s computing assets. 
 
Figure 4-11 below depicts the application of the McFarlan and McKenny Strategic 
Grid (McFarlan et al 1983) to the organisation‟s IT. The organisation is highly reliant 
on its central databases, the support IT infrastructure and the connectivity between 
other departments. IT was assessed as being key operational to the organisation as 
current IT is important to the organisation but future developments are unlikely to 
improve the competitive advantage. 
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Figure 4-11 Case J Strategic Grid 
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Source: Analysis of interview and secondary data 
Threats 
 
The organisation presented documentary evidence of a series of risk assessments that 
had been conducted in order to determine what threats the organisation faced, A 
review of the documentation revealed that there was an emphasis on establishing 
evidence of threats as well as perceived threats; there was an attempt to link the 
threats to incidents. 
 
 „Generally, I don‟t think that we are the specific target of organised 
external hackers or groups. I see the main risk coming from users, 
introducing Trojans through e-mail, instant messaging, unauthorised 
modems – mostly education issues and of course the ever present 
threat of viruses and worms. However, there is still a risk from 
external hackers taking advantage of any vulnerabilities that may 
exist in our infrastructure‟ (J:2.66-70). 
 
 „Hackers, viruses and system users are all possible sources of threats 
to our organisations. I would not consider foreign governments a 
threat or competitors as we don‟t really have any competitors as a 
state government department‟ (J:1.68-71). 
 
Both respondents agreed that virus related threats were the most significant threats 
faced by the organisation. The threat of Trojans combined with access gained 
through system privileges of internal system users. 
 
 „I would consider viruses and system users to be the greatest risk. We 
have extensive virus monitoring in place but because viruses are 
constantly evolving you can potentially be affected before a patch is 
deployed. Viruses can be carried inside our flows (e.g. HTTP port 80) 
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that are otherwise allowed making them all the more 
dangerous….system users are only a risk because of the trusted 
nature of these individuals, and they are generally empowered to 
access information‟ (J:1.76-81). 
 
 „I think the most immediate danger is if an internal user opens up a 
security hole (via a Trojan of some kind) through our firewall and 
other defences. Some of these Trojans can be hard to stop and they 
basically nullify your perimeter defences. Also, education of users can 
be difficult and time consuming‟ (J:2.80-3). 
 
The organisation had calculated the threats that it faced through a number of sources 
including risk assessments, experience of practitioners and personal research. 
 
 „We have experienced all of these security issues that I‟ve discussed to 
some extent. Also by monitoring notification services such as CERT 
and BugTraq, it is possible to see trends‟ (J:2.93-6). 
 
 „(I have learnt about these threats from) experience, research, 
seminars‟ (J:1.91). 
 
Incidents 
 
The respondents described several recent security incidents that had had some form 
of impact upon the operation of IT within the business. As the organisation indicated 
that viruses were its most significant threat is was not surprising that most of the 
incidents reported by the organisation were viruses. 
 
 „Many viruses affect systems like Microsoft Outlook/Exchange which 
we do not use, so I suppose we have been protected somewhat by the 
lack of using these systems, We did get a couple of instances of 
Nimda, however these were quickly isolated‟ (J:2.128-130). 
 
 „I‟ve only been in this position for about three months, however I 
believe that we have recently had problems with viruses/worms and 
inappropriate downloads by users. I‟m not aware of any recent 
hacking/unauthorised access incidents. I do know that a recent 
virus/worm outbreak, Nimda I think caused a lot of problems and took 
a significant amount to clean up‟ (J:2.127-132). 
 
The respondents indicated that no particular threat was particularly prevalent 
however they believed that the incidents of viruses were the most significant. 
 
 „I think the virus/worm scenario is most significant as users are the 
hardest part of the equation to control. These, also seem to be the 
most common day-to-day‟ (J:2.138-9). 
 
 „I do not consider any of these to be prevalent – although you don‟t 
know what you don‟t know! I would consider currently viruses to be 
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our biggest risk, however as the department increases it e-business 
activities with the external public then hacking attempts will become 
an area requiring even more vigilance‟ (J:1.139-42). 
 
The business was unable to estimate the value of any losses that could be attributed 
to security related incidents. 
The business as a target 
 
The organisation believed that there was some potential for it to be targeted. 
 
 „I suppose we run the risk of particular issues/political decisions 
making us a potential target for dissatisfied communities however I 
doubt that generally speaking the department is a high priority target 
amongst the hacker community as I feel there are more interesting 
targets out there….Needless to say this information is not for open 
consumption – hackers may see this as a challenge‟ (J:1.98-102). 
 
 „At this point of time, I don‟t believe we are being targeted‟ (J:2.103). 
 
4.12.2 Management 
Countermeasures 
 
The organisation as a State Government Department was required to adhere to the 
state‟s information security standards. 
 
 „We have a project underway to implement Qld Government 
Information Standard 18 – based on ISO 17799. This implementation 
a formal information security management framework and associated 
policies, standards and procedures. We do have policies and 
procedures currently in place covering major security issues 
(Passwords, Internet use, viruses, etc) although these will be 
overhauled as part of the project‟ (J:2.172-8). 
 
 „We have a range of policies in place. The Department has a project 
in place pursing compliance with IS18‟ (J:1.104-5). 
 
The organisation had recently created an enterprise security manager role in order to 
better coordinate security matters. 
 
 „We now have a specific security position (me) to ensure security is 
appropriately addressed‟ (J:1.180-1). 
 
 „We have an enterprise security manager and security expertise in 
functional areas, networks and servers and such‟ (J:1.180-1). 
 
The organisation employed a range of policy, procedures, and technical 
countermeasures. 
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 „We subscribe to AusCERT. We have firewalls, virus/e-mail scanning, 
two factor authentication for remote access, we will be shortly 
implementing IDS. We have a range of policies in place, for example, 
user responsibilities, Internet access, remote access‟ (J:1.175-9).  
 
 „We have a standard technical controls in place such as virus 
scanning, firewalls, monitoring, although I plan to review this 
architecture to ensure that it is appropriate. I monitor CERT and 
BugTraq for new vulnerabilities. I plan to have an external 
organisation perform a security review each year to ensure we 
maintain a robust security environment‟ (J:2.183-9). 
 
Level of security expenditure 
 
Due to the limited time that the respondents had spent in the organisation they were 
unable to estimate the organisations level of security expenditure. 
 
 „I haven‟t been here long enough to be able to give an accurate 
answer. Plus it is hard to come up with a figure – what do you 
include?‟ (J:2.194-5). 
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4.12.3 Differentiators 
 
A number of potential differentiators were identified during the review of the 
organisation‟s security posture: 
 
 
Table 4-21 Differentiators Case J 
 
Differentiator 
Number 
Differentiator Comments 
1 Large customer base The organisation has an extremely 
large customer base, in excess of 3 
million people. This creates strains on 
infrastructure, data storage, 
transmission and integrity. The 
security of the data becomes more 
complex with the more transactions 
and interactions required with the 
customer base. 
2 Interdependent relationships with 
other departments 
The organisation needs to make its 
data available for both read and write 
access to other government 
departments over multiple sites. This 
creates an information integrity and 
assurance challenge for the 
organisation. 
3 Service provider relationship In some instances the organisation 
operates as a service provider to 
other organisations. This creates at 
times unique security restraints and 
conflicts on the organisation. 
4 Mandated security policy from 
the state government 
As a State Government Department 
the organisation was required to 
implement certain government 
standards in relation to information 
and security. 
5 Size The organisation is large with a large 
amount of staff interacting frequently 
with organisational information 
systems. This makes issues such as 
access control and system access 
more difficult. 
6 Public profile The organisation has a significant 
public profile with data that is both 
sensitive and of interest to a wide 
variety of parties. 
 
Source: Analysis of secondary and interview data  
 
4.12.4 Security Framework 
 
 
Using the framework defined and developed in chapter 2, this study‟s assessment of 
the information security position for Case J is shown in the diagram below. The 
framework illustrates a relatively balanced risk versus threat posture. The 
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organisation has identified key threats to the organisation and has instigated a 
number of countermeasures in an attempt to mitigate the risk. 
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Table 4-22 Information Security Framework Case J 
 
 
 
(+) Factor has a positive impact on the organisation‟s security posture 
(-) Factor has a negative impact on the organisation‟s security posture 
 
Source: Analysis of secondary and interview data  
Research Issue 1 
Reliance on IT 
Research Issue 2 Research Issue 3 
Australian Business as 
Targets 
Research Issue 4 
Countermeasures 
Research Issue 5 
Level of Security 
Expenditure 
Threats Incidents 
Self assessed as 
highly reliant on IT. 
- 
Main risk is from 
users (introducing 
Trojans through e-
mail, instant 
messaging) 
- 
Small 
incidents 
of viruses. - 
Not seen as a major 
threat although the 
organisation could be 
seen as a high payoff 
target. 
+ 
Selection of Lotus 
Notes for e-mail 
rather than 
Exchange. 
+ 
Data from the 
organisation 
was not 
available. 
+ 
Large distributed 
customer database 
that is essential for 
business. 
- 
Viruses and worms. 
- 
Some user 
access 
abuse. 
 
 
 
Implementation of 
standards. 
+ 
 
 
Interdependent 
information with other 
organisations 
- 
Hackers. 
- 
 
 
 
 
Corporate policies 
and procedures. + 
 
 
ERP 
- 
 
 
   
 
Creation of an 
enterprise security 
manager. 
+ 
 
 
Emerging electronic 
delivery. 
- 
 
 
   
 
Firewalls. 
+ 
 
 
        AusCERT +   
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4.12.5 Summary and recommendations 
 
The organisation‟s overall security posture was very good. The organisation had 
conducted comprehensive risk assessment exercises and had implemented 
appropriate countermeasures to mitigate the identified risks. The interdependent 
relationships with other organisations did complicate their security environment to 
some degree – especially in regards to the sharing of sensitive data, however, the 
organisation implemented proactive steps to ensure the systems remained secure. The 
following recommendations are based on a comparison of the analysis of the current 
state of security in Case J with best practice as uncovered by the literature review 
(see chapter 2). If implemented the recommendations should significantly improve 
the organisation‟s security position: 
 
a. Benchmarking. Whilst the current security arrangements are very 
good the organisation should implement a process of monitoring 
trends and the measures employed at other organisations. By 
benchmarking their security against trusted peers within the utilities 
industry the organisation can help ensure that it remains in a strong 
position. The additional benefit is that IT staff will be able keep the 
business informed by making direct comparisons with other like 
organisations. 
 
  
c. Audit and investigation. As the organisation is involved in a 
facilities management arrangement an independent, external audit is 
recommended. This audit and investigation should include a review of 
the policies and procedures of the service provider. Security 
penetration testing should also be a priority to prove the robustness of 
the any security countermeasures employed. Once established the 
audit program should be undertaken regularly. 
 
 
Having completed the analysis of each of the ten cases the next section presents the 
findings of the cross-case analysis from which conclusions are drawn for each of the 
three research questions. 
4.13 Cross – case analysis 
 
This section documents the results of the cross-case analysis for this research. A 
summary of each of the disciplines, as defined in the literature review are presented. 
The conclusions about risks and management are drawn from the themes that 
emerged from the within case analysis and therefore quotations to support these 
findings have not been repeated. 
4.13.1 Risks – Reliance on IT 
 
This section discusses the conclusions regarding the research issues that address the 
risk component of the research problem. A broad cross-section of risks were 
identified for each of the ten organisations that participated in this research. 
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The major risks that emerged from the ten organisations in relation to their reliance 
on IT are summarised in table 4-23. Most of the risks re-occurred in two or more 
cases, therefore demonstrating literal replication logic (Yin 1994) (See chapter 3 
section 3.2.2). 
 
In summary, in eight of the ten organisations there were a group of core functions 
that relied upon IT. This indicated that the organisations themselves were at the very 
least reliant on IT, as the interruption of these functions would adversely impact the 
conduct of business operations. 
 
Eight of the ten organisations were able to demonstrate the linkage between their 
reliance on IT and the impact of the loss of IT on services. It was apparent that not 
only did the organisation‟s specific use of IT help determine the business impacts of 
the loss of IT, it also determined the amount of exposure to security risks that the 
organisation faced. 
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Table 4-23 Indicators of Risk – Reliance on IT 
 
Indicator Cases 
A B C D E F G H I J 
Office automation 
Financials       
Low reliance           
Payroll processing       
Intranet      
Document management       
Integration of telephone systems           
Logistics tracking          
Internet    
Very high reliance on IT         
Information a key resource          
Connection to business partners          
Customer ordering           
Workflow           
Billing and customer accounts           
High reliance on IT       
Used to develop company product           
Business not capable of working without IT           
Used in preference to face to face comms           
Reliance on IT outsourcing arrangement           
ERP         
Direct community access to systems           
 Shows the cases from which the indicator for risk emerged – as assessed 
by the organisation. 
 
Source: analysis of within-case analysis (all cases) 
 
 
4.13.2 Risks - Threats 
 
This next section presents the perceived threats that each of the ten cases believed 
they faced. The threats that emerged are summarised in table 4-24. Approximately 
half of the themes emerged in more than one case demonstrating literal replication. 
Of the threats where literal replication was not demonstrated it could be expected that 
the threats may have been present in the other organisations but were either not 
identified or were perhaps considered not important enough to mention. For example, 
a threat that was identified only by the Case I organisation that would clearly be 
applicable to most of the other cases is that of natural disaster. An earthquake, fire or 
flood could cause a serious disruption to the provision of reliable IT services. This 
could occur indirectly, such in the case of widespread power blackouts. These types 
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of circumstances are typically considered as part of Business Continuity Planning 
(BCP) rather than information security per se. 
 
Table 4-24 Risks – Threats 
 
Threat Cases 
A B C D E F G H I J 
Viruses 
Hackers     
Port scans          
System users    
Organised group of hackers          
Foreign governments          
Complacency           
Close integration of key applications           
Staff turn over           
Poor quality code           
Issue motivated groups           
Competitors           
Outsider from within (Library access)           
Natural disaster (earthquake, flood, fires)           
 Shows the cases from which the theme for risk emerged 
Source: analysis of within-case analysis (all cases) 
 
 
In summary three threats were identified by eight of the ten participating 
organisations. Hackers, viruses and system users were seen as the major threats faced 
by each organisation. As discussed earlier in the within-case analysis, organisations 
used a variety of methods, including formal risk assessments to identify the threats 
that were relevant to their businesses. 
 
4.13.3 Risks – Incidents 
 
This section presents data discovered regarding the actual information security 
incidents experienced by the ten case participants. The incidents that emerged are 
summarised in table 4-25. Only three of the incidents did not appear in more than 
one case, therefore demonstrating a high degree of literal replication among the other 
incidents. 
 
Table 4-25 Risk – Incidents 
 
Incident Cases 
A B C D E F G H I J 
Port scans          
Viruses 
System privelge abuse - users       
Chain e-mails/SPAM          
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Contractors abusing system privileges          
Hardware theft (e.g.Laptops)      
Hacking          
Data destruction           
Attacks from automated scripting tools           
Information leakage           

 Shows the cases from which the theme for risk emerged 
Source: analysis of within-case analysis (all cases) 
 
In summary, there were three types of incidents that were relevant across most 
organisations, namely; viruses (all organisations) , hardware theft (seven of ten) , and 
system access abuse by system users (six of ten). These results explain why most of 
the case organisations listed viruses as the key threat to the security of their systems; 
they actually experienced virus attacks more often any other security incident. 
Relatively few organisations reported incidents of hacker attacks despite several of 
the cases listing hackers as a credible threat to their business. At least two different 
conclusions can be drawn from this point. Firstly, the threat is not as significant as 
suggested by much of the literature (see chapter 2); or the countermeasures that each 
organisation puts in place effectively reduces the number of incidents. 
 
4.13.4 Risks - Australian business as targets 
 
This section summarises the responses of the case organisations regarding the 
likelihood of them being specifically targeted by would be attackers. The results for 
each of the ten cases is summarised in table 4-26. 
 
Table 4-26 Risk – The business as a target 
 
Security Risk Cases 
A B C D E F G H I J 
Believed they are a target         
Believed they were not a target      
 
 Shows the cases from which the theme for risk. 
Source: analysis of within-case analysis (all cases) 
 
 
As shown, two more organisations believed that they were not at risk (six), as 
specific targets than those (four) who believed they were subjected to dedicated 
targeting from attackers. It is important to emphasise that these results are based on 
the organisations perceptions or views, and in fact an organisation could be targeted 
and not know it. For example, a number of the cases believed that at most they would 
be considered targets of opportunity. If they were to not consistently employ 
countermeasures to reduce the general risk then security incidents could occur. This 
point of view is not always supportable based on the researcher‟s analysis of the 
cases. An organisation could be a specific target for any number of reasons. 
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4.13.5 Management – Countermeasures 
 
This next section presents the countermeasures discovered in relation to the 
countermeasures that were employed by each of the case organisations. The results 
for each of the ten cases are summarised in table 4-27 
 
The organisations responses regarding the countermeasures that they employed 
displayed a high degree of literal replication. Only five of the twenty 
countermeasures mentioned were adopted by a single case. The table and the 
responses illustrate that all organisations rely on anti-viral software and seven of the 
ten organisations employ security policies and firewalls to protect their systems. 
 
However, there were only a five of ten instances of organisations specifically 
matched the countermeasures that they employed with the perceived threats and 
incidents. This essentially demonstrates the lack of effective risk management and 
risk analysis that is undertaken to define the threat and then systematically counter 
that threat through the thoughtful application of policies and technology. 
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Table 4-27 Management - countermeasures 
Security Countermeasure Cases 
A B C D E F G H I J 
Freeware security tools                    
Anti-viral software 
Software firewalls                  
Security policies       
Procedures and work instructions for the use of IT             
Automated patch management of virus definitions                 
Hardware firewalls      
System access controls      
Capacity planning                    
Disaster recovery plans          
Reporting of incidents                  
Internal CERT capability                    
Software patch management                    
Security service provider                  
Full-time security manager               
Security auditing                
Linkage between threat and incidents identified                 
Physical security                 
Lotus Notes instead of Microsoft Exchange                   
AusCERT subscription                   
 
 Shows the cases from which the theme for management 
Source: analysis of within-case analysis (all cases) 
 
 
4.13.6 Management – Level of security budget 
 
This section summarises the responses briefly presents the responses regarding 
security budgets. The responses are summarised in table 4-28. In four of the ten 
organisations either no information or limited information was available from the 
cases regarding their security budget. Due to limited information about budgets it 
was deemed to be more informative to report on those organisations where a 
dedicated and separate security budget was in existence, rather than reporting on the 
actual amount of each budget as this information was either unknown, too sensitive, 
or was highly variable for any number of reasons. 
 
 
Table 4-28 Level of Security Budget – Security Budget 
 
Element of Management Security Budget Cases 
A B C D E F G H I J 
Does the case have a Identifiable security budget        
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separate security budget? No identifiable security budget          
 
 Shows the cases from which the theme for management emerged. 
Source: analysis of within-case analysis (all cases) 
 
 
In summary, four of the ten organisations did not have a recognisable security 
budget. Rather, they could however estimate a percentage of the overall IT budget 
that was spent on security or make an estimate based on their understanding of recent 
capital acquisitions. 
 
When comparing the qualitative and quantitative results in this area it was observed 
that all organisations (and all interviewees) provided a figure in response to the 
survey question (quantitative) regarding a figure for the organisation‟s information 
security budget. In the interviews the responses were far more general in nature. If 
the survey data were viewed in isolation from the interview data it would have been 
possible to assume that the organisations did have separate security budgets and that 
the interviewees had an intimate knowledge of the actual figures. The interview 
provided the opportunity to fully explore the nature of the information security 
budgeting process in each of the organisations. This allowed for a higher degree of 
confidence that the results listed in Table 4-28 are an accurate reflection of the state 
of budgeting in the organisations. 
 
4.13.7 Differentiators 
 
Differentiators have been previously defined as those themes, ideas or issues that 
may help to explain why each case organisation approaches information security in 
the way it does. In addressing the specific research issues, it was planned to see if  
differentiators would also explain if and why Australian businesses‟ security 
positions may be different to their international counterparts. Unlike the other 
elements previously compared in the cross-case analysis the researcher derived the 
differentiators after an analysis of all responses. The derived differentiators for each 
of the cases are summarised in table 4-29. 
 
As might be expected with a list of differentiators table 4-29 does not illustrate a high 
degree of literal replication between cases. Size, relationships with other 
organisations, and the value the business placed on information were each present as 
differentiators in three or more of the cases. The table demonstrates that whilst 
concern about information security issues is common across all organisations, each 
organisation is faced with a unique environment, which impacts on how it addresses 
its concerns. 
 
Table 4-29 Differentiators 
Differentiator Cases 
  A B C D E F G H I J 
Nature of the business           
Size        
Role of security professional           
Use of the Internet           
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Dispersed nature of the business           
Structure           
Value of organisational information          
Reliance on the Internet           
Reliance on IT           
Relationships with other organisations         
Lack of information security vision           
Lack of contingency planning           
Profile           
Access to new technology           
International footprint           
Interviewees           
Reliance on one central application           
Senior management attitude towards staff           
Lack of policies and procedures           
No IT management structure           
Some components can function without IT           
Use of open source products           
IT security a key part of the business           
Outsourcing arrangement           
Commonwealth Government department           
Responsible for Government IT policies           
New organisation           
Managed services           
Segregation of networks           
Multiple layers of firewalls           
International standards           
Government owned corporation           
Use of external auditors          
Local government           
Disaster recovery           
Small budget           
Many remote sites           
Mandated state security policy         
International offices           
Facilities management arrangements           
Focus on physical security           
High level of security knowledge           
Large customer base         
Public profile           
Service provider relationship          
 
Source: analysis of within-case analysis (all cases) 
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4.14 Summary 
 
This chapter reported the results of the data that were collected from the ten case 
organisations that participated in this research. Qualitative analysis techniques were 
applied to the in-depth interview transcripts to understand the risk management 
issues firstly, for each case, and secondly across all ten cases demonstrating literal 
replication. It was found that the top three issues of hardware theft, viruses, and 
system user access abuse were common across most organisations, and that the 
organisations had a variety of responses in terms of countermeasures to potentially 
defend against those threats and incidents. Additionally it was discovered that 
organisations did not have a rigorous approach to defining and managing separate 
information security budgets. 
 
In the next and final chapter, conclusions are drawn by comparing the findings 
presented in this chapter with the evidence from the literature that was presented in 
chapter 2. 
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CHAPTER 5 - CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
The purpose of this research was to investigate information security issues in 
Australian businesses. Chapter 1 outlined this research problem, highlighting the 
need to compare international information security issues with those found in 
Australia. This research was justified in terms of its importance to business and the 
lack of previous research regarding information security within the Australian 
business context. 
 
Chapter 2 reviewed the information security literature relating to the disciplines of 
risk management and information security and discussed a range of concepts and 
issues within information security. The literature was then reviewed in relation to 
information security threats, incidents, and countermeasures. From that literature, a 
model was developed depicting the relationship between security risks and 
management of those risks, including identified business-specific differentiators. The 
theoretical support for this model highlighted the expected types and effects of risks 
and risk management countermeasures. 
 
Chapter 3 outlined and justified the use of a multiple case study approach to collect 
data to address the research problem. The multiple case study design applied to this 
research was described, along with details of how the data were prepared for analysis 
and then analysed. 
 
The analysis of the data collected from the interviews with sixteen IT security 
professionals in ten organisations was presented in chapter 4. The results of the 
within-case analysis were presented for each case, followed by the results of the 
cross-case analysis. 
In this final chapter, firstly conclusions are drawn regarding the five research issues 
(RI): 
RI 1. How reliant are Australian organisations on their IT? 
RI 2. How is the threat to organisations‟ computers, data, and networks 
manifesting itself in Australian industry? 
RI 3. Is the information security threat greater in Australia? If so, why? 
RI 4. How are Australian organisations protecting their computers, data, and 
networks from information security risks? 
RI 5. What level of resource expenditure are Australian organisations 
committing to protect their systems and data? 
 
Secondly, implications of this research for theory and practice are discussed along 
with suggestions for future research. Conclusions will be derived through a 
comparison of case findings with the applicable literature (in chapter 2, section 2.3) 
and the data (in chapter 4 section 4.13). Finally, the limitations of this research are 
discussed. 
5.1 Conclusions about IT reliance 
This section presents conclusions about the first research issue: How reliant are 
Australian organisations on their IT? 
 
In particular the research issue is divided into two sub issues: 
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RI 1.1. How dependent are Australian organisations on their IT in terms of 
computing systems and the data that resides on those systems? 
RI 1.2. What is the likely impact of the loss of use of an organisation‟s IT 
capability? 
 
The following conclusions are drawn from a comparison of the evidence in the IT 
security literature (reviewed in chapter 2) with the results of the cross-case analysis 
(presented in section 4.13). 
 
This study uncovered additional information regarding organisational reliance on IT. 
As indicated in chapter 2 (literature review) and the previous chapter much of the 
existing data on information security is contained in quantitative research reports in 
magazine and newspaper articles as well as vendor sponsored material. Some of it 
tends to be superficial and potentially biased in nature – especially with regards to 
the last mentioned source. The qualitative approach of this research study enabled a 
more in-depth review of the level of reliance on IT within the case organisations, 
uncovering a greater level of detail in regards to what organisations actually used 
their technology for and how dependent they are on it. For example, this study found 
that even small organisations are now using computer systems to manage their 
financial data. According to much of the existing literature the management of this 
data has relied on manual book keeping methods. 
 
The existing literature describes IT reliance at the macro-level, for example, in terms 
of „Internet and Intranet‟ usage or in terms of general „computer use‟. The in-depth 
approach used by this study provided a better understanding of the overall reliance 
on IT by organisations and of how the loss of IT through an information security 
incident could impact the business. In the previous chapter each organisation‟s 
overall use of IT was assigned to a quadrant according to its fit within the McFarlan 
and McKenny strategic grid. In keeping with expectations this research found that 
the greater the importance of its current and future information systems to the 
organisation the greater the potential loss the organisation would face as a result of a 
serious information security incident. Even though this finding in itself may seem 
obvious, it highlights the need for organisations to conduct a fundamental analysis of 
the risk they face based on the importance of their information technology. 
 
Table 5-1 provides a summary of the responses given by the organisations when they 
asked what they used their IT for and how critical their IT was to the conduct of their 
core business. This then allowed an assessment to be made regarding the extent to 
which each business was reliant IT (see case summaries in chapter 4) and to 
determine if the organisations understood the relationship between use, reliance, and 
impact as depicted in Figure 2-7, section 2.3.5 of chapter 2.  
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Table 5-1 Indicators of IT reliance: this study’s findings versus the literature 
 
Indicators of IT Reliance Cases – This study’s findings Main 
emphasis 
in 
Literature A B C D E F G H I J 
Billing and customer accounts            
Business not capable of working without IT            
Connection to business partners            
Customer ordering (e-Commerce)           
Direct community access to systems            
Document management         
ERP           
Financials         
Information a key resource (Info Mgt Systems)            
Integration of telephone systems            
Internet     
Intranet        
Logistics tracking           
Office automation  
Payroll processing         
Implementation of an IT outsourcing arrangement            
Used in preference to face to face comms            
Used to develop company product            
Workflow            
 
Source: analysis of interview data, observation data and literature 
 
As shown in the table, the most prolific indicators of IT reliance in the literature and 
this research were: office automation, Internet use, and Intranet use. In comparison 
with this study‟s findings the literature identified only a limited number of indicators. 
This emphasises the contribution of this research to the detailed understanding of 
organisational reliance on IT. 
 
The research discovered indicators of IT reliance that were not present in the 
literature. As shown in Table 5-1, the following indicators of IT reliance surfaced in 
two or more of the organisations that participated in this research, suggesting that 
these factors may also be present in organisations generally: 
 Office automation (10 out of 10 organisations) 
 Financials (6 out of 10 organisations) 
 Payroll processing (6 out of 10 organisations) 
 Document management (6 out of 10 organisations) 
 ERP (3 out of 10 organisations) 
 Logistics tracking (2 out of 10 organisations) 
 Information a key resource (2 out of 10 organisations) 
 Connection to business partners (2 out of 10 organisations) 
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 Billing and customer accounts (2 out of 10 organisations) 
 Business not capable of working without IT (2 out of 10 
organisations) 
 
All ten organisations used their IT for office automation and most also used their 
systems to access the Internet. Three of the five medium-to-large organisations that 
took part in the research (500 + employees) had an ERP deployed that offered an 
integrated management system that included financials, payroll, and customer 
billing. Four of the six smaller organisations (less than 200 employees) used 
applications that were specifically designed for small business accounting and 
financial management – a best of breed approach. Based on the evidence provided, it 
is concluded that nine of the ten organisations that participated in the study are 
reliant on their IT. Only one organisation said it could continue to operate at a 
reasonable level of effectiveness without access to its information systems. 
 
The following indicators of IT reliance were reported once in this research. It is 
therefore planned to undertake further research in the future covering a larger 
number of organisations be undertaken to determine if these indicators have an 
impact on the overall reliance on systems, the assessed risk, and proposed response 
to those risks: 
 Integration of telephone systems 
 Customer ordering 
 Workflow 
 Used to develop company product 
 Used in preference to face-to-face communication 
 Implementation of an IT outsourcing arrangement 
 Direct community access to systems 
 
These factors tended to be either specific to an organisation  (such as providing direct 
access to organisational systems in the case of one organisation operating a 
community library), or involved emerging technology that had been implemented 
only by organisations that could be considered to be early adopters of technology 
(such as the integration of telephony and data systems). 
 
The summary and recommendation component of the within-case analysis presented 
in chapter four specified how reliant each organisation was on its technology. Having 
determined that the majority of organisations in this study (nine out of ten) were 
highly reliant on their IT systems it was then important to assess the impact of the 
loss of those systems. (This was achieved via analysis of the data gathered as part of 
this research). 
 
The literature indicated in very general terms that the impact of loss of systems 
would be related to the organisation‟s overall reliance on IT. This study provides 
additional evidence to support that rule of thumb. With the exception of one 
organisation, each case participant emphasised how their organisation‟s core 
business would be negatively impacted by the loss of its IT systems or data. The 
realisation of this point had led six of the organisations in the study to invest in 
disaster recovery and other business continuity initiatives. 
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In summary, this study on information security adds to the body of knowledge 
relating to organisational reliance on IT and the potential impact on organisations 
should they lose access to those systems. In addition, it expands on our ability to 
identify the extent of  IT reliance by reference to frameworks such as the McFarlan 
and McKenny strategic grid. The adoption of qualitative data collection techniques 
enabled significantly more data to be collected on what organisations were using 
their IT for. Further, it confirmed the link identified in chapter two, (section 2.3.5, 
Figure 2.7) between organisational use of IT, reliance on those systems, and the 
impact suffered if the systems were not available. Based on that additional 
information, this study‟s findings indicate that information security has not been 
adequately addressed in the literature and that the need for information security is 
still evolving and can be recognised by a growing number of emerging factors. 
 
Conclusions relating to information security threats are discussed next. 
5.2 Conclusions about threats 
 
This section presents conclusions about the second research question: How does the 
threat to organisations‟ computers, data, and networks manifest itself in Australian 
industry? 
 
This research issue was divided into three sub issues (RI): 
RI 2.1.What potential threats to computers, data, and networks are Australian 
organisations likely to face? (Potential security threats) 
RI 2.2. What threat(s) do Australian organisations perceive to be the most 
likely and prevalent/significant? (Perceived security threats) 
RI 2.3. What is the level of actual information security incidents in Australian 
organisations? (Actual security incidents) 
 
5.2.1 Potential security threats 
 
The following conclusions are drawn from a comparison of the evidence in the 
literature regarding the different types of information security threats (presented in 
chapter 2) with the results of the cross-case analysis (presented in section 4.13). 
 
The similarities and differences between the evidence in the literature and the 
findings of this research in relation to information are highlighted in table 5-2 below. 
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Table 5-2 Types of information security threats: this study’s findings versus the 
literature 
 
 
Threat Cases Literature 
A B C D E F G H I J 
Close integration of key applications                     
Competitors                   
Complacency                     
Foreign governments               
Hackers      
Issue motivated groups                   
Natural disaster (earthquake, flood, fires)                     
Organised group of hackers               
Outsider from within (Library access)                     
Poor quality code                     
Port scans                 
Staff turn over                     
System users      
Viruses  
Source: analysis of interview data, observation data and literature 
 
Organisations were asked to identify what the complete list of information security 
threats were. These included a number of information security threats that were not 
discussed in the literature (thus adding to previous research on information security). 
The following threats surfaced in more than one case, suggesting that they may be 
common to organisations generally. 
 Port scans 
 Foreign governments 
 Hackers 
 Organised groups of hackers 
 System users 
 Viruses 
 
The literature‟s inconsistent use of terms used to describe information security issues 
and in particular threats increases the difficulty of the classification of threats. For 
example, the literature also refers to port scans as hacking attempts or as the use of 
automated scripting and analysis tools. It could be argued that rather than a type of 
threat in itself, these two could be classified as methods of hacking. 
 
The following threats were reported only once in this research and therefore 
additional research will be needed to assess their importance: 
 Complacency 
 Staff-turn over 
 Poor quality code 
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 Outsider within 
 Natural disaster 
 
The literature suggests that organisations face a wide variety of potential threats and 
that these threats are serious in nature. In particular the literature defines viruses, 
hacking and internal threats to be the major threats faced by organisations. The 
internal versus external categorisation should be seen to be a macro classification in 
that both threats can be made up of a variety of other threats such as viruses, hacking 
and the like 
 
Eight of the organisations that participated in this study reported that viruses, 
hackers, and internal system users are the main threats to their systems, (all ten 
indicated viruses as a potential threat). While this study confirmed the literature‟s 
view of the „core‟ potential threats to security as viruses, hackers, and insiders, it also 
identified nine additional potential threats (see table 5-2). 
 
5.2.2 Perceived security threats 
 
In order to investigate research issue 2.2 the organisations were asked to name the 
threats that they perceived that they were likely to face and the ones that they deemed 
to be the most significant (i.e. the ones that can potentially cause the most harm to an 
organisation‟s information systems).  
 
A comparison between the perceived threats from this study‟s findings and the 
literature is presented in Table 5-3 below. Participant selected the threats deemed to 
be the most likely were from the list of potential threats. They recognised that whilst 
there may be a very wide selection of potential threats, their business were likely to 
be subjected only to a limited sub set of those threats. Therefore, for risk 
management purposes they would dedicate their limited resources to defending 
against those threats that were most likely to be encountered and that would cause 
the most significant damage.  
 
Table 5-3 Types of security threats: this study’s findings versus the literature 
 
 
Security Risk Cases Literature 
A B C D E F G H I J 
Viruses  
Hackers     
System Users      
Source: analysis of interview data, observation data and literature 
 
A review of the literature (see chapter 2, section 2.3.1) identified the most significant 
threats in the following order: 
 Hackers 
 System users 
 Viruses 
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They are the threats that are reported as being perceived as being of greatest concern 
to organisations. 
 
While this study uncovered the same perceived significant threats it revealed a 
difference in the order of importance of these key threats. It found that the most 
significant perceived threats in order of importance are: 
 Viruses 
 System users 
 Hackers 
 
Due to identified perceived significance of each of these threats specific findings and 
comments regarding each of these three threats follow. 
 
(i) Viruses 
In this research, viruses were determined to be the major threat to Australian 
computing systems. There is an increasing level of concern regarding the 
growing number and the potential impact that viruses can have on an 
organisation‟s information security posture. The findings of this research support 
the literature‟s position that viruses are commonplace and that they are increasing 
in number, and the potential detrimental impact that they can have on computer 
systems is also increasing. However, this study‟s evidence placed viruses ahead 
of all other threats in terms of perceived prevalence and significance. 
 
(ii) System users 
This research provided additional insight into the threat posed by internal system 
users: that is, employees of an organisation as being a significant threat. Findings 
uncovered that there was a perception that system users frequently created 
security incidents due to a lack of diligence in following system processes and 
procedures. However, most organisations indicated that an increased awareness 
of policies and countermeasures had reduced their concern about the internal 
threat. 
 
The literature on the other hand tended to focus on deliberate, malicious acts of 
hacking or hacking-like activities perpetrated by internal system users. It 
emphasised the significance of the threat faced from system users and highlighted 
how internal system users could potentially use their authorised access to the 
system to create other forms of threats, (e.g. as an internal person launching a 
hacker attack).  
 
This research confirmed that organisations believed system users were a threat.  
This research differed from the literature in that it revealed that the perceptions 
are that system users are more likely to be a threat as a result of ignorance of or 
failure to adhere to system policies rather than any deliberate or malicious act. 
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(iii) Hackers and Hacking 
The literature provided numerous examples (see section 2.3.13) of serious 
hacker attacks on a variety of organisations‟ computer systems. That 
quantitative data gathered in industry-based surveys summarised in chapter 2. 
The findings of this study‟s qualitative research supports these reports,, (i.e. 
organisations are concerned about the hacker threat).  Eight out of the ten 
organisations perceived that hackers were a threat to their business and as 
such considered it appropriate to consider the hacking threat when 
formulating their security plans. 
 
However as discussed in section 5.2.3, despite this strongly held perception, 
there appear to be few serious hacker related incidents.. 
 
5.2.3 Actual security incidents 
 
This section deals with research issue 2.3, the level of information security incidents 
actually encountered by Australian organisations. 
 
The following conclusions are drawn from a comparison of the evidence in the 
literature regarding information security threats (presented in chapter 2, section 
2.3.1) with the results of the cross-case analysis (presented in section 4.13). 
 
Table 5-4 below summarises the type of incidents actually experienced by the 
organisations that participated in this research as well as an indication as to whether 
the type of incident was mentioned in the literature (i.e. the literature which provided 
quantitative evidence of organisations reporting actual security incidents). 
 
 
Table 5-4 Information security incidents: this study’s findings versus the 
literature 
 
Incident Cases Literature 
A B C D E F G H I J 
Attacks from automated scripting tools                   
Chain e-mails/SPAM                   
Contractors abusing system privileges                   
Data destruction                   
Hacking (exclusing port scans)               
Hardware theft (e.g.Laptops)       
Information leakage                     
Port scans                  
System privilege abuse by users          
Viruses  
 
Source: analysis of interview data, observation data and literature 
 
For the purposes of this research it was important to separate potential and perceived 
threats from those actually experienced by Australian organisations. With most of the 
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literature being comprised of newspaper reports and vendor sponsored articles, 
distinction between the types of threats and their relationship to the actual incidents 
experienced by organisations is often not clear. 
 
The table above indicates that viruses are the most prevalent form of security 
incident. This confirms that the perceived threat matches the incidents experienced 
by the organisation. Section 2.3.11 highlighted that there was a large difference in 
the literature in the percentage of organisations encountering virus incidents (from 
49% up to 90%). The different results could be due to varying methodologies used in 
the conduct of the research. For example, this qualitative approach allowed for a 
definition to be presented and discussed as well as allowing it to be assessed. This 
study found that all participants had encountered virus incidents.  
 
Table 5-4 also shows that seven of the participating organisations had incidents of IT 
hardware theft. It is interesting to note that no organisation mentioned this when 
listing the threats. This could perhaps indicate a lack of analysis regarding the 
potential consequences (risks) associated with security threats. For example, the theft 
of a laptop computer could give access to an organisation‟s systems or to confidential 
data stored on it. The evidence available in the literature suggests that the theft of IT 
equipment is a serious issue (Brinery, 1998; Thompson, 1998; Rapalus, 2000). The 
literature, does however, lack detailed analysis of the issue. It does not separate theft 
of easily-removed assets with thefts that could be the part of a larger security 
incident (e.g. the theft of a laptop computer that is later used to remotely access the 
organisation‟s computer systems). 
 
The other significant difference between the threat and the actual incidents is that 
despite the perception of high frequency, relatively few organisations actually 
experienced a hacker related incident. Eight of the organisations rated the hacker 
threat as high but didn‟t have any evidence that this type of incident had occurred in 
their organisations. When this point was made during interviews with the participants 
it became clear that the organisations‟ perceptions are not based on their own 
experiences, but are based on reported incidents from other organisations, from the 
press, and vendor marketing. 
 
There is a higher level of incidents reported in the literature than was uncovered in 
this study, i.e. the actual level of incidents experienced by the participating 
organisations.  The literature reported an increase in the number of reported hacker 
incidents in recent years (from single digits per year to several thousand). What is not 
clear in the literature is if this is due to a rise in hacker incidents, or from better/more 
consistent reporting, or even from an increase in the number of people asking 
questions regarding hacking. 
 
As has been noted, there was no correlation between the perceived hacker threat and 
the actual rate of hacker related incidents within the organisations.  One 
interpretation of this finding is that the literature itself is influencing the perceptions 
of organisations. They read reports about the severity of the hacker problem and 
assume it is an issue for their business too. This is a key insight of this research. 
 
The findings of this study suggest that organisations should take a more specific 
approach in determining what threats are relevant to their business. For example, by 
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reviewing information security threats based on the likelihood of a threat actually 
occurring and by assessing the impact of that incident on the organisation (i.e. risk 
assessment). This approach in itself will allow organisations to better understand the 
risk versus countermeasure equation, and therefore enable them to make more 
informed decisions regarding their investments in information security; allowing 
them to migrate from „I think‟ to „I know‟ based decision making. 
 
Conclusions about Australian businesses as information security targets are discussed 
next. 
 
5.3 Conclusions about Australian businesses as targets 
 
This section presents conclusions about the third research issue: Are Australian 
organisations being targeted? If so why? 
 
In particular this research issue was divided into two sub issues: 
 
RI 3.1. In comparison with the international experience, is there any difference in 
the extent to which Australian organisations are being targeted for information 
security related attacks? 
RI 3.2. If so, what are the identifiable differentiators? 
 
The conclusions are drawn from a comparison of the evidence in the literature 
regarding the potential of Australian businesses as targets (presented in Chapter 2) 
with the results of the cross-case analysis (presented in section 4.13) 
 
5.3.1 Information security incidents: Australia vs. overseas 
 
This research has attempted to add to the body of knowledge in this area by 
specifically identifying potential reasons (or differentiators) as to why Australian 
organisations may be targeted. In comparison with the majority of studies contained 
in the literature is that study, being qualitative in nature, allowed more 
comprehensive answers to be given in response to the interview question. 
The literature suggests that Australian businesses are the specific targets of 
information security attacks. As Australian businesses adopt new technology and rely 
upon IT to underpin their business the literature implies that the chances of 
Australian organisations being targeted increase (Rapalus, 2000). As mentioned in 
chapter 1 (section 1.3) the body of knowledge on information security contains a 
number of comparative quantitative surveys that compare organisations who are 
targeted in various parts of the world. There is empirical evidence that indicates that 
as organisations have implemented Internet and e-Commerce based technologies the 
rate of security incidents has increased (Kearvekk-White, 1996; Lichtenstein, 1998; 
Rapalus, 2000; Power, 2000a). 
 
Table 5-5, below illustrates that in both the literature and this study there were 
instances where organisations felt that they were specific targets. However, there 
were also organisations in both that believed they were not specific targets. 
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Table 5-5 Target status: this study’s findings versus the literature 
 
Target Status Cases Literature 
A B C D E F G H I J 
Believed they are a target             
Believed they were not a 
target          
 
Source: analysis of interview data, observation data and literature 
 
In order to understand the Australian information security environment, and to 
properly address this research issue it was necessary to identify why organisations 
either feel they are targeted or not. The four organisations that believed they were 
specifically targeted gave the following as reasons why they felt they were targeted: 
 Foreign governments are interested in their business 
 The nature of the organisation‟s business makes them a potential 
target 
 Because they are connected to the Internet 
 High profile organisation with a potential high pay-off if the attack is 
successful 
 Profile of the organisation 
 Weaknesses in outsourcing agreement(s) – where there is unclear 
accountability regarding security responsibilities. 
 
This belief resulted in a series of comprehensive countermeasures aimed at 
specifically defeating the aforementioned threats. 
 
The six organisations in this study that did not believe they were specific targets of 
any specific threat gave these reasons for their belief: 
 Competitors do not have the technical expertise to defeat firewalls 
 Organisation maintains a low profile and potentially sensitive 
information is not on Internet-connected machines 
 Not an interesting target for would-be attackers 
 No evidence of being a specific or dedicated target 
 
The organisations that fell into this latter group believed that if they were targeted it 
would be an opportunistic rather than a dedicated attack. This belief resulted in the 
application of standard countermeasures to ensure that the organisation‟s security 
posture was adequate. 
 
This study agrees with the previous research that Australian organisations can be 
specific targets of information security attacks. However, this study found that the 
majority of organisations studied (i.e. six out of 10) believed that they were not 
specific targets; rather they were more likely to be subjected to random opportunistic 
attacks. 
 
Previous research does not specifically indicate reasons for Australian businesses 
being considered as targets, other than the growing proliferation of technology into 
standard business operations. The literature suggests that Australian businesses are 
subjected to less attacks than businesses in countries such as the United States of 
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America or United Kingdom. However, it also suggests that Australian organisations 
were less likely to employ sufficient countermeasures (Thompson, 1997; Kearvell-
White, 1996; Rapalus, 2000). 
 
In summary, this study adds to the body of knowledge on information security by 
providing a more definitive and descriptive answer regarding the targeting of 
Australian businesses. The study has determined that even though Australian 
organisations may be specific targets of information security attacks, the majority of 
organisations studied (i.e. six out of 10) believed that they were not specific targets 
and that any attack would be random and opportunistic. 
 
5.3.2 Differentiators 
 
As stated in chapter 4, this research identified a number of potential differentiators 
that could explain or justify an organisation‟s information security posture. It 
determined that an organisation typically has a unique set of differentiators that 
determined its security posture. Additionally, those organisations that believed that 
they were specifically targeted could identify key differentiators that led to that 
targeting. Each organisation had made the point that it was its unique set of 
differentiators that either made it a specific target or not. 
 
Table 5-6 below summarises the assessed differentiators for each of the 
organisations. 
 
Table 5-6 Differentiators: this study’s findings versus the literature 
 
Differentiator Cases Literature 
  A B C D E F G H I J 
Access to new technology                     
Commonwealth Government department                     
Disaster recovery capability                   
Dispersed nature of the business                     
Facilities management arrangements – 
how data centres are managed and 
secured                 
Focus on physical security – how 
organisations take steps to secure 
computing facilities with locked rooms, 
limited access, etc.                 
Government owned corporation                     
High level of security knowledge                 
International footprint                     
International offices                 
International standards                     
Interviewees                     
IT security a key part of the business                     
Lack of contingency planning                     
Lack of information security vision                     
Lack of policies and procedures                     
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Large customer base                
Local government                   
Managed services                     
Mandated state security policy              
Many remote sites                   
Multiple layers of firewalls                     
Nature of the business                 
New organisation                     
No IT management structure                     
Outsourcing arrangement                     
Profile                     
Public profile                 
Relationships with other organisations                
Reliance on IT                 
Reliance on one central application                     
Reliance on the Internet                 
Responsible for Government IT policies                     
Role of security professional                     
Segregation of networks                     
Senior management attitude towards staff                     
Service provider relationship                      
Size            
Small budget                   
Some components can function without IT                     
Structure                     
Use of external auditors                 
Use of open source products                 
Use of the Internet                 
Value of organisational information               
 
Source: analysis of interview data, observation data and literature 
 
The literature provided limited data on potential organisational differentiators. It 
focused on organisations being „targets of opportunity‟ rather than being the focus of 
a dedicated attack. As stated previously, the quantitative nature of much of the 
research literature meant that questions such as how and why respondents answered 
questions in the manner that they did was not known. This study‟s qualitative 
approach supports those earlier the findings, however; with the benefit of in-depth 
follow up questions, it also uncovered that some organisations could be the victims 
of dedicated attacks. 
 
There appears to be some anecdotal evidence that suggests that the major security 
threat, viruses, tends to infect systems based on the international time zone, as this 
was mentioned by a number of the participants. Essentially, this results in major 
virus outbreaks impacting in the Northern Hemisphere first, allowing some time 
(albeit limited) for Australian organisations to proactively respond to the threat 
before it becomes an actual threat here.  
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The spread of the participants‟ business was seen as a key-determining factor in the 
extent to which they were exposed to threats. For example a multi-national company 
would have significantly more exposure to security risks in comparison to a small 
organisation operating only in Australia. 
 
As much of the research recorded in the literature has been conducted in the United 
States or the United Kingdom, it was considered important to identify differentiators 
that might make Australian information security different. There differences in 
themselves are general in nature and should be read in compare and contrast fashion. 
For example, there are far more large multinational organisations operating out of the 
America and Europe than in Australia. 
 
A number of differentiators were identified that could explain divergence from the 
international norm. These included: 
 Nature of the business 
 Size 
 Use of the Internet 
 Value of organisational information 
 Relationships with other organisations 
 Use of open source products 
 Use of external auditors 
 Mandated state security policy. 
 
From a practitioners point of view this information is important as it should influence 
the security countermeasures that an Australian organisation may decide to employ. 
 
As noted in section 4.13.7, there was not a high degree of literal replication between 
the 10 cases in this study. This highlights the point that each organisation has unique 
security issues.  This realisation raises issues regarding how security consultants 
should approach their assignments. Thus it is important that security professionals do 
not simply apply a standard approach based on their previous experience in other 
organisations. The unique aspects of each organisation need to be identified and 
addressed. Conclusions about countermeasures are discussed next. 
5.4 Conclusions about countermeasures 
 
This section presents conclusions about the fourth research issue: How are 
organisations protecting their computing, data, and networks from security threats? 
 
Thus far this chapter has addressed the information security risks that the participants 
believe they face or that have actually experienced. This section addresses the 
countermeasures that the 10 case organisations have employed in order to protect 
their organisations against the risks. 
 
This research found (section 4.3) that there was frequently little correlation between 
an organisation‟s perceived threat posture and the actual countermeasures that the 
organisation employed. One possible reason could be the low instance of 
organisations conducting formal threat and risk assessment tailored to their 
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organisation (as indicated in their responses to the questions). This of course, 
increases the risk of making erroneous information security investment decisions. 
 
Only three of the research participants (i.e. B, C and I) could demonstrate a linkage 
between their perceived threats, the actual threats, and the countermeasures that they 
employed. This potentially indicates that there is insufficient risk analysis being 
conducted to ensure that investment decisions are being made correctly. 
 
As shown in Table 5-7, the majority of countermeasures employed by the 
participating organisations were discussed in the literature. This research did, 
however, uncover additional details regarding how organisations deployed their 
countermeasures. For example, this research revealed that while all the case 
organisations use anti-viral countermeasures only a few used sophisticated 
management processes and technologies to ensure that the anti-virus definitions were 
up to date. 
 
Table 5-7 Countermeasures employed: this study’s findings versus the literature 
 
Security Countermeasure Cases Literature  
A B C D E F G H I J 
Anti-viral software   
AusCERT subscription                      
Automated patch management of virus definitions                  
Capacity planning                     
Disaster recovery plans            
Freeware security tools                      
Full-time security manager                 
Hardware firewalls        
Internal CERT capability                      
Linkage between threat and incidents identified                  
Lotus Notes instead of Microsoft Exchange                      
Physical security                  
Procedures and work instructions for the use of IT               
Reporting of incidents                   
Security auditing                 
Security policies          
Security service provider                    
Software firewalls                   
Software patch management                     
System access controls        
 
Source: analysis of interview data, observation data and literature 
 
Table 5-7 depicts the variety of countermeasures that are available to an organisation 
to deploy. The cases have a good representation of both hardware and infrastructure-
related countermeasures, as well as the „softer‟ countermeasures such as people and 
policies. The organisations that had the most comprehensive approach to information 
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security issues (i.e., organisations B, C, and I) demonstrated good alignment between 
threats, incidents, and countermeasures. In the area of countermeasures, policies and 
procedures were used to underpin the infrastructure-based countermeasures such as 
firewalls. For example, in order for firewalls to be deemed appropriately managed 
they need to have policies that dictated how they should be configured the types of 
attack they are intended to resist. The procedures should indicate how, when, and by 
whom are applied. 
 
The countermeasures listed in table 5.7 that were reported only by a single 
organisation warrant investigation in a larger study. These are: 
 AusCERT subscription 
 Use of an internal CERT capability 
 Freeware security tools 
 Lotus Notes used instead of Microsoft Exchange 
 Software patch management 
 
The use of CERT capabilities within case organisation „C‟ provided an insight into 
some of the differences between the literature and this research as well as the 
differences between the Australian and the international experience. The literature 
presented numerous examples of organisations using the CERT subscriptions to 
supplement their internal security expertise. This study, however, uncovered a 
general apathy towards the use of the recognised Australian CERT agency, 
AusCERT. Respondents believed that they offered a lower than their international 
equivalents. Some organisations stated that they believed because security 
vulnerabilities tended to follow the international dateline they would be better served 
by using a North American agency such as CANCERT. One organisation, the largest 
of the participants, had an internal CERT capability of their own. 
 
The range of countermeasures that organisations employ is an indication of how 
comprehensive the security management process is within an organisation. The 
above table provides two indications of the extent of each participant‟s risk 
management process. Firstly, a review of the linkage between threats and 
countermeasures indicates which organisations have implemented a countermeasure 
based on a specific threat. Secondly, more countermeasures generally indicate 
greater complexity and comprehensiveness in the organisation‟s security program. 
 
From an information systems security management point of view the output of tables 
5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6 indicate the overall risk posture. If the risk analysis 
(information security parent discipline: see chapter 2, section 2.3) has been 
conducted appropriately, the output countermeasures should be those listed in table 
5.7. The importance of aligning the various components of the information security 
landscape by matching the organisation‟s defined risks with an appropriate set of 
countermeasures is a key contribution of this research. 
 
Table 5.4 illustrates that all the organisations are experiencing issues with viruses 
and that they are the most significant and prevalent threat. Reference to tables 5.4 
and 5.7 indicates that all the organisations employed anti-viral countermeasures. 
However only three employed automated patch management to protect against 
known vulnerabilities and only one had a defined software patch management 
process that enabled it to stay ahead of the virus/trojan/exploit cycle. The findings 
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suggested that all the organisations could improve their security posture by being 
more proactive in updating operating systems, applications and virus definition files. 
 
One organisation had taken into account that many of the virus exploits are designed 
to take advantage of vulnerabilities in Microsoft‟s exchange e-mail platform. To 
avoid these vulnerabilities and the cost associated with the management of updates 
they had chosen to use Lotus Notes as their preferred e-mail server and client. A 
review of primary and secondary evidence suggested that they did have fewer virus 
related incidents that were associated with e-mail deliveries and exploits – 
vindicating the organisation‟s selection of the alternative e-mail platform. 
 
Conclusions about security budgets are discussed next. 
5.5 Conclusions about security budgets 
 
This section presents conclusions with regard to the final research issue: What level 
of resource expenditure are Australian organisations committing to protect their 
systems and data? 
 
This research found that organisations were either reluctant or were unable to give 
the exact details of their security budgets. However table 5-8 below shows that six of 
the ten organisations could readily demonstrate that they had a specific information 
security budget. (This table and table 4-28 were developed after the review of 
interview transcripts, exit surveys, and secondary data analysis).  
 
Table 5-8 Security Budgets: this study’s findings versus the literature 
 
Security Budget Cases Literature 
A B C D E F G H I J 
Identifiable security budget         
No identifiable security budget            
 
Source: analysis of interview data, observation data and literature 
 
As all the organisations employed some form of information security 
countermeasure, they all had some form of budget for security products and or 
services. The amount of the budget often was not available as there was not a clear 
separation of information security funds from other IT expenditure. For example, one 
of the organisation‟s IT infrastructure was managed through an outsourcing 
agreement where they simply paid one fee for all services. As part of that fee the 
outsourcing company was expected to deploy a range of information security 
countermeasures. 
 
Information security resource research (see chapter 2, section 2.3.4) states that 45% 
of Australian organisations don‟t have an information security budget. This study 
provides support for the literature to the extent that whilst all the organisations have 
some form of information security resource expenditure, 40% do not and budget for 
that type of expenditure separately from other IT expenditure (see table 5-8). 
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It was evident that there was difficulty in all the organisations in justifying 
expenditure based on Return on Investment (ROI) for security related projects. This 
coupled with the lack of robust threat and risk assessment meant that even business-
critical information security initiatives were hard to justify (unless there was a clear 
understanding of the cost of the potential losses). There was no evidence in any of 
the case organisations of a successful methodology for identifying ROI for security 
initiatives. From a business management perspective no evidence was uncovered of 
performance management or Key Performance Indicators (KPI) that were based on 
achieving information security outcomes. 
 
The absence of a detailed security budget in four of the organisations highlights a 
flaw in much of the popular data on information security literature which reported 
losses as a result of security incidents. This research indicated that it was certainly 
not being used to justify, at least successfully, additional investment in information 
security. 
 
A final difference between the literature and the findings of this qualitative, interview 
based research! The literature reported on quantitative surveys highlighting the 
increasing trend of organisations to devote more resources to information security 
issues. In most cases the interview respondents were willing to discuss in general 
terms the nature of, or even present documentary evidence on their security budgets. 
However, none of the organisations provided resource expenditure data that 
correlated facts with that information put forward in chapter 2. Information security 
expenditure is therefore considered to be worthy of further research outside the 
context of this study. 
 
5.6 Implications for theory 
 
Through the development and testing of a model to investigate the effects of 
information security within the Australian business context, this research makes the 
following five contributions to theory: 
 
 It was the first comprehensive qualitative-based investigation into 
information security in Australia 
 Its innovative use of technology and in particular the Internet, to gather data 
(via virtual interviews) enabled increased confidence in the findings via data 
triangulation 
 It is the first study to investigate a broad spectrum of information security 
issues within the framework of Australian business 
 It explored the relevance to the Australian context of existing information 
security theories 
 It confirms the appropriateness of case studies in obtaining rich data to assist 
in the understanding of information security issues. 
 
A discussion of each of these five contributions follows. 
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5.6.1 Qualitative based research 
 
As introduced in chapter 1, section 1.3, and subsequently addressed throughout, this 
research is distinctive in its use of qualitative research to gain a better understanding 
of the Australian information security scene. The review of the current literature 
(chapter 2) showed that most of the research in the field is quantitative, and as such 
without specific context, resulting in a general lack of understanding as to around 
why certain responses may have been given in survey-based studies. The qualitative 
research paradigm addresses the why and the how to explored, not just the what (Yin 
1994).  
 
While there has been considerable research in an international context, there has been 
no previous major qualitative study focusing on the information security issues faced 
by Australian businesses. 
 
5.6.2  Innovative use of technology 
 
The use of a qualitative research methodology in this study was underpinned by an 
innovative use of Internet based technologies to supplement traditional interview and 
survey techniques. During the pilot research phase it became clear that the potentially 
sensitive nature of information security meant that some organisations may be 
reluctant to divulge certain facts. To overcome this issue a web based virtual 
interview was developed to follow the same structure and guidelines as those of the 
face-to-face in-depth interviews. In all cases it was found to be an extremely 
effective tool in gathering high quality data. It was found that the respondents often 
put forward more comprehensive, targeted responses to interview questions than 
those given in normal interview conditions. Whilst the reason for this is not entirely 
clear, it may be that the virtual interview provides a perceived degree of anonymity. 
 
It allowed respondents to consider their answers as well as seek facts to back up their 
statements rather than feeling the need to give an instant response. 
 
Data collection and accuracy was improved at the completion of the virtual interview 
by directing respondents to a quantitative „exit‟ survey that was aimed at 
triangulating the responses given as part of the interview. 
 
 
5.6.3 Broad approach 
 
As far as could be ascertained, this study is the first of its kind to take a broad 
approach to the investigation of information security issues faced by Australian 
organisations. Thus, one of its contributions is that it provides a more complete 
understanding of information security within Australia. This was especially so with 
regard to the link between information security risks and the management of those 
risks. 
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5.6.4 Use of existing theories 
 
This research made use of the existing theories in information security in order to 
determine where a gap in literature existed and to help create a research framework 
to apply to the collection and analysis of data. The literature review (chapter 2) 
highlighted the lack of detailed qualitative research in information security it was in 
addressing this gap, this research examined existing theories to create a research 
framework to apply to the collection and analysis of data. As recommended in 
section 5.7 that framework provides practitioners with a rigorous approach for 
managing their information security environment. 
 
5.6.5 Appropriateness of case study research 
 
There is a growing body of research that indicates that the qualitative paradigm will 
assist in increasing our understanding of issues facing IS researchers and 
practitioners (Benbasat, Goldstein & Mead 1987; Franz & Robey 1987, Lee 1989, 
Cavaye 1996; Doolin 1996; Trauth 1997). The successful application of this multiple 
case study design to collect data to examine the information security issues in 
Australian business provides additional support for the appropriateness of case study 
research for the discipline of IS.  
5.7 Implications for practice 
 
The application of this study‟s information security framework will enable an 
organisation to obtain a detailed understanding of its information security 
environment, and then to take appropriate steps to manage that environment. This 
framework can also be applied as an information security awareness and 
improvement program. The stages of the security framework (that was developed 
and implemented in the collection and analysis of data for this study) are: 
 
Stage 1 – Identify Information Security Risks 
 
a. Determine the organisation‟s reliance on IT. 
b. Assess what the potential information security threats are to the 
organisation. 
c. Determine if the organisation could be at risk (or a specified target) 
due to the nature of its business. 
d. Conduct an audit of information security incidents that the 
organisation has experienced in its recent history. 
e. Assess the likelihood of any differentiators that may create a situation 
where the organisation has a different information security posture to 
that of other Australian organisations. 
f. The output of this stage is a Threat and Risk Assessment. 
 
Stage 2 – Management of the Security Risks 
 
a. Identify what the current information security countermeasures are 
that are used within the organisation. 
b. Conduct a gap analysis to determine if the countermeasures employed 
make sense in comparison to identified risks. 
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c. Conduct an assessment of the information security budget and match 
it to organisational countermeasures plan. 
d. The output of this stage is a list of required countermeasures and an 
information security budget estimate. 
 
Stage 3 – Action Plan  
 
In the final stage a plan is developed for the implementation of the 
countermeasures to ensure the organisation can overcome the threats and 
risks identified in stage 1 with the countermeasures highlighted in stage 2. 
The on-going monitoring of the effectiveness of the plan is essential. 
 
5.8 Implications for future research 
 
Suggestions for future research to further the body of knowledge in relation to 
information security in Australia were provided in sections 5.1 to section 5.5. This 
section deals with three further recommendations for future research: a longitudinal 
study, a detailed comparison between information security issues in another country 
(for example the US or UK), and the use of experimental research techniques. These 
implications for future research address the limitations of this research discussed in 
section 1.6.  
 
Longitudinal study. Information security issues and the strategies that organisations 
employ to manage those issues change over time. Therefore, the collection of time 
series data would provide a greater depth of understanding of information security 
issues. A longitudinal study of the implementation of the best practice information 
security management practices (see stages 1 to 3 above) would allow an assessment 
of the impact of this study‟s model especially with regards to organisational 
information security weaknesses and the practical countermeasures to address 
identified risks. 
 
Comparison of information security across different countries. This research 
explored information security within the Australian business context. As this 
research has shown, there are a number of differences between Australian 
information security issues and those reported in the literature for in North America. 
Future research could compare the findings of this research with similar research 
undertaken in organisations in another country. For the comparison to be valid the 
research methodology used in this study would need to be adopted. 
 
Experimental research techniques. At times in this research reference has been 
made to the perception of threats and some of the findings have been presented in 
anecdotal form. As such there is an opportunity for the conduct of experiments into 
information security focusing on the nature of information security attacks, perhaps 
through the establishment of computer systems that could be open for attack or 
where „would-be‟ computer hackers are „invited‟ to attempt to exploit security 
vulnerabilities. 
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5.9 Limitations of this study 
 
Limitations of this research were discussed in sections 1.6. This section outlines two 
further limitations that should be noted in relation to the findings of this research: 
that the results are not generalisable; and that the data were collected over a period of 
two years, and analysed in the third year. „Write up‟ occurred subsequently. 
 
Results not generalisable. A weakness of case research is that the findings cannot be 
generalised across populations (Yin 1994; Cavaye 1996). As case studies were used 
in this research, no attempt has been made to statistically generalise the results across 
all organisations in Australia.  
 
Duration of the study. Data were collected for this research in 2002 and 2003 with 
the analysis conducted in 2004. The time taken for data collection and subsequent 
analysis and „write up‟ was unavoidable due to excessive work commitments. 
However, constant updates of the literature were conducted to ensure that changes in 
the information security environment over the course of the study were taken into 
account. As the field is constantly changing – the data collection time frames must be 
considered when making conclusions regarding the current issues facing similar 
Australian organisations. 
 
5.10 Concluding remarks 
 
In summary, this research provided insights into information security in the 
Australian business context through the investigation of organisational reliance on 
IT; information security threats; actual incidents; countermeasures; Australian 
businesses as targets; and information security budgets. A qualitative, case based 
research methodology was used. Prior to this research much of the data used to drive 
information security management decisions were based either on quantitative 
research or from studies conducted overseas. Through the development of a 
theoretical framework, a pragmatic methodology for uncovering information security 
issues was created. It enables an in-depth understanding of an organisation‟s 
information security posture to be gained. As a result, this research has made several 
significant contributions to both information security theory and practice. 
 
The major findings with regard to this study's research issues are: 
 
 The case-study organisations are generally highly reliant on IT for the 
conduct of their business and therefore would be heavily impacted if it was 
unavailable 
 They face a variety of information security threats with viruses being the 
most prevalent threat. The hacking threat was not as evident as reported in the 
literature 
 There are some differences between the Australian information security 
experience and that reported in the literature for international organisations in 
particular many of the very large business overseas operate on a much larger 
scale than those in Australia 
 The organisations do not believe that they are specific targets for security 
attacks; rather they believe that are 'targets of opportunity' 
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 A wide range of countermeasures are employed; generally, the larger the 
organisation the greater the diversity and complexity of countermeasures. 
However, the majority do not have a clear link between risks and 
countermeasures 
 The majority of the organisations do not have a specific security budget. 
 
The objectives of this research have been achieved, with improved insights into the 
effects of the information security in Australia having been gained. Practitioners now 
have a framework that enables them to obtain an in-depth understanding of 
information security threats, incidents, countermeasures, and then to apply 
appropriate countermeasures. 
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APPENDIX A – INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
 
Preliminary Information. 
 
Introductions 
 
Interviewer introduces himself as Warren Darragh. 
 
Purpose – I am conducting research as part of my dissertation for my Master of 
Information Technology degree, studied through the Faculty of Business and 
Commerce at the University of Southern Queensland. 
 
Topic – A study into IT Security in Australia – Computer, Data, and Network 
security in an Australian business context. 
 
Confidentiality – Confidentiality is assured. There will be no linkage between a 
specific organisation and the information it supplies. Only aggregate information will 
be used. Specific instances will be referred to in very general terms, „…. such as one 
large organisation‟ 
 
Interview recorded – It is my intention to use a mini-disc recorder and microphone 
to record this interview. The mini-disc and microphone are in plain sight. The reason 
for recording the interview is to ensure that the notes I take are accurate. It is also my 
intention to provide you with a copy of my notes to ensure that the information 
recorded is a true and accurate reflection of the interview. 
 
Duration – The expected duration of the interview is 45 minutes. 
 
Conduct of the interview – The interview will be conducted in five parts 
 
a. IT in your organisation 
 
b. Threats to computers, data, and networks in your organisation 
 
c. Computer, data, and network security incidents 
 
d. Security Practices and Procedures 
 
e. Your organisation 
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Section A - Use of IT within your organisation 
 
The aim of this part of the interview is to understand an organisation‟s level of 
reliance on Information Technology. The underlying question that needs to be asked 
in relation to Information Security is what is the impact or result of the loss of use of 
IT resources. 
 
Research Issue: 1 (Reliance on IT within an organisation). 
 
Tell me the story/about your organisation‟s reliance on IT? 
 
Possible probe questions/or points (ie what about, tell me about) 
 
 Reliance/level of. 
 Business and enhancement. 
 E-commerce. 
 B2B. 
 Intranet. 
 Training. 
 Customers/orders processed online? 
 What happens when it doesn‟t work? 
 
 
Section B - Threats to computers, data, and networks 
 
This section relates to RI 2 and 3. This section aims at identifying the type and nature 
of Information Security threats and how prevalent or serious they are. This section 
attempts to discover if organisations perceive that they are targeted for specific 
reasons, i.e. due to the type of organisation. 
 
Please tell me about the threats that your organisation‟s systems. Where do they 
originate from? 
 
Possible probe questions. 
 Individual hackers. 
 Organised groups of hackers. 
 Issue motivated groups. 
 Foreign governments. 
 System users. 
 Suppliers. 
 Competitors. 
 
 
Of these which would you describe as the most significant risk? 
 
How do you know about these threats? 
 Experience 
 Study 
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 Research. 
 
 
Do you believe that your organisation is targeted? Why? 
 
 
Section C - Computer, data, and network security incidents 
 
This section relates to RI 2 and 3. 
 
Section C, which deals with specific incidents may provide evidence that the 
organisation has been targeted. The comparison component of this research issue can 
only be answered by review previous research. 
 
Can you relate to me any experiences that your organisations may have had of 
computer, data, or network security incidents? 
 
 
Possible probe questions. 
 Viruses. 
 Employee Access abuse. 
 Theft or destruction of resources. 
 Leak incidents. 
 Data destruction. 
 Access abuses. 
 Unauthorised access. 
 Hacking. 
 
 
 
 
Please describe/detail which type of incident you believe is the most 
prevalent/significant? Why? 
 
 
Could you estimate the monetary value of any losses you have had as a result of any 
breaches 
Section D - Security Practices and Procedures 
 
This section relates to RI 4 and aims at discovering the systems, methods and 
techniques used by the organisation to protect themselves from information security 
incidents. 
 
Can you tell me how your organisation protects itself from the threat? 
 
 
Possible probe questions. 
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 Database of security incidents. 
 Conduct of investigations. 
 CERT. 
 Firewalls. 
 Risk Management. 
 IT Policy and procedures. 
 Training. 
 Disaster recovery plans. 
 
How much money would you estimate your organisation would spend on IT 
security? 
This question attempts to answer RI 5. 
 
 
Section E - Your Organisation 
This section gathers demographic information. 
 
What is your position title? _________________________________ 
What is the category of your organisation?_____________________ 
What is the mission of your organisation?______________________ 
What is the role of IT within your organisation?_________________ 
How long have you been with your organisation? 
 
 
Conclusion of interview 
 
Thank interviewee for allowing the interview. 
 
Assure of confidentiality. 
 
Remind if intention to send a record of the interview to ensure that the record is 
accurate. 
 
Ask if they want a copy of the aggregate results of the study. 
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APPENDIX B – SURVEY INSTRUMENT 
 
(Intentionally blank)
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Information Security 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An Australian survey 
 
This survey, which is sponsored by the University of Southern Queensland, will 
produce findings about Information Security in Australia, which should benefit you, 
and author organisations who rely on Information Technology. 
 
 
Please complete the following questions. If you wish to comment on any 
questions or qualify your answers, please use the space provided on the back 
cover. 
 
 
 
 
 
Section A: Information Technology in your Organisation 
Faculty of Business and Commerce 
University of Southern Queensland 
TOOWOOMBA QLD 4350 
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A1. My organisation’s networks are 
connected to the Internet (Please tick one 
box) 
□ Yes 
□ No 
A4. Does your organisation have written 
procedures governing the use of IT 
resources (Such as software manuals, 
rules for use etc)? (Please tick one box) 
□ Yes              □ Don’t Know 
□ No 
 
A2. What is your organisation’s annual IT&T 
budget? (Please tick one box) 
□ Less than $10 000 
□ $10 000 to $50 000 
□ $50 000 to $250 000 
□ $250 000 to $1 000 000 
□ More than $1 000 000 
A5. My organisation’s computing 
networks are connected to other 
companies’ networks? (Please tick one 
box) 
□ Yes              □ Don’t Know  
□ No 
A6. My organisation conducts business 
online? (Please tick one box) 
□ Yes              □ Don’t Know 
□ No 
 
A3. How many computers and computer 
network devices are connected to your 
organisation’s networks? (Please tick one 
box) 
□ Less than 50 
□ 50 to 200 
□ 200 to 500 
□ 500 to 1000 
□ 1000 to 5000 
□ More than 5000 
A7. My organisation has a web page? 
(Please tick one box) 
□ Yes              □ Don’t Know 
□ No 
A8. Do most users receive training on 
the use of IT resources including how to 
access data and use software packages? 
(Please tick one box) 
□ Yes              □ Don’t Know 
□ No 
 
  
  
  
  
 
The following statements describe possible objectives or uses of IT within an 
organisation. For each statement please indicate the extent to which it applies to your 
organisation. 
For each of the following statements, please tick the box which best describes your opinion. 
(Please rate your agreement or disagreement by ticking the appropriate box using the following scale) 
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1 = Strongly Agree 
2 = Agree 
3 = Neutral 
4 = Disagree 
5 = Strongly disagree 
NA = Not applicable 
   1 2 3 4 5 NA 
A9. IT Improves the operational 
effectiveness of my organisation. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ 
A10. IT Improves managerial effectiveness 
in my organisation. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ 
A11. IT networks improve information 
sharing in my organisation. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ 
A12. IT is an essential component of 
business operations. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ 
A13. If the IT doesn’t work the 
organisation does not work. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ 
A14. My organisation has little or no 
reliance on IT. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ 
A15. My organisation has a clearly defined 
IT management structure. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
A16. Would you like to make any other comments about the use of IT within your 
organisation? (Please use the space provided below) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please proceed to Section B Threats 
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Section B: Threats to Information Security 
This section relates to the threats that you perceive exist to computers, networks, and 
the data that reside on those systems. The threat, in relation to this study refers to 
who or what originates a computer or network security incident rather than the method 
employed (ie denial of service attack or data theft).  
For each of the following statements, please tick the box which best describes your 
opinion. 
(Please rate your agreement or disagreement by ticking the appropriate box using the 
following scale) 
1 = Strongly Agree 
2 = Agree 
3 = Neutral 
4 = Disagree 
5 = Strongly disagree 
NA = Not applicable 
   1 2 3 4 5 
 
NA 
B1. Individual hackers are a threat to my 
organisation’s computers, data, and networks. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ 
B2. Organised groups of hackers are a threat 
to my organisation’s computers, data, and 
networks. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ 
B3. Issue motivated groups are a threat to 
my organisation’s computers, data, and 
networks. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ 
B4. Foreign governments are a threat to my 
organisation’s computers, data, and networks. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ 
B5. My organisation’s competitors are a 
threat to my organisation’s computers, data, 
and networks. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ 
B6. Foreign business competitors are a 
threat to my organisation’s computers, data, 
and networks. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ 
B7. My organisation’s IT users are a threat 
to my organisation’s computers, data, and 
networks. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ 
B8. There is no threat to my organisation and 
its’ computing networks. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ 
B9. Overall, I would classify the threats to 
my organisation’s IT as significant. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ 
B10. My knowledge on the threats faced by 
my organisation is based on research. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ 
B11. My knowledge on the threats faced by 
my organisation is based on my experience. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ 
B12. My knowledge on the threats faced by 
my organisation is based on study and 
training on the topic. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ 
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B13. Which of the following threats do you perceive as potential threats (or likely 
threats) to your organisations IT resources? (More than one box may be ticked) 
     
Individual Hackers □ Computer Viruses □  
Organised groups of 
hackers □ 
Lack of security policy and 
procedures □  
Issue motivated groups □ 
Lack of adherence to 
security procedures □  
Competitors □ 
Lack of knowledge on 
security issues □  
Foreign competitors □ Apathy □  
Foreign governments □ 
Partners or suppliers with 
connectivity and access to 
your systems 
□  
Disgruntled employees □ 
Customers with connectivity 
and access to your systems □  
System users in 
General □ 
Lack of resources committed 
to security □  
 
B14. Would you like to make any other comments about the threats to the IT resources 
of your organisation? (Please use the space provided below) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please proceed to Section C: Information Security incidents. 
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Section C: Information Security Incidents 
The following questions relate to computer security incidents that have occurred at your organisation.  
C1. Has your organisation experienced any 
unauthorised use of its IT resources within the 
last 12 months? (Please tick one box) 
□ Yes              □ Don’t Know 
□ No     --------- Please go to Section D 
C6. How many of your recorded incidents 
originated from within the organisation? (Please 
tick one box) 
□ 1-5              □ 6 - 10      □ 11 - 20 
□ 21 – 50        □ 51 - 100 
□ More than 100 (please specify) 
 
C2. How many separate incidents have occurred? 
(Please tick one box) 
□ 1-5              □ 6 - 10      □ 11 - 20 
□ 21 – 50        □ 51 - 100 
□ More than 100 (please specify)  
C7. Please estimate the monetary value of losses 
that have resulted from breaches to your 
organisation’s Information Security (Include the 
costs of loss of resources, hardware, time, 
resources required to fix the problem) 
□ No losses   □ Less than $10 000 
□ $10 000 to $50 000 
□ $50 001 to $100 000 
□ $100 001 to $500 000 
□ More than $500 000 
□ Don’t know □ Intangible 
 
C3. How many of these incidents originated from 
outside the organisation? (Please tick one box) 
□ 1-5              □ 6 - 10      □ 11 - 20 
□ 21 – 50        □ 51 - 100 
□ More than 100 (please specify) 
C4. Was your organisation’s remote dial-in service 
a source of security attacks? (Please tick one box) 
□ Yes              □ Don’t Know 
□ No 
C8. Was your organisation’s Internet connection 
a source of security attacks? (Please tick one 
box) 
□ Yes              □ Don’t Know 
□ No  
C5. Was your organisation’s internal systems a 
source of security attacks? (Please tick one box) 
□ Yes              □ Don’t Know 
□ No 
 
 
C9. The number of security incidents in my 
organisation over the last 12 months has: (Please 
tick one box) 
□ Increased               □ Decreased 
□ Stayed the same     □ Don’t know 
 
 
C10. Which of the following incidents has your organisation experienced in the last 12 months? (More 
than one box may be ticked) 
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□ Viruses 
□ Information Leaks  
(Information being released to 
unauthorised parties) 
□ Theft of IT resources. (i.e. laptop 
theft) 
□ Destruction of IT resources 
(ie hard drives destroyed, CD-ROMS, 
computers etc) 
□ Theft or destruction of data (theft 
or deletion of organisational data) 
□ Unauthorised access by employees 
 
□ Industrial espionage 
(Security incidents, including those 
types that are listed in this question 
that you believe can be traced to 
competitors) 
□ Unauthorised use by contractors/suppliers/customers 
□ System Penetration from outside (Including breaking 
into company IT networks, system probes, defacing web 
sites, running programs, altering or modifying system 
settings) 
□ Denial of Service  
(Attack that stops or prevents system users from 
accessing resources) 
 
□ Financial fraud  
(The use of your organisation’s computer systems for 
personal financial benefit) 
□ Employee abuse of Internet 
(Accessing inappropriate web sites, general surfing instead 
of work) 
 
□ Other (Please specify) 
C11. Using the scale below please indicate your opinion as to where your security breaches have 
originated? 
 
1 = Very Likely 
2 = Likely 
3 = Neutral 
4 = Unlikely 
5 = Very Unlikely 
NA = Not applicable 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 NA 
Individual Hackers □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Organised groups of hackers □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Issue motivated groups □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Competitors □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Foreign competitors □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Suppliers □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Customers □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Foreign governments □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Disgruntled employees □ □ □ □ □ □ 
System users in General □ □ □ □ □ □ 
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On the scale indicated below, please indicate the frequency of attacks relating to the listed access 
points? 
1 = Least Frequent 
2 = Not Frequent 
3 = Frequent 
4 = Most Frequent 
NA = Not applicable 
 1 2 3 4 NA 
Internal systems □ □ □ □ □ 
Internet Access □ □ □ □ □ 
Remote dial-in access □ □ □ □ □ 
Other  
(specify, i.e. direct business to business 
link) 
□ □ □ □ □ 
C12. Were the Information Security incidents reported to an organisation 
outside of your company? (Please tick one box) 
□ Yes     Go to question C13         □ Don’t Know 
□ No      Go to question C14 
  
C13. Who did you report the incident(s) to? (More than one box may be 
ticked) 
□ Police             □ Customers    □ Suppliers       □ AusCERT 
□ Partners         □ Other (Please specify) 
(If you reported all incidents please proceed to Section D, otherwise 
proceed to question C14.) 
  
C14. Please indicate below your reasons for not reporting incidents? 
 
 
 
C15. Would you like to add any other comments about Information Security incidents? (Please use the 
space provided below) 
 
Section D: Security Practices and Procedures 
The following section relates to those IT security practices and procedures that your organisation 
has established in anticipation of likely threats or as a result of past incidents. 
D1. A database of security incidents 
is maintained by my organisation? 
(Please tick one box) 
□ Yes              □ Don’t Know 
□ No 
D6. My organisation has an IT security policy. (Please tick one 
box) 
□ Yes              □ Don’t Know 
□ No 
Master of Information Technology   
 
 
203 
D2. Security investigations are 
conducted by my organisation and 
action is taken to remedy problems? 
(Please tick one box) 
□ Yes              □ Don’t Know 
□ No 
D7. Training is conducted in my organisation on Information 
Security issues. (Please tick one box) 
□ Yes              □ Don’t Know 
□ No 
D3. My organisation is a subscriber 
to the Australian Computer 
Emergency Response Teams 
(AUSCERT) and they are an 
important part of my organisation’s’ 
IT security strategy? (Please tick 
one box) 
□ Yes              □ Don’t Know 
□ No (Please specify is there are 
any reasons why you choose not use 
AUSCERT’s services) 
 
 
 
 
D8. My organisation has a disaster recovery plan. (Please tick 
one box) 
□ Yes              □ Don’t Know 
□ No 
D9. My organisation has a business continuity plan. (Please tick 
one box) 
□ Yes              □ Don’t Know 
□ No 
D4. Encryption is used to protect 
data in my organisation? (Please tick 
one box) 
□ Yes              □ Don’t Know 
□ No 
D10. Consultants or external agencies are used to provide 
advice on Information Security related issues. (Please tick one 
box) 
□ Yes              □ Don’t Know 
□ No 
D5. My organisation uses firewalls 
to protect its networks? (Please tick 
one box) 
□ Yes              □ Don’t Know 
□ No 
D11. My organisation has an individual or group of people who 
are solely responsible for Information Security. (Please tick 
one box) 
□ Yes              □ Don’t Know 
□ No 
D12. Senior non-IT management are informed of Information Security incidents. (Please tick one 
box) 
□ Yes              □ Don’t Know 
□ No 
For each of the following statements, please tick the box which best describes your opinion. 
(Please rate your agreement or disagreement by ticking the appropriate box using the following scale) 
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1 = Strongly Agree 
2 = Agree 
3 = Neutral 
4 = Disagree 
5 = Strongly disagree 
NA = Not applicable 
 1 2 3 4 5 NA 
D13. My organisation takes Information Security 
seriously. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ 
D14. There are probably security incidents on my 
organisation’s computers, data, and networks that are 
not reported. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ 
D15. There are probably security incidents on my 
organisation’s computers, data, and networks that are 
not detected. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ 
D16. The measures employed by my organisation to 
ensure computer and network security are effective. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ 
D17. The number of computer and network related 
security incidents are increasing. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ 
      
D18. Please indicate in the boxes below the approximate amount of money your organisation commits 
to Information Security? (Please tick one box) 
□ Less than $10 000         □ $10 000 to $50 000   □ $50 000 to $100 000 
□ $100 000 to $500 000  □ Greater than $500 000 (Please Specify)  _____________________ 
 
 D19. Would you like to make any other comments on Information Security Practices and Procedures 
in your organisation? (Please use the space provided below) 
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SECTION E: Demographics 
These questions relate to the organisation that you work for. 
These questions are asked in order to make more valid 
inferences in relation to the findings of this research. The term 
‘organisation’ in this survey refers to your organisation, which is 
the Australian-based division or business unit that you see 
yourself as belonging to.  
 
E1. Please indicate the primary function 
performed by your organisation. 
(Please tick the nearest equivalent box) 
E2. What is your position title 
in the organisation? 
 
 
□ Manufacturing 
□ Wholesale and retail trade 
□ Financial Services 
□ Mining 
□ Transport and Storage 
□ Construction 
□ Business Services 
□ Communications and Media 
□ IT & T 
□ Agriculture/Forestry 
□ Government (Federal) 
□ Government (State) 
□ Government (Local) 
□ Other (Please specify) 
 
 
E3. What is the level of your 
position in the organisation? 
(Please tick the nearest 
equivalent) 
□ CEO 
□ Senior Management 
□ Middle Management 
□ Supervisory Level 
□ Other (Please specify) 
 
 
E4. Would you classify your 
position as an IT&T role or a 
management role? (Please tick 
appropriate box) 
□ IT & T 
□ Management 
  
E5. How long have you been 
with your organisation? (Please 
tick the nearest box) 
 
□ Less than 1 year 
□ 1 to 5 years 
□ 6 to 10 years 
□ More than 10 years 
A2. Approximately how many staff in total 
does your organisation employ? (Please tick 
one box) 
  
 
□ Less than 25 full-time staff or 
equivalent 
□ 25 to 49 full-time staff 
□ 50 to 99 full-time staff 
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E6. Approximately how many staff in total does your organisation employ? (Please tick one box) 
 
□ Less than 25 full-time staff or equivalent 
□ 25 to 49 full-time staff 
□ 50 to 99 full-time staff 
□ 100 to 499 full-time staff 
□ 500 to 2000 full-time staff 
□ More than 2000 full-time staff 
 
 
Are there any other comments you would like to make in relation to computer and 
network security? 
 
     
If you would like a copy of the research results please write your details in the box 
below (Confidentiality is assured). Or you can e-mail at wdarragh@bigpond.com stating 
that you would like a copy of the research results. 
 
     
     
That concludes the survey on computer and network. Thank you for 
taking the time to complete the questionnaire, you are making a 
significant contribution to knowledge in the area. Please use the reply 
paid envelope enclosed to return your response. 
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APPENDIX C - VIRTUAL INTERIEW 
 
(See next page)
Master of Information Technology   
 
 
208 
Virtual Interview Protocol 
Introduction 
Thank you for support research at the University of Southern 
Queensland. A virtual interview was designed in order to encourage the 
maximum amount of interview participation as possible. The primary 
method of data collection for this study is case based in-depth 
interviews. Where possible these interviews are conducted face-to-face. 
Given the potential sensitive nature of the topic and a number of 
fundamental limitations (such as travel and time), this technique has 
been designed to increase the participants. The more participants the 
more accurate the data is. 
   
Confidentiality – Confidentiality is assured. There will be no linkage 
between a specific organisation and the information it supplies. Only 
aggregate information will be used. Specific instances will be referred to 
in very general terms, ‘…. such as one large organisation’ 
   
Interview recorded – The face-to-face interviews are recorded. The 
virtual interview keeps a transcript of what you type and sends it to the 
researchers via e-mail when you hit the submit button. The transcript 
will then be coded and analysed using a number of software techniques 
that have been specifically designed for this kind of research. 
Duration – Depending on how fast you type and how much you have to tell 
us, the expected duration of the virtual interview is 45 minutes.  
Conduct  
Conduct of the interview – The interview will be conducted in five parts   
a.                  IT in your organisation 
b.                  Threats to computers, data, and networks in your organisation 
c.                  Computer, data, and network security incidents 
d.                  Security Practices and Procedures 
Master of Information Technology   
 
 
209 
e.                  Your organisation 
The sections have been designed to ensure that the defined research 
issues for the study are answered. 
General Instructions 
In each area you will be presented with a general question followed by a 
series of dot points which are given as possible probe points/issues or 
questions. Please consider how these issues relate to your organisation in 
context with the stated question. There is no need to feel limited by the 
probe questions. They are designed merely to give guidance on the 
question. Please add any additional points or issues that you feel fit the 
question(s). Each question has a scrolling textbox in which you can type 
your response. You will need to use your mouse to select each of the text 
areas, however you can use the [ENTER] key to create new lines within 
the text. You may wish to quickly view the scope of the questions asked 
in each component of the Virtual Interview so that you can better target 
your responses to each area. 
  
The virtual interview begins........  
   
Use of IT within your organisation 
   
In the box below please tell the story of your organisations 
organisation’s reliance on IT. ie How reliant is your organisation on IT? 
 Possible probe questions/or points (ie what about, tell me about etc) 
 Reliance/level of.  
 What is the scale of IT use in terms of the number of users and 
the number of computer etc?  
 Business and enhancement.  
 E-commerce.  
 B2B.  
 Intranet.  
 Customers/orders processed online?  
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 What happens when the IT doesn’t work?  
 Do you have a web site?  
   
 
   
Threats to computers, data, and networks 
   
Please describe the threats to your organisation’s systems. Where do 
they originate from? 
Possible probe questions.  
 Individual hackers.  
 Organised groups of hackers.  
 Issue motivated groups.  
 Foreign governments.  
 System users.  
 Suppliers.  
 Competitors.  
 Viruses  
 Poor quality code?  
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Of these which would you describe as the most significant risk? 
Why? 
   
How do you know about these threats? 
 Experience?  
 Study?  
 Research?  
 Other?  
   
   
Do you believe that your organisation is targeted? Why? 
 
Computer, data, and network security incidents 
This section deals with actual Information Security incidents as they 
may have occurred within your organisation.  
   
Can you relate to us any experiences that your organisations may 
have had of computer, data, or network security incidents? 
Possible probe questions.  
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 Viruses.  
 Employee Access abuse.  
 Theft or destruction of resources (including PC/Laptops).  
 Leak incidents.  
 Data destruction.  
 Access abuses.  
 Unauthorised access.  
 Hacking.  
 Other.  
   
Please describe/detail which type of incident you believe is the most 
prevalent/significant? Why?  
   
   
Could you estimate the monetary value of any losses you have had as 
a result of any breaches? 
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Security Practices and Procedures 
This section deals with the general countermeasures that your 
organisation uses in order to protect itself from the threat of 
information security related threats.  
Can you describe how your organisation protects itself from the 
threat? What countermeasures do you employ? 
Possible probe questions.   
 Database of security incidents.  
 Conduct of investigations.  
 Security staff (how many)?  
 CERT.  
 Firewalls.  
 IDS  
 IT Policy and procedures.  
 Training.  
 Disaster recovery plans.  
 AS/NZS 7799  
 Other standards.  
 Other counter measures.  
 
   
How much money would you estimate your organisation would spend on 
IT security in a 12 month period? 
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Your Organisation 
The final part of the virtual interview is designed to gather information 
about your organisation. This information is used merely to allow 
accurate comparisons and benchmarks of similar sized organisations 
operating within similar industries. 
What is your position title?   
 
What is the industry sector of your organisation? 
 
Are you a government or a private organisation? 
 
How many staff (approx) are there in your organisation? 
 
What is the mission of your organisation? 
 
What is the role of IT within your organisation (ie support, etc)? 
 
How long have you been with your organisation? 
 
Please include your e-mail address so we can send you a transcript of the 
interview (to ensure that it is accurate) and also to address any issues 
that may require clarification.  
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Conclusion of interview 
Thank you for answering the questions and supporting research at the 
University of Southern Queensland. 
Again, I assure you that the information gathered by this research is to 
be used only for research purposes, and will in no way be linked to you 
personally or your organisation. 
Would you like to make any comments about this research topic or 
mention anything else that you have yet to state? If so please use the 
box below.  
 
   
   
  
  
  
  
Submit Form Reset Form
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APPENDIX D – LETTER TO PARTICIPANTS 
«Title» «FirstName» «LastName» 
«JobTitle» 
«Company» 
«City» «State» «PostalCode» 
 
 
Dear «Title» «LastName» 
 
 
Information Security in Australia 
 
A good understanding of computer and network security is essential to ensure that 
Information Technology and Telecommunications systems and devices are used in 
an effective and efficient manner. Recent media coverage has highlighted that some 
companies are vulnerable to computer network attacks, viruses, and in extreme cases 
to industrial espionage. Much of the current knowledge on computer and network 
security and security related incidents originates from international sources. There 
has been little informative data gathered in Australia.   In order to redress the current 
information vacuum in this area and to enable Australian IT managers to make more 
informed decisions in regards computer and network security issues the University of 
Southern Queensland is conducting research in this area. 
 
Your organisation has been specifically chosen because the nature of your business 
makes information and information technology important to you. The information 
gathered in this research will enable organisations like yours to make better-informed 
decisions regarding information security. Importantly, it will provide clearer 
information to enable you decide what resources should be committed to combating 
information security problems such as hackers, computer viruses, and industrial 
espionage. 
We would be most grateful if you could participate by taking part in two short 
interviews. We require access to two IT managers or IT security staff within your 
organisation. Each interview is expected to last approximately sixty minutes. The 
results will be analysed and form the basis of a dissertation on information security. 
 
Information gathered in the interviews will be kept strictly confidential. The results 
will be published in aggregate form only and we can assure you that there will be no 
means by which your organisation or employees could be identified. Our aim is to 
accurately articulate the current state of play in regards to information security 
problems and issues that Australian business faces. All participants will be making a 
significant contribution to the current knowledge in the field. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I would like to thank you in advance for your participation in the study. Should you 
have any questions, please feel free to contact Warren Darragh on 07 3332 7833 or 
Dr Andy Koronios on 07 46311266. If you are willing to take part of the research we 
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would greatly appreciate it if you could contact us so arrangements can be made for 
the conduct of the interviews. Further information for participants can be found on 
the Internet at the following address:  
 
http://www.connect.usq.edu.au/students/q9520838/security.htm 
 
Yours sincerely 
Warren Darragh      Dr Andy Koronios 
Student       Associate Professor 
Department of Information Systems   Department of Information Systems 
Faculty of Business and Commerce   Faculty of Business and Commerce 
07 3332 7833      07 46311266 
wdarragh@bigpond.com     koronios@usq.edu.au 
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APPENDIX E – EXAMPLE INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT 
 
(See following page)
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Section One 1 
 2 
Use of IT within your organisation 3 
 4 
In the box below please tell the story of your organisations organisation's reliance on 5 
IT. ie How reliant is your organisation on IT? Possible probe questions/or points (ie 6 
what about, tell me about etc) 7 
 8 
Reliance/level of. 9 
What is the scale of IT use in terms of the number of users and the number of 10 
computer etc? 11 
Business and enhancement. 12 
E-commerce. 13 
B2B. 14 
Intranet. 15 
Customers/orders processed online? 16 
What happens when the IT doesn't work?Do you have a web site? 17 
 18 
 19 
Department of State Development has 900 employees, it is a distributed 20 
environment. We have 18 regional offices that are located around Queensland. We 21 
have 10 international offices. There are approximately 500 - 600 staff employeed 22 
within the central business district itself. 23 
The network is large and it is shared with the Department of Premiers and Cabinet, 24 
they have approx 800 people as well. They have similar types of regional offices here 25 
in Qld they have no international offices.  26 
It is largely a NT4 Client/Server Network. We have a central firewall system located 27 
in Brisbane and then each of the international offices  has its own firewall. The 28 
network comprises of a WAN regionally that is linked by ATM/frame relay that is 29 
provided by Telstra. The overseas networks are linked back to Australia using VPN 30 
over the internet. 31 
 32 
The state development assets base is approximately $6M is capital. 33 
 34 
The organisation runs three major ERP packages. They being SAP for financials, HR 35 
which Aurion we have a business package, called DSD online, it comprises three 36 
components. There is a CRM component, which is applix, which is all the work flow 37 
and history of all of the departments clients. Its a new project, it has been rolled out 38 
to about 200 people as a stage 1 client. Subject to the success of that it will rollout to 39 
the remainder of the department. At the moment it is looking very good. There is also 40 
a component called smart license, gives the ability for businesses to register online it 41 
is a brockerage for a number of other government departments. It allows people to do 42 
all the things they need, get permits etc to start up a business. 43 
 44 
There is a third part which is called the virtual campus which is actually an online 45 
learning facility and thats there so that business can register to do training such as, 46 
'how to write a business plan', and that comprises DSDonline, which is provides 47 
services throughout QLd. 48 
 49 
The whole organisation is structured around the IT infrastructure if the infrastructure 50 
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doesn't work then nothing gets done. I could use a recent example when we had a fire 51 
in the south of Brisbane that cut the electricity the building went down and we had to 52 
wait for the generators to come up, there was a problem with the generators because 53 
when it came up it blew a circuit and what happened was that systems in one of our 54 
buildings was done for half a day and what it meant was that no one could do any 55 
work and basically we gave the option to go home or do filing. 56 
 57 
If the systems doesnt work then the organisation doesnt work because it can't access 58 
its files and records and the records management system is a paper based system but 59 
it is indexed electronically. So no access to the computer screen and there are no 60 
manual processes there to be used. 61 
 62 
State Development has an induction course. As part of the induction course they get 63 
given an account. Now that accoutn is only good for a five day period at the of that 5 64 
day period they have to go attend what we cal a quick start course and that introduces 65 
them to basic applications in the department, its the office suite and it also talks 66 
about internet and computer security issues. If they don't complete that course in the 67 
first five days then their account permissions are revoked until they attend that 68 
course. The course is an internal course. 69 
 70 
With regards the enterprise packages, those courses are conducted by the particular 71 
areas and are conducted on an as required basis. Classes on DSDonline, as a new 72 
product are being run at 20 students per time. People don't get the icon on their 73 
screens until they have done the course. They have to trainied to use it. We use the 74 
profiles and groups features of the operating systems to deny people access until they 75 
have been trained. 76 
 77 
 78 
 79 
Section Two 80 
 81 
Threats to computers, data, and networks 82 
 83 
Please describe the threats to your organisation's systems. Where do they originate 84 
from?Possible probe questions. 85 
Individual hackers. 86 
Organised groups of hackers. 87 
Issue motivated groups. 88 
Foreign governments. 89 
System users. 90 
Suppliers. 91 
Competitors. 92 
Viruses 93 
Poor quality code? 94 
 95 
 96 
We have four threats. 97 
1. The internal threat of the disastisfied user. 98 
2. External threat from someone who will try and write a viruses and try and infect 99 
the system. 100 
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3. The natural disaster threat, thats beyond our control. 101 
4. Because we operate in overseas countries is the people who live in those countries. 102 
 103 
These threats determine how we structure to operate the IT environment. 104 
 105 
We have only had one instance of a hacker. That was the code red - virus, where this 106 
was released and actually appeared on one of our internal systems. Because we are 107 
an international organisation it doesn't look good for people to be greeted that this 108 
site has been hacked by the chinese. We actually tend to look at that a little more 109 
seriously then perhaps a normal user. 110 
 111 
 112 
 113 
Of these which would you describe as the most significant risk? Why? 114 
 115 
The one that is giving us the most trouble is viruses. 116 
I would put the risks in order of Viruses first, natural disaster second, internal and 117 
international equal third. They are the low risk. 118 
 119 
 120 
How do you know about these threats? 121 
Experience? 122 
Study? 123 
Research? 124 
Other? 125 
 126 
 127 
As part of the organisations' task we are actually responsible to do the business 128 
continuity plan, and as part of the business continuity plan we do a risk assessment, 129 
with regard to network vulnerabilities. We also do it with regard to specific 130 
applications so we go to the business units and say give us your priorities for 131 
restoration should the system go down, you know how critical is this business 132 
application to your system, we then equate the ERP, e-mail, explorer, those kinds of 133 
things, it interesting that each of the business systems, as we go around to the 134 
business units that the risk is not so much someone placing something into the e-mail 135 
system its the person who used to have access to the payroll system for example, the 136 
person who has access to the financial system. 137 
 138 
Internally we do our own reviews. We believe that the only way we will know what 139 
is really going on is to go and ask the questions ourselves. With regard to viruses and 140 
hacking we actually engage third parties. We check on maintainence and virus 141 
reports so we can go through and determine what viruses are coming, what have been 142 
identified. We also conduct discussions with the Queensland University of 143 
Technology and talk to Prof Caelli and his team and Mark Lui, we have discussed 144 
the opportunities with organisations such as AUSCERT, however, we haven't really 145 
seen the value in what they can provide.  146 
 147 
We don't really see any benefit in AUSCERT as their services are available through a 148 
maintenance agreement with a number of the software and virus packages that we 149 
have anyway. 150 
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We haven't joined AUSCERT. Its not worth our while. 151 
 152 
 153 
Do you believe that your organisation is targeted? Why? 154 
 155 
 156 
 157 
No evidence of that. We run our own packages to actually check for that. 158 
Historically, its mainly university students trying out the theories that they have 159 
learnt. Looking at the firewall logs that every university in Australia is represented 160 
on there. There is a lot spam activity that comes up against the firewall, but there has 161 
been no evidence of any specific attacks, other than lets visit and see what we can do 162 
and once they realise that its a firewall on the front of it they tend to go away. 163 
 164 
 165 
Section Three 166 
 167 
Computer, data, and network security incidents 168 
 169 
This section deals with actual Information Security incidents as they may have 170 
occurred within your organisation. 171 
 172 
Can you relate to us any experiences that your organisations may have had of 173 
computer, data, or network security incidents? 174 
Possible probe questions. 175 
Viruses. 176 
Employee Access abuse. 177 
Theft or destruction of resources (including PC/Laptops). 178 
Leak incidents. 179 
Data destruction. 180 
Access abuses. 181 
Unauthorised access. 182 
Hacking. 183 
Other. 184 
 185 
 186 
Code red Virus. The departments web site is hosted externally by web central. What 187 
happened was that our web development people actually managed that server and 188 
even though they had received the warnings to update the service packs on that 189 
server for code red is that they hadnt done it and so when code red was released it 190 
affected that server by dropping it off the air. We had to close it down and re-build it. 191 
The reason that accurred whilst there was an awareness of the protective measures 192 
they had not followed through within the time frame that they were required to do it. 193 
So basically, we have instigated a new set of checks and balances to check on that. 194 
 195 
The other one was the Nimda virus, with that one it actually got inside our system. 196 
As soon as that happened we cut all external links out to the world and erradicated 197 
the virus and rebuilt the systems and the re-opened up the systems. That one was 198 
particularly interesting as not only did we have to do it in the central computing 199 
system but we also had to do it in each of the nine offices and then internationally 200 
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and clean those ones as well. 201 
 202 
Qld audit are on top of access issues. The biggest issues are people attempting to go 203 
to unauthorised web sites. There is an internal audit program that is right on top of 204 
that. 205 
 206 
Theft is an issues, mainly from an external point of view. We have had instances of 207 
people breaking into buildings and stealing laptops, in the last 6 months we have lost 208 
two, in last 12 months there was something like 78 reported incidents of thefts of 209 
laptops in the cbd of brisbane. 210 
 211 
PC vault stops people from accessing information if machine is stolen. 212 
 213 
Electronic mail stuff has slipped out of the media and appeared in the bottom line. 214 
 215 
 216 
 217 
Please describe/detail which type of incident you believe is the most 218 
prevalent/significant? Why? 219 
 220 
Viruses are the most prevelant. We do updates frequently. Because we have 221 
problems getting people to log on and off, we had to write a script to get machines to 222 
log out automatically. Automatic updates are occuring. 223 
 224 
 225 
Could you estimate the monetary value of any losses you have had as a result of any 226 
breaches? 227 
 228 
Don't put a monetary value on it. We have lost probably 2 weeks over the last 229 
financial year. 230 
 231 
 232 
Section Four 233 
 234 
 235 
Security Practices and Procedures 236 
 237 
This section deals with the general countermeasures that your organisation uses in 238 
order to protect itself from the threat of information security related threats. 239 
Can you describe how your organisation protects itself from the threat? What 240 
countermeasures do you employ? 241 
Possible probe questions.  242 
Database of security incidents. 243 
Conduct of investigations. 244 
Security staff (how many)? 245 
CERT. 246 
Firewalls. 247 
IDS 248 
IT Policy and procedures. 249 
Training. 250 
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Disaster recovery plans. 251 
AS/NZS 7799 252 
Other standards. 253 
Other counter measures. 254 
 255 
 256 
Queensland Government has a significant information security standard. Called 257 
information standard 18, it available on the web, its a generic document that each 258 
department has to apply, in some cases it is specific, and other places it is generic. 259 
 260 
We use the following: 261 
Passwords 262 
User Accounts 263 
Specific approvals for remote access 264 
Policies 265 
Firewalls, DMZ, Covered circuits (VPN) 266 
Closed networks, that compartmentalised. 267 
Physical security 268 
Backup and storage off-site 269 
specific security areas that are discrete and not accessible. 270 
Compartmentalised information, 271 
Virus software. 272 
Clearances for contractors, staff put into clauses on contracts. 273 
Firewalls logs. 274 
Third party auditors to review the system and checks. 275 
Staff training 276 
Security advisers 277 
Configuration control 278 
Risk management used to determine how we do. 279 
Disaster Recovery Plan. (Separate Facility) 280 
We have a database of security incidents 281 
We have a security professional, and he can do investigations 282 
We run security applications. 283 
Physical systems are located in all of our buildings, buildings have CCTV 284 
Only IDS on firewalls and logs and inspected by FM team 285 
USed AS/NZ 7799. 286 
 287 
How much money would you estimate your organisation would spend on IT security 288 
in a 12 month period? 289 
 290 
Facilities management contract includes all. 291 
50-100K for software. 292 
About 200 000 per year. 293 
Its an ongoing investment. 294 
Security is a cost of doing business these days. 295 
 296 
 297 
 298 
Section Five 299 
 300 
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Your Organisation 301 
 302 
What is your position title? 303 
 304 
Director  IM 305 
 306 
 307 
What is the industry sector of your organisation? 308 
 309 
Lage Government 310 
 311 
Are you a government or a private organisation? 312 
 313 
Government 314 
 315 
How many staff (approx) are there in your organisation? 316 
 317 
600 318 
 319 
 320 
 321 
What is the mission of your organisation? 322 
 323 
Grow qld globally to create to more jobs and a better environment for qld 324 
 325 
 326 
What is the role of IT within your organisation (ie support, etc)? 327 
 328 
Business enabler 329 
 330 
How long have you been with your organisation? 331 
 332 
4 years 333 
 334 
 335 
E-Mail address 336 
 337 
 338 
 339 
 340 
Comments 341 
 342 
 343 
FILEEND  344 
 345 
 346 
   347 
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APPENDIX F – THANK YOU E-MAIL TO PARTICIPANTS 
 
Thank you for your participation in our research.  
Below is the transcript for your interview. Please indicate if it  
is a correct record of your comments and responses. 
If you have not already done so, could you please have another relevant 
member of your organisation take part in the virtual interview. 
 
Thank you again for your participation in this valuable research opportunity.  
  
  
regards 
  
Warren Darragh 
  
  
<begin transcript> 
 
